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INTRODUCTION

We have been living with Article 9, more or less happily, for at
least thirty years.' While Article 9 does not enjoy the jurisprudential
vogue of Article 2,2 its distinguished intellectual lineage and enor1. The first version of the U.C.C. enacted nationally was the 1962 Official Text, but
earlier versions circulated as early as 1952. Grant Gilmore, who played a leading role in
drafting Article 9, regarded 1950 as the U.C.C.'s intellectual birth date. See 1 GRANT
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 288-89 (1965). By Gilmore's
reckoning, we have been living with Article 9 for over forty years.
An amended version of Article 9 was promulgated as the 1972 Official Text. Every state
except Vermont has enacted some version of the 1972 text. For convenience, my citations to
the "1972 Code" will refer to the most recent edition. See A.L.I., NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1990 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH
COMMENTS. I refer to the 1962 and pre-1962 versions of the Code by including the date of the
text in question.
2. The U.C.C. has attracted a good deal of self-consciously jurisprudential attention. Yet
most of this literature has focused on Article 2, apparently assuming that the treatment of sales
is paradigmatic for the Code as a whole. See, e.g., DONALD KING, THE NEW
CONCEPTUALISM OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1968) (dealing almost exclusively
with concepts operating within Article 2); Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975) (primarily a comment on the
jurisprudence of Article 2); John L. Gedid, U. CC Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at
the Code, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341 (1988) (examining interpretive methodology in
context of Article 2). While commentators have made important theoretical investigations of
Article 9, see, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and
PrioritiesAmong Creditors,88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979), students of jurisprudence find the law of
secured transactions less attractive. Exceptions, of course, exist. See David G. Carlson,
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mous practical importance keep it constantly before the eyes of
courts3 and commentators.4 At this late date, we could be forgiven
our assumption that we know the statute like the backs of our hands.
In this paper, however, I contend that prevailing accounts are completely--or at least three-quarters-wrong. Dominant interpretations

have misconstrued Article 9's principal substantive provision, section
9-201, which states that, except as otherwise provided by the Code
itself, "a security agreement is effective . . . between the parties,
against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors." Influenced
by Article 9's broad statement that it "applies ...to any transaction
(regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest

in personal property or fixtures," 5 numerous courts 6 and commentators7 have assumed that section 9-201 establishes a presumption that a
Rationality,Accident and Priority Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 MINN.
L. REV. 207 (1986) (examining Article 9 from perspective of "legal existentialism"); Dennis
M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance and
Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 335 (1988) (examining Article 9 from
perspective of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language).
3. See Barkley Clark, Survey: Uniform Commercial Code-Secured Transactions, 42
Bus. LAW. 1333, 1333 (1987) (Article 9 is typically the "most heavily litigated portion" of the
U.C.C.).

Cf DAVID EPSTEIN ET AL., BASIC UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TEACHING

MATERIALS 21 (3d ed. 1988) ("Article 9 is not only the 'most novel' and 'most important'
article of the Uniform Commercial Code, it is also the most criticized and the most
amended.") (footnotes omitted).
4. Article 9 has inspired a number of excellent and comprehensive treatises. See
BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991); PETER COOGAN ET AL., SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1987); GILMORE, supra note 1;
RAY D. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE U.C.C. (2d ed.
1979); ROBERT HILLMAN ET AL., COMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE chs. 18-26 (1985 & Supp. 1991); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (3d ed. 1988) (chapters 21-25).

5. U.C.C. § 9-102(l)(a) (1987). The Official Comment reinforces this, stating that § 9102 "bring[s] all consensual security interests ... under this Article." Id. § 9-102(1)(a) cmt. I
(emphasis added).
6. See, e.g., Griffin v. Continental Am. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 671, 673 (11th Cir. 1984)
(app.) (§ 9-201 is a "keystone rule" that "give[s] the Article 9 secured party, upon a debtor's
default, priority over 'anyone, anywhere, anyhow,' except as provided by the remaining Code
priority rules.") (quoting Special Project: The Priority Rules of Article Nine, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 834, 842 (1977); May v. G.M.B., Inc., 778 P.2d. 424, 427 (Nev. 1989) ("UCC's so-called
'golden rule' . . . is found in [section 9-201]") (quoting JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 901 (1972);

Federal Depositors Ins. Corp. v. Yates, 719 S.W. 2d 481, 484 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) ("Article 9
'begins with the assumption that an unperfected security interest is good against the world.' ")
(quoting THOMAS M. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW
DIGEST § 9-301[A][8] (1978)).
7. For a recent example, see David G. Carlson, Bulk Sales Under Article 9: Some Easy
Cases Made Difficult, 41 ALA. L. REV. 729, 735 n.13 (1990) [hereinafter Bulk Sales] ("the
residual rule in section 9-201 ...provides that secured parties always win unless some specific
provision of the UCC says otherwise"). Cf DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON,

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:951

security interest' prevails in every sort of dispute with a competing
claim. This presumption is rebuttable, but only by "specific proviSECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 330 (2d ed. 1987) ("[Section] 9-201 provides

that, as a general matter, a secured creditor prevails against all other parties, once its interest
attaches .... ); 2 THOMAS M. QUINN, QUINN'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY
AND LAW DIGEST § 9-201[A][1] (1991) (under § 9-201, security agreement binds "not only
... the contracting parties but third persons as well"); id. § 9-301[A] ("All disputes regarding
the collateral would end right there [i.e., with § 9-201] save for the proviso that the rule applies
'except as otherwise provided by this Act.' "); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 24-2
(section 9-201 "means what it says, and the secured creditor, even an unperfected secured
creditor, has greater rights in his collateral than any other creditor unless Article Nine
provides otherwise"); David G. Carlson, Death and Subordination Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: Senior Buyers and Senior Lien Creditors, 5 CARDOZO L. REV.
547, 563 (1984) [hereinafter Death and Subordination] ("The thrust of... [§ 9-201] is that a
security interest lives on perpetually unless a UCC provision says otherwise."); John F. Dolan,
Good Faith Purchase and Warehouse Receipts: Thoughts on the Interplay of Articles 2, 7, and 9
of the UCC, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 32-38 (1978); Steven L. Harris, The Rights of Creditors Under
Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REV. 803, 865 (1988) (§ 9-201 "is written in broad enough language to
suggest that a secured party always takes priority," although this "is subject to the rest of the
Code.") (footnote omitted); Ingrid M. Hillinger, The Treatment of Consignments in
Bankruptcy: Two Codes and Their Fictions, at Play, in the Fields, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 73, 86 n.
59 ("Section 9-201 ... provides that unless Article 9 provides otherwise, the security interest is
effective against everyone."); Thomas Ward, Ordering the Judicial Process Lien and the
Security Interest Under Article Nine: Meshing Two Different Worlds Part I - Secured Parties
and Post-Judgment Process Creditors, 31 ME. L. REV. 223, 231 (1980); Dan Coenan, et al.,
Special Project, The Priority Rules ofArticle Nine, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 834, 842 (1977) ("the
holder of an Article Nine security interest has rights in the claimed collateral superior to
anyone, anywhere, anyhow").
There are occasional dissents from the Received View. One very early commentator
observed that, although "[s]ection 9-201 does state that the security agreement is valid as
against third parties except as provided in Article 9[,] [t]his provision seems to be directed at
third parties asserting rights to the goods subsequent to the creation and perfection of the
security interest." William E. Hogan, The Marriage of Sales to Chattel Security in the Uniform
Commercial Code: Massachusetts Variety, 38 B.U. L. REV. 571, 591 (1958). More recently,
Professor McDonnell has stated that "[s]ection 9-201 does not embody a negotiability
principle that automatically gives secured creditors priority over all prior legal and equitable
claims to property not dealt with in Article 9." Peter F. Coogan & Julian B. McDonnell, The
Intelligent Lawyer's Guide to Secured Transactions After More Than Three Decades Under the
Code, in COOGAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 2.08[2]. Professor Baird and Dean Jackson have
said, in connection with § 9-201, that "someone with a perfected security interest in property
that the debtor already owns has an interest in the property superior to almost anyone whose
rights arise at a later time." BAIRD & JACKSON, supra, at 76 (emphasis supplied). This not
quite the same as saying that a secured party (or purported secured party) presumptively is
subject to any rights that arise before the security interest attaches. Baird and Jackson here
seem close to recognizing the limited scope of § 9-201. I am not sure how to reconcile this with
their statement quoted above.
8. Section 9-201 refers by its terms only to the effectiveness of a "security agreement."
However, as one early and meticulous commentator pointed out, Article 9 actually lays down
rules governing the consequences of the security interests that a "security agreement" creates
or for which it provides. See Peter F. Coogan, A Suggested Analytical Approach to Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1963). Following Coogan, I will
treat § 9-201 as laying down a rule regarding the effectiveness of security interests.
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sion[s]" of the U.C.C. that require a different result. 9 My thesis is
that this expansive reading-the "Received View" of section 9-201overstates the intended scope of Article 9 and distorts interpretation

of fundamental Code provisions regarding the attachment and priority of security interests.
My critique of the Received View focuses on the four basic "Scenarios" in which a purported Article 9 security interest collides with a
competing claim."0 In the first two Scenarios, a purported secured
party is pitted against someone to whom the debtor 1 has also pur9. See U.C.C. § 9-201 cmt. 1 (1987).
10. The present study does not discuss disputes in which the secured party and the
competing person assert claims to or under different titles. Suppose, for example, that Finder
finds a diamond ring on the street. Finder acquires an original title to the ring, but this title is
inferior to that of Loser, the person who lost the ring. Finder can grant Bank a security
interest on his title to the ring, but this security interest is not enforceable against Loser, who
has a separate and superior title. Although commercial law scholarship has said little
regarding "multiple titles" cases, I presume that Article 9 does not govern such disputes.
Under general property-law principles, Loser's title to the ring prevails against Bank's valid
and perfected security interest on Finder'stitle, even though the Code does not so indicate.
In another important class of cases, commentators have recognized a second unstated
limitation on the scope of Article 9. These disputes involve a single title, but two purported
debtors. Such cases must be determined using general property-law principles, even though
the language of Article 9, e.g., § 9-312(5), seems to apply. See, e.g., Bank of the West v.
Commercial Credit Fin. Serv., Inc., 852 F.2d 1162, 1171-74 (9th Cir. 1988); CLARK, supra
note 4, § 3.08[4] ("The Dual Debtor Dilemma"); Steven L. Harris, The Interactionof Articles
6 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Study of Conveyancing, Priorities,and Code
Interpretation, 39 VAND. L. REV. 179, 222-25 (1986); Charles H. Oldfather, Floor Plan
FinancingUnder Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 U. KAN. L. REV. 571, 582-84
(1966); Robert H. Skilton, Security Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 925, 948.
This paper does not deal with these limitations on the scope of Article 9. Rather, it
focuses on cases involving a single title and a single debtor. Until now, there has been no
systematic scrutiny of the assumption that Article 9 governs these cases.
11. I will use "debtor" to refer to the person who purports to grant the security interest,
whether or not the Code makes the purported grant effective. The Code, in contrast, defines
"debtor" as either "the person who owes payment or other performance of the obligations
secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral" or "the owner of the
collateral," depending on the context. U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(d) (1987). In addition to being
confusing, this definition often does not comport with Article 9's actual use of "debtor."
Section 9-203(l)(c), for example, provides that a security interest cannot attach unless "the
debtor" has "rights in the collateral." If "debtor" is defined to mean "the owner of the
collateral," this requirement will always be satisfied. This cannot be what the drafters
intended. Section 9-203(l)(c) obviously anticipates that situations will arise in which the
"debtor" does not have "rights in the collateral," with the consequence that the attempt to
create the security interest will not succeed. In such cases, the person that § 9-203(1) calls the
"debtor" does not fit the definition set out in § 9-105(l)(d) ("the owner of the collateral"). My
definition of "debtor" as the person who purports to create the security interest accommodates
§ 9-203(l)(c) and other provisions that determine whether a purported security interest will
actually attach.
The confusion in the Code's definition of "debtor" is not an isolated lapse. Cf Coogan &
McDonnell, supra note 7, § 2.08[l] (observing that § 9-203(l)(c)'s use of "collateral" is
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portedly made a transfer. The difference between the two Scenarios is
one of timing. In the first Scenario, the "Subsequent-Transferee Scenario," the debtor makes its transfer to the rival claimant after having
granted a security interest to the secured party.12 In the second situation, the "Antecedent-Transferee Scenario," the transfer to the rival
claimant precedes the purported grant to the would-be secured
party. 13 In the third situation, the "Antecedent-Transferor Scenario,"
the configuration of the parties is quite different. The rival claimant
does not trace her claim back to a transfer from the debtor, but rather
to a transfer from some independent source. What connects the rival
claimant to the debtor is her transfer to the debtor of some limited
interest relating to her own interest. After this transfer, the debtor
purports to grant a security interest to the would-be secured party. 14
circular unless that term means purported collateral). For a classic critique of the Code's
ambiguity and occasional unintelligibility, see David Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 77 YALE L. J. 185 (1967).
12. For example, suppose that the debtor grants a security interest to Bank on March 1.
On March 15, the debtor suffers the attachment of a judicial lien in favor of Finance Company
on the same property to which Bank's security interest already attached. Finance Company,
now a judicial lien creditor, is a "subsequent transferee." In a diagram:
•

.

I

de bt r

o

]tm

time
judicial lien taken by
Finance Company
[March15 ]

security interest
granted to Bank
[March 1]

]Finance Company
"subsequenttransferee"
13. Here suppose that a judicial lien attaches in favor of Finance Company on April 1.
The debtor then purports to grant a security interest on that property to Bank on April 20.
Finance Company is an "antecedent transferee." In a diagram:
time
debtor
security interest
judical lien taken by
granted to Bank
Finance Company
[April20]
[April 11

"antecedenttransferee"

1

1

14. Suppose that someone with title to a tractor enters into a lease with the debtor on May
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In the fourth situation, the "Set-Off Scenario," the rival claimant is a
creditor who asserts a power to set off the amount she is owed against
a debt that she owes the debtor.I5 Her dispute with the secured party
arises because the secured party has a security interest on the debtor's
interest in the obligation that the rival claimant 6 is trying to reduce
by setting off.
The Received View is that section 9-201's presumption favors the
purported secured party in allfour Scenarios. The rival claimant, in
other words, loses unless she can adduce a provision of the Code that
specifically protects her from the purported security interest. I contend, however, that section 9-201 applies only to thefirst of the four
Scenarios, leaving the scope of Article 9 only "one quarter" as great
as is commonly supposed. 7 Section 9-201 makes a security interest
effective against a subsequent transferee, but not against antecedent
transferees, antecedent transferors, or offsetting creditors. Because
section 9-201 does not apply against them in the first place, these persons need not search the U.C.C. for provisions with which to rebut
the statutory presumption.
Given the limited scope of section 9-201, we need to revise the
prevailing understanding of Article 9 and its relation to non-Code
law. Until now, courts and commentators espousing the Received
View have had to argue that the Code itself protects antecedent trans5. The debtor then purports to grant Bank a security interest on title to the tractor on May 25.
In a dispute between Bank and the lessor, the lessor is an "antecedent transferor." Another
diagram:
leasehold interest
granted to debtor
[May 51

lessor

"antecedenttransferor"

time

]debtor
security interest
purportedly
granted to Bank
[May 251

Bank

15. For example, if the creditor owes $100 to the debtor and the debtor owes $75 to the
creditor, setting off the mutual debts will leave the creditor owing the debtor only $25; the
debtor will owe the creditor nothing.
16. Because of its proprietary connotations, the term "rival claimant" can be misleading in
this context. I prefer to use the more customary "account debtor" to refer to the creditor who
attempts to set off. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
17. This is not to say that only one quarter of cases actually litigated fall within Article 9.
The great majority of reported cases involve conflicts between a secured party and a
subsequent transferee, which are certainly covered by section 9-201. The three other types of
cases are less common, but they are essential to understanding the limitations of Article 9.
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ferees, " antecedent transferors,' 9 and offsetting creditors 20 from section 9-201. But if section 9-201's presumption does not apply, efforts
to "protect" these persons are fundamentally misguided. A correct
analysis of these cases should concentrate on identifying and applying
the law that actually governs the disputes in question rather than
looking to Article 9, which really addresses only conflicts between
secured parties and subsequent transferees. The U.C.C will contain
some of this law, but most of it resides outside the Code.
This idea will surprise those who assume that the U.C.C. is a
universal commercial code, not just a uniform one. Everyone concedes that the U.C.C., including Article 9, contains its share of gaps
and omissions. 2' The usual assumption is that we can fill these gaps
by invoking "general principles of law and equity" 22 or extrapolating
from the text and policies of the Code. But the U.C.C.'s failure to
deal with the three problematic Scenarios is not a "gap." On the contrary, the fact that section 9-201 makes a security interest effective
only against subsequent transferees is a fundamental and intended
limitation on the scope of the statute. Article 9 is not universal; the
law relevant to security interests is therefore a good deal less uniform
than courts and commentators have previously recognized.
This may seem disquieting, at least at first. But Article 9 does
not, and was never intended to, supply a sensible set of rules to govern
disputes between a secured party and an antecedent transferee, antecedent transferor, or offsetting creditor.23 The efforts of courts and
commentators to apply Article 9 outside the Subsequent-Transferee
Scenario are ingenious and well intended, but they do not withstand
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part W.A.
See infra Part V.C.
See infra Part VI.A.
See, e.g., Julian McDonnell, The Scope of Article 9, in COOGAN ET AL., supra note 4,

§3-1.
22. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1987) ("Supplementary General Principles of Law Applicable").
Here the Code declares that, "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of the this Act,
the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to
contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions." For an
exhaustive account of the jurisprudence that has grown up around § 1-103, see HILLMAN ET
AL., supra note 4.
23. A partial exception to this statement is § 9-318, which addresses certain disputes
between a secured party and a creditor seeking to set off. However, the existence of § 9-318
does not presuppose that § 9-201 applies to such disputes. See infra Part VI.B.
Section 9-114, added in 1972, provides another exception to the statement in text. Section
9-114 provides that a secured party claiming through a consignee sometimes defeats the
interest of a consignor. This is an instance of the Antecedent-Transferor Scenario. In
principle, the rule stated in § 9-114 should be part of § 2-326, which deals more generally with
consignments.
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close scrutiny. A restrictive reading of section 9-201, on the other
hand, makes more substantive and analytical sense; it is also truer to
the language and history of Article 9. Rejecting the Received View
means we must abandon the idea that Article 9 is "comprehensive" in
the strongest sense, but the benefits of a narrower reading far exceed
the costs.
Inevitably, my substantive critique of the Received View involves
a challenge to prevailing Code methodology. The fact that most
.courts and commentators have misunderstood Article 9 at such a fundamental level suggests that they have been using the wrong analytical and conceptual tools. Although each Article of the Code must be
understood as part of a larger whole,24 I reject the assumption that
the relevant whole is the U.C.C. 25 We will make more progress by
examining Article 9 as a component of the system I call "propertytransfer law." This approach does not displace interpretative methodologies founded on commercial practice,26 everyday morality,2 7 or
economic theory.2 8 But fundamental aspects of Article 9-most notably, its scope-cannot be grasped without understanding the system
of property-transfer law and the statute's place within it. Once Article 9 is understood in the proper context, it is easy to develop accurate
interpretations of Code provisions that have misled previous investigators. It even becomes possible to identify and criticize several mis29
conceptions that are enshrined within Article 9 itself.
Understanding Article 9's role within property-transfer law,
however, is difficult because the system of property-transfer law is
largely unformulated. Instead, there exists a congeries of doctrines,
vocabularies, and conceptions that have grown up over centuries to
deal with particular interests and particular modes of transfer. In
24. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (1987) ("The Act should be construed in accordance
with its underlying purposes and policies. The text of each section should be read in the light
of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, as [sic] also of the Act as a whole
.... ").

25. I acknowledge that a dense network of cross-references and shared definitions links
Article 9 to the other Articles and that the Code's general approach to commercial-law
problems informs Article 9. In ordinary contexts, these connections can be critical. However,
they do not illuminate basic "structural" issues such as those implicit in the interpretation of
§ 9-201. If they did, the Received View would never have gained its present currency.
26. See, e.g., Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of
Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (1986).
27. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 2.
28. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An
Examination of the Scope ofArticle 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175 (1983); Robert Scott, A Relational
Theory of Secured Financing,86 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (1986).
29. See, for example, my criticism of the Code's conception of "collateral" and my
proposed reformulation of § 9-203(l)(c). See infra Part V.D.
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recent years, commercial-law scholarship has emphasized themes and
principles that run through property-transfer law, 30 but the extreme
diversity of surface structures has precluded a systematic treatment of
the subject. As a result, courts and commentators still lack a rigorous
framework within which to examine prevailing interpretations of
Article 9.
The problem has been one of conceptualization. Previous studies
have proceeded without a well-defined "model" of property transfers,
that is, without a consistent means of representing what is common to
a variety of transactions while bringing to prominence the features
that distinguish one type of transfer from another. An aversion to
explicit conceptualization (not to mention systematization) has
marked commercial-law scholarship for fifty years.3a It is unclear
whether this aversion has saved Article 9 from the vices of "conceptualism," but it has certainly discouraged efforts to analyze, classify,
and compare transfer transactions and the rules that determine their
consequences.
To engage the Received View, we must locate Article 9 within
the system of property-transfer law. Part II sets out a simple model of
property transfers and a basic account of the property-transfer system. These provide the conceptual framework and diagnostic vocabulary for the remainder of the paper; they are essential for
understanding Article 9's relations to its doctrinal neighbors and,
equally importantly, its doctrinal predecessors. My account of property-transfer law may be neither all-embracing nor definitive in its
details, but the body of the paper will demonstrate its utility.
The next four Parts examine the four Scenarios. My plan is to
30. See John Dolan, The UC.C. Framework: Conveyancing Principles and Interests, 59
B.U. L. REV. 811 (1979). For an instructive example of work building on Dolan's analysis, see
Harris, supra note 10. See also BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 7, at 3-8 (discussing the

"derivation principle" and its role in analysis of purported property transfers).
I use the phrase "property-transfer law" instead of "conveyancing principles" to avoid the
narrowing connotations of "conveyancing," which historically has been associated with
transfers of interests relating to real and not personal property. I also want to emphasize that
the transfer rules should be understood as rules of law. "Principles" suggests themes, patterns,
or policies that we discern in our rules of law; but themes, patterns, and policies are not
governing rules. To construct a coherent system of rules, we need more than heuristic
"principles."
31. See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, Security Law, Formalism, and Article 9, 47 NEB. L. REV.
659, 668-69 (1968) (Article 9 aimed to simplify secured transactions and end "extreme
formalism of security law"); Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L. REV. 321, 328 (Code drafters "feared that they
might produce a code inviting conceptual jurisprudence, i.e., a decision-making process based
not directly on the merits of a problem but on selection among pigeon-hole categories
constituting pre-determined answers to the questions at issue.").
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show that prevailing accounts of the Antecedent-Transferee, Antecedent-Transferor, and Set-Off Scenarios are unconvincing as statutory
interpretation and unappealing as a matter of policy. I demonstrate
that the language and history of Article 9 support a narrow reading of
section 9-201's declaration of the persons against whom a security
interest is presumptively effective; that this reading fits Article 9
neatly into the system of property-transfer law; and that it generates
results that are truer to the ideals that animate the statute.
II.

A SIMPLE MODEL OF PROPERTY TRANSFERS AND THE
PROPERTY-TRANSFER SYSTEM

A.

Property Transfers: Assigning and Encumbering Interests

Our legal system recognizes a variety of persons, most of them
capable of being vested with an array of property and other interests.
The legal system also recognizes a number of transactions that may be
termed "transfers" of interests. My model divides transfers into two
32
types. In the first type of transfer, the person making or suffering
the transfer (the transferor) is divested of an interest while the beneficiary of the transfer (the transferee) is simultaneously invested with a
substantially similar interest. I call these divesting transfers "assignments" of interests. Familiar examples are gifts or sales of interests,
which are assignments of the interests donated or sold.
In the second type of transfer, the transferor is not divested of his
interest; nor is the transferee invested with an interest like the one
retained by the transferor.3 3 Instead, the transferee becomes vested
with a new interest, which takes the transferor's interest as its
"object" or "target." These transactions invest the transferee with an
"encumbrance" on the transferor's interest. The paradigm of an
encumbering transfer is a judgment creditor's acquisition of a judicial
lien on an interest of a judgment debtor. Attachment of the encumbrance does not divest the judgment debtor of its interest, although
enforcement of the judicial lien will ultimately do so. 4 The attach32. When the transfer takes place without the transferor's consent, such as when a judicial
lien creditor forces a sale of a judgment debtor's property, it might be better to say that the
transferor "suffers" the transfer. For convenience, however, I will describe even involuntary
transferors as actively "making" the transfer. This usage is generally consistent with that of
the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1979) (" 'transfer' means every mode ...
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or an interest in property")
(emphasis supplied).
33. My terminology diverges from that of the Restatement of Property, which defines
"transfer" as "the extinguishment of such interests existing in one person and the creation of
such interests in another person."

RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 13(1) (1936).

The

Restatement uses "transfer" in the same sense that I use "assignment."
34. When enforcing a judicial lien, the sheriff sells the judgment debtor's interest, free of

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:951

ment of a security interest under Article 9 works the same way. 35 It is
useful to think of transactions creating bailments, leaseholds, and
trust beneficiaries' interests as encumbering transfers. The bailor, lessor, or trust settlor retains his original interest even after the transfer-although his enjoyment of that interest is suspended to the extent
it has been encumbered in favor of the transferee. 36 This is a departure from traditional concepts, which often treat the transferee's interest as something "subtracted" from the transferor's "bundle of
38
sticks," '37 not as an encumbrance on the bundle itself.
the judgment creditor's lien and any junior encumbrances, to the highest bidder. The proceeds
of the sale are applied, first, to the sheriff's expenses and then to the satisfaction of the

judgment debt. If the proceeds are insufficient to pay off the judgment creditor, the sheriff will
levy on something else. If anything remains after the judgment creditor and any junior
encumbrancers receive full payment, the sheriff turns it over to the judgment debtor. See
generally THOMAS CRANDALL ET AL., DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW MANUAL § 6.01-.07 (1985 &
Supp. 1990).
35. This may sound uncontroversial, but it is a serious point of contention in the analysis
of Antecedent-Transferor cases. In those cases, it is essential to be clear about what a security
interest attaches to. The prevailing analysis founders, in part, because it conceives of security
interests (and other encumbrances) as attaching to things, e.g., computers and copyrights,
rather than to interests respecting things. See infra Part V.B.
36. As Kocourek suggests, "[t]he jural situation may be described figuratively as a partial
eclipse of one legal relation by another." ALBERT KOCOUREK, JURAL RELATIONS 118 (1927).
"If the moon happens to be occluded through a temporary conjunction of celestial bodies, we
do not say that there is no moon simply because for a limited time it ceases to be visible." Id.
118-19. The chief benefit of keeping the encumbered interest intact is that it promotes
"accuracy ofjural accounting." Id. at 120. No substantive agenda is implied.
37. In leasing transactions, for example, the lessor's original interest is commonly viewed
as splitting into a leasehold and a reversion, with the leasehold immediately assigned to the
lessee; the reversion remains vested in the lessor. See 1 HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY §§ 110-13 (3d. ed. 1939 & Supp. 1991). Similarly, in transactions creating
equitable interests, it is often assumed that title to property is divided into two titles, one
"legal" and the other "equitable." The legal title remains in the grantor, and the equitable title
is assigned to the equitable beneficiary.
38. I emphasize that I have selected conceptions because I find them easy to work with; I
do not intend for them to be outcome determinative. In particular, I disavow any suggestion
that characterizing a transferee's interest as an encumbrance means that interest is somehow
"weaker" than one acquired by assignment. The unfortunate idea that a "mere encumbrance"
endows its holder with a second-rate entitlement has a long history in commercial law. Cf I
GILMORE, supra note 1, § 3.2 (observing that title retention devices "have always been looked
on as somehow 'stronger' than the 'weaker' lien devices of mortgage, pledge and factor's lien")
(footnote omitted). The consequences of either type of transfer should depend not on the
nature of the transfer but on other rules of the legal system. By the way we frame those rules,
we can achieve whatever substantive result we think fair, efficient, or otherwise desirable,
whether the rules must operate on assignments or encumbrances. Our initial selection of
conceptions is important merely because it dictates the contours of the rules that must
ultimately determine the consequences of the transfers in question. But the determination of
outcomes is up to us. An emphasis on conceptions does not entail a formalistic approach to
substantive issues.
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B.

The Transfer Baselines and the Structure of Exceptional Rules

Now that we know how the pieces move, we can formulate the
rules of the game itself. Traditional accounts of property-transfer 3law
9
often begin with the venerable maxim nemo dat quod non habet. I
follow their lead, but unpack the formula and restate it as two "baseline rules" focusing on the two types of transfers-assignments and
encumberings.
1.

THE VESTEDNESS RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS

The first transfer baseline, the "Vestedness Rule," states a presumptive limitation on a person's power to transfer an interest: A
person has a power to assign or encumber an interest only if that person is vested' with that interest at the time of the purported
transfer.41
The Vestedness Rule states a baseline, but our legal system often
rejects the results it generates, usually because of concern about ostensible ownership. 42 There are two main ways for a legal system to
reverse the results flowing from the Vestedness Rule. The first is to
adopt an exceptional rule that expressly empowers a person to transfer an interest even though that interest is vested in someone else.
Article 2's treatment of "entrusting" provides a good example. Suppose that Owner, who is vested with title to a broken watch, delivers
the watch to Jeweller for repair. The next day, Jeweller purports to
assign title to Customer, who pays Jeweller $50 and leaves with the
39. The latin tag means "no one gives what he does not have." See generally BAIRD &
JACKSON, supra note 7, at 4-6 (discussing nemo-dat rule as "derivation rule"); 1 GILMORE,
supra note 1, § 7.10; ROYSTON M. GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW 392-93 (1982); HILLMAN ET
AL., supra note 4, § 18-3; Dolan, supra note 30, at 812-13; Harris, supra note 10, at 192 n.55.
Another familiar maxim, "first-in-time, first-in-right," can be viewed as restating the nemo-dat
rule. See Harris, supra note 7, at 808.
The law of real property embraces this baseline. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM F. WALSH,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 216 (1947) ("Apart from the

[recording] statutes .... a valid title or lien existing and enforceable at law is never cut off or
affected by a subsequent deed or mortgage executed by the same owner or vendor to another
person, whether a purchaser for value or not."); 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.1
(James Casner ed., 1952 & Supp. 1958).
40. I am using "vestedness" as my own term of art. Disregard any associations that it may
arouse regarding similar terms used in the rule against perpetuities, the Takings Clause, or
other contexts.
41. The formulation in text applies to voluntary transfers. The rule for involuntary
transfers is harder to state in general form, although the basic idea is clear. A judgment
creditor, for example, has the power to impose a judicial lien on an interest only if that interest
is vested in the judgment debtor at the time of the purported transfer.
42. See, e.g., Boris Kozolchyk, Transferof PersonalProperty by a Nonowner: Its Future in
Light of Its Past, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1453 (1987); Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the
Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1987).
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watch. Ordinarily, the Vestedness Rule would prevent the purported
assignment from taking effect. When Owner entrusted Jeweller with
possession of the watch, Owner encumbered his title with some sort of
bailment interest in favor of Jeweller, but title remained in Owner.
Under the Vestedness Rule, Jeweller's purported assignment of title to
Customer cannot succeed. If, however, Jeweller is a merchant dealing
in watches, Article 2 expressly endows her with a "power to transfer
all rights of the entruster [in this case, title, which remained vested in
Owner] to a buyer in ordinary course of business."43 Assuming that
Customer buys in the ordinary course of business," this straightforward rule lets Jeweller do what she purports to do, even though this is
"impossible" under the Vestedness Rule.45
The second kind of exceptional rule takes a roundabout route to
the same result. Rules of this type create exceptions by amending the
facts46 so that the desired result follows under the baseline rule itself.
The rule of section 2-403(2), for example, could be replaced by one
declaring that Owner's purported retention of title to the watch "is
void as against a buyer in ordinary course of business." This would
let Customer argue that the transaction in which Owner appeared to
grant Jeweller only a bailment interest actually invested Jeweller with
title to the watch. Given these new "facts," the Vestedness Rule
would pose no obstacle to Jeweller's subsequent purported assignment
of title to Customer. This type of rule, which employs a fiction,47 is at
43. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1987).
44. A buyer in the ordinary course of business is "a person who in good faith and without
knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a
third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods
of that kind." U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1987). The fact that Jeweller can legally assign Owner's title
to Customer does not mean that Jeweller may do so with impunity. Section 2-403(2) gives
Jeweller a power, but not a privilege, to assign the title. If she violates her duty to Owner not
to exercise her power, she will be liable to Owner for conversion and may suffer criminal
penalties as well.
45. See, e.g., Baehr v. Clark, 49 N.W. 840, 841 (Iowa 1891) ("If one delivers property to
another as a mere bailee, a purchaser from the bailee acquires no title, however innocent he
may be."). Eventually, the common law reached a conclusion similar to the one set out in § 2403(2). See Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc., 111 N.E.2d 871 (N.Y. 1953) (theories of
estoppel and apparent authority protect purported buyer of title to ring entrusted to auction
house).
46. I intend this and similar phrases to be merely suggestive. I take no position regarding,
for example, the status of facts vis-a-vis legal conclusions flowing from facts.
47. See LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONs 28 (2d ed. 1967). As Fuller notes, real-estate
recording acts typically declare unrecorded transfers void as against certain third persons, but
not as against others. Thus, courts sometimes describe the situation following an unrecorded
assignment of title by saying that, as between assignor and assignee, title is vested in the
assignee; but, as between the assignee and third persons protected by the statute, title remains
vested in the assignor. Fuller quite sensibly asks, "[w]hat kind of title is this which is both in,
and not in, the grantor and the grantee at the same time? Does not such a contradictory
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least as common as rules that explicitly empower someone to transfer
an interest that is admittedly vested in someone else. Examples of the
fictive approach appear in Article 2's treatment of consignments; 48 fictions were also prevalent in pre-Code statutes dealing with conditional sales.4 9
2.

THE ENCUMBRANCE RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS

The second baseline rule, the "Encumbrance Rule," applies to
transfers that have passed muster under the Vestedness Rule or one of
its exceptions. The Encumbrance Rule's formulation depends on the
type of transfer under consideration. The first formulation of the
Rule states that an encumbrance remains attached to its targeted
interest despite the assignment of that interest to a third person.
Thus, if Abel is vested with an interest he has encumbered in favor of
Beatrice, he can sell or donate the interest to Cedric, but the interest
remains encumbered in favor of Beatrice. 50
The second formulation of the Encumbrance Rule applies when
assertion deserve the disparaging epithet 'fiction'?" Fuller concludes, benignly, that it does
not. Id. Legal Realism has instilled in us a horror of fictions, but we can promote clarity at
the technical and structural levels by acknowledging the fictive aspect of many common types
of rules, e.g., those that declare a purported transfer effective as to some persons, but not as to
others.
48. Section 2-326 "deems" consigned goods to have been sold to the consignee, but subject
to an option on the part of the "buyer" (the consignee) to sell them back to the "seller" (the
consignor). This fiction vests the consignor's interest in the goods in the consignee, where it
can be reached by the consignee's creditors without violating the Vestedness Rule.
It is interesting to observe that the Mercantile Factor's Acts, see infra Part V, achieved a
similar result by providing that a purported transfer by a mercantile factor would sometimes
"be as valid as if [the factor] were expressly authorized by the owner of the goods to make the
same." Stat. 52-53 Vict. 189 § 2(1) (1889). The "as if" marks this as a fiction, or at least as a
rule that takes a counterfactual state of affairs as its standard.
49. See, e.g., UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 5 (1918)
Every provision in a conditional sale reserving property in the seller, shall be void
as to any purchaser from or creditor of the buyer, who, without notice of such
provision, purchases the goods or acquires by attachment or levy a lien upon
them, before the contract or a copy thereof shall be filed as herein provided,
unless such contract or copy is so filed within ten days after the making of the
conditional sale.
See In re Bell, 55 B.R. 246, 249 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985) ("[A]ssuming that the conveyances
are fraudulent as to [the claimant], upon recovery, [the claimant's] recorded judgment lien is
attached to the property as if it had never been conveyed.").
50. Article 9 codifies a version of this rule in § 9-306(2): "Except where this Article
otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding [its] sale... [or]
exchange .... " Codifying the baseline rules is, strictly speaking, unnecessary. It can also
lead to confusion if the codification fails to make appropriate allowance for exceptions. See.
e.g., Carlson, supra note 7, at 575-81 (expressing concern that state laws discharging junior
encumbrances, including security interests, in judicial sales to enforce a judicial lien are
inconsistent with sections 9-201 and 9-306(2) because the laws relating to such sales are not
part of the U.C.C.).
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the holder of an already encumbered interest purports to encumber it
again. The attempt to encumber the targeted interest succeeds, but
the new encumbrance is subordinate to its predecessor. For example,
if Abel is vested with an interest that is encumbered by a judicial lien
in favor of Beatrice, he can grant Cedric a security interest on the
targeted interest. But this security interest will be subordinate to Beatrice's existing judicial lien. Although what it means for one encumbrance to be subordinate to another varies with the characteristics of
the encumbrances involved, the general idea is familiar. 5
Exceptional rules overriding the first version of the Encumbrance
Rule are sometimes framed as rules letting the assignor assign the
interest "free of" the existing encumbrance. Article 9, for example,
declares that a buyer in ordinary course of business "takes free of a
security interest created by his seller." 52 Exceptions to the second
version of the Encumbrance Rule can operate by abrogating the rule
that the second encumbrance is subordinate to the first. Suppose that
Elaine grants a security interest to Fred and later suffers the attachment of a judicial lien in favor of Gus. Under the second branch of
the Encumbrance Rule, Gus's judicial lien is subordinate to Fred's
security interest. But if Fred has failed to "perfect" his security interest by the time Gus's lien attaches, Article 9 reverses this result:
Fred's unperfected security interest "is subordinate to the rights of a
person who ... becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is
perfected." 53 Gus takes priority, even though Fred's encumbrance
was the first to attach.
The Encumbrance Rule can also be overridden by rules that
recharacterize the facts. Most often, such rules declare the transfer
creating the initial encumbrance "ineffective" or "void as against" the
subsequent assignee or encumbrancer. This means the Encumbrance
Rule does not apply against the subsequent transferee under the
"facts" of her case, according to which no prior transfer occurred.
Historically, most exceptions to the Encumbrance Rule have taken
this form. The chattel mortgage acts, the principal predecessors of
Article 9, established conditions under which unrecorded security
51. In my example, both encumbrances secure some indebtedness of Abel. If Beatrice
enforces her judicial lien, the sheriff will sell Abel's interest, free of Beatrice's lien and Cedric's
security interest, and pay the proceeds over to Beatrice. If the proceeds are sufficient to pay
her all she is owed, the remainder can be paid over to Cedric. If Cedric is paid in full, any
surplus is remitted to Abel.
52. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1987).
53. Id. 9-301(1)(b). The rationale is that Fred has failed to cure the ostensible-ownership
problem created when the security interest attached to Elaine's apparently unencumbered
interest.
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interests were "void as against" certain subsequent transferees. 54
Recharacterization rules are also common in contemporary realestate recording acts. 5" Article 9 is actually somewhat unusual in not
employing the "void-as-against" device.
C.

Dramatis Personae: "Debtor," "Secured Party," "Rival
Claimant," and "X"

Having formulated the transfer baselines and described the operation of exceptional rules, I will examine the four Scenarios. My discussion features a stock cast of characters playing very simple parts.
In each instance, a corporation (call it "Debtor") is purporting to
grant a security interest to someone (call him "Secured Party") who
eventually gets involved in a dispute with someone (call her "Rival
Claimant") asserting a competing claim to the interest (call it "X")
that Debtor is purporting to encumber. 6 Possible values of X include
54. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. CODE § 2330 (1928) (repealed):
A chattel mortgage or other instrument or writing intended to operate as a
mortgage or lien upon personal property, which is not accompanied by an
immediate delivery and followed by an actual and continued change of
possession of the property mortgaged or pledged by such instrument, is void as
against the creditors of the mortgagor or person making the same, and as against
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees and lienholders in good faith, unless such
instrument or a true copy thereof was forthwith filed in the office of the county
recorder ....
N.J. CHATTEL MORTGAGE ACT § 4 (1 Comp. St. 1910) (repealed 1962):
Every mortgage or conveyance intended to operate as a mortgage of goods or
chattels hereafter made, which shall not be accompanied by an immediate delivery, and followed by an actual and continued change of possession of the thing
mortgaged, shall be absolutely void as against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith, unless the mortgage . . . be recorded as directed in the
succeeding section of this act.
Cf. MINN. STAT. 1927 § 8360 (Mason 1927) (repealed 1966) (conditional sale contract "shall
be void as to creditors of the vendee and subsequent purchasers and mortgagees of such property in good faith unless the ...contract ... be filed as in the case of a chattel mortgage"). See

generally 2 LEONARD

JONES, THE LAW OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES

§§ 324-26 (6th rev. ed. 1933); 1 GILMORE, supra note 1, § 15.1 ("Without exception, all filing
statutes provided that unfiled interests are void against good faith purchasers of the
collateral.").
55. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE, § 1214 (West 1990) ("Every conveyance of real property
...is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property... in good
faith and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance is the first duly recorded, and as
against any judgment affecting the title, unless the conveyance shall have been duly recorded
prior to the record of notice of action."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 706.08 (West 1990) ("Every
conveyance . . . which is not recorded as provided by law shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration of the same real estate ...
whose conveyance shall first be duly recorded.").
56. I have made Debtor a corporation and Secured Party and Rival Claimant male and
female human beings so that I can use the pronouns "it," "he," and "she." None of this is
necessary except for purposes of exposition.
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every kind of transferrable interest: titles to tangible and intangible
things, such as computers and copyrights; leasehold interests on titles
to such things; trust beneficiaries' interests on leasehold interests on
titles to such things; and so on to any desired degree of complexity.
However, it is rarely necessary to specify the content of X; the relevant rules operate the same way no matter what X happens to be.
III. THE SUBSEQUENT-TRANSFEREE SCENARIO: SECURED
PARTIES VERSUS SUBSEQUENT ENCUMBRANCERS AND ASSIGNEES

When the Subsequent-Transferee Scenario opens, Debtor is
vested with some interest, X. Two transactions ensue. Debtor first
purports to grant Secured Party a security interest on X to secure an
indebtedness that Debtor owes to Secured Party." Debtor then purportedly makes or suffers a transfer of X in favor of Rival Claimant.
The dispute between Secured Party and Rival Claimant concerns
their relative entitlements respecting X in the event that Debtor
defaults on its debt to Secured Party.
SDebtor
creation of security
interest on X
Secured Party

time
creation of encumbrance on X
or
assignment of X

[Rival Climn
Figure 1: Secured Party v. Subsequent Transferee
No one doubts that section 9-201 applies against subsequent
transferees. But analysis of this Scenario helps to establish three
important propositions about the structure and origins of Article 9.
First, section 9-201's presumption in favor of Secured Party and the
priority rules that allow subsequent transferees to rebut that presumption fit neatly into the general system of property-transfer law. Second, section 9-201 is closely related to the operative provisions of the
chattel mortgage acts that preceded Article 9. Third, the rules gov57. In fact, it is not necessary that the indebtedness be Debtor's. Debtor may encumber its
interest to secure the obligation of some fourth person. For convenience, I will ignore this
possibility, which does not affect the analysis.
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erning subsequent transferees are plausible responses to the problem
of ostensible ownership. It is not easy to make analogous claims when
the Code is invoked in the other Scenarios.
This Part begins by examining how Subsequent-Transferee cases
play out under the property-transfer baselines. It then reviews how
pre-Code law, specifically the chattel mortgage acts, modified these
results in favor of certain subsequent transferees to vindicate concerns
about ostensible ownership. Finally, it examines Article 9's treatment
of three important priority disputes: (1) secured party versus subsequent buyer; (2) secured party versus subsequent judicial lien creditor;
and (3) secured party versus subsequent secured party. Taken
together, these points elucidate Article 9's connection to the Subsequent-Transferee Scenario.
A.

Analysis Under the Property-TransferBaselines

In Subsequent-Transferee cases, the Vestedness Rule poses no
obstacle to the two purported transfers. Because debtor is vested with
X when it purports to encumber that interest in favor of Secured
Party, the intended security interest attaches to X. The first transfer
does not divest Debtor of X, so Debtor can subsequently transfer X to
Rival Claimant.
In this Scenario, it is the Encumbrance Rule that counts. In the
case in which Debtor's transfer to Rival Claimant encumbers X, the
second branch of the Encumbrance Rule tells us that this second
encumbrance, whether a judicial lien, security interest, leasehold
interest, or something else, is subordinate to the security interest
already granted to Secured Party. The situation is essentially the
same when Debtor assigns X to Rival Claimant. The assignment,
whether a sale or gift, invests Rival Claimant with X, but the first
branch of the Encumbrance Rule informs us that X remains encumbered in favor of Secured Party. Therefore, under the baseline property-transfer rules, Secured Party enjoys priority over both types of
subsequent transferees.
B.

ExceptionalRules Before Article 9." Ostensible Ownership and
the Chattel Mortgage Acts

Secured Party's priority under the baseline rules has often been
tenuous, however, because of rules creating exceptions in favor of subsequent transferees. For centuries, Anglo-American law has been
reluctant to apply the Encumbrance Rule against Rival Claimant if
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Debtor was in possession of the relevant chattel,5 8 with Secured
Party's consent, at the time of the transfer to Rival Claimant. This
reluctance is rooted in the conviction that third persons who find
someone in possession of a thing are entitled to infer, without further
inquiry, that the possessor is vested with unencumbered title to that
thing." This is the principle of ostensible ownership, probably the
chief source of exceptions to the property-transfer baseline rules.'
In the Subsequent-Transferee Scenario, rules that protect Rival
Claimant from the ordinary consequences of the Encumbrance Rule
vindicate ostensible-ownership concerns. In most cases, these rules
have operated by recharacterization-i.e., they have adjusted the facts
so that acceptable results can be reached without creating an explicit
exception to the Encumbrance Rule itself. An early and important
example is the Statute of 13 Elizabeth,6 1 the ancestor of today's statutes that regulate fraudulent conveyances. The Statute declared that
any transfer intended to hinder, delay, or defraud the transferor's
"creditors" was "utterly void, frustrate, and of none effect" as against
those creditors.6 2 For two hundred and fifty years, Anglo-American
courts, concerned about ostensible ownership, used the Statute to
hold a security interest on X void as against Rival Claimant if she
obtained a judicial lien on X while Debtor was still in possession of
58. I will consistently use phrases such as "the relevant chattel" or "the relevant thing" in
place of the more customary "collateral." Article 9 defines "collateral" as "the property
subject to a security interest." U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(c) (1987). A security interest (or other
encumbrance) attaches to another interest, not to the tangible or intangible thing that is the
targeted interest's ultimate focus. See supra Part II.A. There are many instances, however, in
which Article 9 uses "collateral" to refer to things. See, e.g., id. § 9-203(l)(a) (signed security
agreement unnecessary if "the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to
agreement"). I take up this point again in my analysis of the Antecedent-Transferor Scenario.
See infra Part V.D. In the meantime, I steer clear of the ambiguous term "collateral."
59. For a justification of the principle on efficiency grounds, see generally Douglas Baird &
Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
299 (1984) (Article 9 efficiently allocates information costs); Douglas G. Baird, Notice Filing
and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (1983).
60. The ostensible-ownership principle is enforced widely, but by no means universally, in
our legal system. It is responsible for the many exceptions to the Encumbrance Rule, but it
has not generated a comparable number of exceptions to the Vestedness Rule. As a result, the
prevailing state of affairs is roughly this: A third person who finds someone in possession of a
thing can legitimately infer (in the absence of some form of recording act) that the possessor's
interest, if any, is free of encumbrances. This is a far cry from a license to infer that the
possessor is vested with title to the thing. See generally Baird & Jackson, supra note 28; Jeffrey
Helman, Ostensible Ownership and the Uniform Commercial Code, 83 CoM. L.J. 25 (1978).
61. Stat. 13 Eliz. ch. 5 (1571).
62. Id. (fraudulent transfers of interests relating to land or goods void as against
"creditors"); cf Stat. 27 Eliz. ch. 4 (1584) (fraudulent transfers of interests relating to land
void as against purchasers for value).
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the relevant thing.63 Once it was established that the security interest
was void as against Rival Claimant, she would have no reason to fear
application of the Encumbrance Rule because, for purposes of her dispute with Secured Party, the prior encumbrance did not exist.
During the nineteenth century, the various American jurisdictions found ways to accommodate nonpossessory 6 security interests.
Borrowing from their real-property recording acts, the states enacted
special statutes, the chattel mortgage acts, legitimating nonpossessory
security interests on the condition that their existence be publicly
recorded. The operative provision of these statutes typically declared
nonpossessory security interests that were not properly recorded
("unperfected" security interests) "void as against" certain "subsequent purchasers" and "creditors." Thus, in Subsequent-Transferee
cases, the chattel mortgage acts created effective exceptions to the
Encumbrance Rule in order to deal with ostensible-ownership
concerns.
C.

Analysis of Three Basic Disputes Under Article 9

There is a significant relationship between the way the chattel
mortgage acts and Article 9 deal with subsequent transferees. Analysis under the U.C.C. begins with section 9-201, which presumes a
security interest to be "effective ...

against purchasers of the collat-

eral and against creditors. ' 65 When "purchasers" and "creditors" are
subsequent transferees, section 9-201 functions like a codification of
the Encumbrance Rule. I contend, however, that section 9-201 is
nothing but a codification of this baseline rule as it applies in favor of
secured parties against subsequent transferees.6 6 The present discussion provides intuitive grounds for regarding section 9-201 as essentially concerned with subsequent transferees.
To understand the relationship between section 9-201 and the
chattel mortgage acts, we need to consider the analogy between the
63. See, e.g., Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819). See generally 1 GILMORE,
supra note 1, § 14.1; 1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES,
§§ 61-61(E) (REV. ED. 1940).
64. A security interest is "nonpossessory" if the secured party has not taken possession of
the relevant thing. Needless to say, a secured party who takes possession eliminates the
ostensible-ownership problem that his security interest would otherwise impose on persons
dealing with the debtor. In some situations, possession by someone other than the secured
party will remove the security interest from the "nonpossessory" category. See U.C.C. 9-305
(1987) (secured party deemed to have possession from the time he gives notice of his
encumbrance to a bailee in possession of the relevant thing, provided that the bailee is not
subject to the debtor's control).
65. Id. § 9-201.
66. See infra Parts IV.B., V.D., VIB.
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basic Article 9 priority rules6 7 and the exceptions to the Encumbrance
Rule recognized in the chattel mortgage acts. The acts typically
declared unperfected security interests void as against certain "subsequent purchasers" and "creditors." Although Article 9 does not use
the "void-as-against" device, a careful observer can discern remarkable substantive and structural similarities between the old and the new

regimes.
1.

RIVAL CLAIMANT AS SUBSEQUENT BUYER

The case where Rival Claimant is a subsequent buyer reveals the
similarity between the chattel mortgage acts and Article 9. The acts
held an unperfected security interest on X void as against a "subsequent purchaser" who took X for value and without knowledge of the
existing security interest. Similarly, section 9-301(1)(c) provides that
a buyer takes X free6" of an unperfected 69 security interest "to the
extent that ... [she] gives value and receives delivery of the collateral

without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected."
Section 9-301(1)(c) retains the thrust of the chattel mortgage acts by
requiring that Rival Claimant purchase in good faith (i.e., without
knowledge) and for value while the security interest is unperfected.
The only difference is that section 9-301(1)(c) adds a requirement that
the buyer take possession of the relevant thing before the secured
party perfects his security interest. 70 Rival Claimant, in other words,
cannot prevail unless she first cures the ostensible-ownership problem
67. By "priority rules," I refer primarily to §§ 9-301(1) and 9-312(5). Of course, there are
other important exceptional rules, such as § 9-307(l). However, it is generally clear that the
other rules apply only in favor of subsequent transferees. Thus, I do not deal with them here.
I make no attempt to account for the Code's complicated and largely unassimilated rules
governing interests relating to "fixtures." See generally id. § 9-313. They are a world unto
themselves.
68. Unfortunately, the text of § 9-301(l)(c) does not describe the buyer as taking "free" of
the security interest. Instead, it says that an unperfected security interest "is subordinate to
the rights of [the buyer]," which does not make it clear that the "subordinate" security interest
is detached from X. See Carlson, Death and Subordination, supra note 7, at 575-81. Article 9's

imprecision on this point has misled at least one important commercial court. See Aircraft
Trading & Serv. Inc. v. Braniff, Inc., 819 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1987). For critiques of the Second
Circuit's decision, see Carlson, Bulk Sales, supra note 7, at 748-62; Clark, supra note 3, at
1462-63; Harris, supra note 7, at 821 n.68. The Permanent Editorial Board for the U.C.C. has
issued a Commentary disapproving the Second Circuit's reasoning and result. See PEB
COMMENTARIES ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE Commentary 6 (Final Draft March
10, 1990).
69. In general, a security interest is "unperfected" if it has attached but the secured party
has neither taken possession of the relevant thing nor filed appropriate financing statements
giving public notice of the security interest. U.C.C. §§ 9-302 to 9-305 (1987). For our
purposes, an unperfected security interest can be compared to an unrecorded, nonpossessory
security interest under the chattel mortgage acts.
70. A parallel rule exists for buyers when X is an interest relating to "accounts" or
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created by her purchase of X. This is a departure from the regime of
the chattel mortgage acts, but hardly a radical one. Here Article 9
simply adopts a "race-notice" rule, directly analogous to the "racenotice" rules found in most states' real-property recording acts.7'
Overall, section 9-301(l)(c) treats subsequent buyers pretty much the
same way that the chattel mortgage acts did.
2.

RIVAL CLAIMANT AS SUBSEQUENT JUDICIAL LIEN CREDITOR

The chattel mortgage acts frequently declared an unperfected
security interest on X void as against "creditors." We will explore the
precise extension of the term "creditors" in Part IV, but for now it is
enough to observe that the term has always included subsequent judicial lien creditors, who clearly fall within the Subsequent-Transferee
Scenario. Section 9-301(l)(b) of the U.C.C., which declares an
unperfected security interest "subordinate to the rights of... a person
who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected"
protects judicial lien creditors from section 9-201. This effectively
protects subsequent judicial lien creditors from unperfected security
interests and the ostensible-ownership problems that such security
interests present. In fact, the rules stated in the current Code and in
the chattel mortgage acts are both somewhat overprotective of judicial lien creditors. In contrast to results reached under section 9301(l)(c) and the former acts, a judicial lien creditor can prevail
against an unperfected security interest even if she acquires her lien
with actual knowledge that there is a security interest on X. This was
not true of the 1962 version of section 9-301(1)(b), which required the
subsequent transferee to acquire her interest without knowledge of the
existing security interest. 72 But except for this difference, the treat"general intangibles," but it omits the possession requirement. See U.C.C. 9-301(l)(d) (1987).
It is impossible for a buyer (or anyone else) to take possession of these intangible things.
71. See AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 39, § 17.5 n.63 (listing states). For a
general discussion of the principles underlying race-notice systems, see 6A RICHARD A.
POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 905[l][c][iii] (1992). For an examination of
problems inherent in notice requirements in the real-estate recording acts, see Corwin W.
Johnson, Purpose and Scope of Recording Statutes, 47 IOWA L. REV. 231, 238-43 (1962).
72. Commentators have argued that the deletion in 1972 of the "no-knowledge"
requirement is justified because it obviates potentially costly and uncertain inquiries into the
judicial lien creditor's state of mind. See, e.g., BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 7, at 366.70
(discussing the difficulties created by systems that take knowledge into account). By this
reasoning, we should also eliminate the "no-knowledge" requirement that still applies against
buyers in sections 9-301(l)(c) and (d).
The revisors offer two explanations for their amendment of section 9-301(1)(b). First, it is
anomalous or unfair to "den[y] the lien creditor priority even though he had no knowledge
when he got involved by extending credit, if he acquired knowledge while attempting to
extricate himself." U.C.C. § 9-301 Reasons for 1972 Change. This rationale justifies very
little. To begin with, it applies only if the lien creditor lent without knowledge of the
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ment of subsequent judicial lien creditors is identical under the old
and new regimes.
3.

RIVAL CLAIMANT AS SUBSEQUENT SECURED PARTY

The current rule, section 9-312(5)(a), states that competing
security interests "rank according to priority in time of filing or
perfection." That is to say, priority goes to whichever of the two
secured parties is the first either to file a financing statement or to
perfect his or her security interest. This rule departs notably from the
chattel mortgage acts, although "notice-filing" systems were
employed in some other pre-Code statutes.73 Section 9-312(5) does
not make clear how, or even whether, it relates to the older rules governing conflicts with a subsequent secured party. Yet, a connection
exists, hidden in the history of the now-vestigial section 9-301(l)(a).
First, however, the mechanics of section 9-312(5)(a) should be
clarified. Suppose that Rival Claimant files a financing statement coVunperfected security interest; why should we protect the lien creditor who lent with knowledge
of an existing encumbrance? Moreover, the basic premise of the argument, that we ought to
protect lien creditors who lent without knowledge, finds little support in Article 9. Suppose
the secured party perfects after the creditor lends but before the creditor gets a judicial lien.
Undoubtedly, the secured party prevails, even under the 1972 Code. Whether the judicial lien
creditor innocently extended credit is irrelevant so long as the secured party perfects before the
judicial lien attaches. If the creditor's lack of knowledge at the time of extending credit makes
no difference in this situation, it is hard to see why it should in the first one.
The revisors' second argument, that a "no-knowledge" requirement is inconsistent with
the spirit of Article 9, presupposes a controversial determination of what that spirit is or
should be. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 235-38. For discussion of similar problems raised by
"no-notice" requirements in the real-property recording acts, see POWELL, supra note 71,
§ 905[l][c][2]; Francis Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, 93 U. PA.
L. REV. 125 (1944).
Ironically, two provisions added in 1972 require an inquiry into the secured party's
knowledge at the time that he extends credit, if this extension of credit is a "future advance."
See U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (1987) (subsequent judicial lien creditor who acquires lien while security
interest is perfected is subordinate to the security interest, except to the extent that the security
interest secures repayment of discretionary advances made by the secured party more than 45
days after attachment of the lien and with knowledge thereof); U.C.C. § 9-307(3) (1987)
(subsequent buyer takes subject to a perfected security interest, except to the extent that it
secures discretionary advances made more than 45 days after the sale or with knowledge
thereof).
73. "The Uniform Trust Receipts Act [U.T.R.A.] was the first widely enacted notice filing
statute. Subsequently the accounts receivable filing statutes and the Factor's Lien Acts, which
were adopted during the 1940's and 1950's, all adopted the system of notice filing." 2
GILMORE, supra note 1, § 34.3. For a general account of the notice filing system under the
U.T.R.A. and the Factor's Lien Acts, see Robert H. Skilton, The Factor's Lien on
Merchandise, pt. 2, 1955 Wis. L. REV. 609, 614-19. The chattel mortgage acts, by contrast,
mandated a system of transactional filing in which the security agreement itself was recorded,
generally accompanied by affidavits that the transaction was for good consideration and not an
effort to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors of the mortgagor. See 1 GILMORE, supra note 1,
§ 15.2; JONES, supra note 54, §§ 308-14.
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ering X on January 1-before she lends any money to Debtor and
before Debtor grants her any security interest on X.74 On January 5,
Debtor does a quick deal, borrowing $75,000 from Secured Party and
granting him a security interest on X; Secured Party perfects by filing
on January 6. On January 10, Rival Claimant lends $100,000 to
Debtor and Debtor simultaneously grants Rival Claimant a security
interest on X.
Under section 9-201, Secured Party is presumptively entitled to
priority against Rival Claimant, who is a subsequent purchaser. But
because Rival Claimant filed (on January 1) before Secured Party
either filed or perfected (both on January 6), she can rebut the presumption using section 9-312(5)(a). Under the chattel mortgage acts,
in contrast, Rival Claimant could have overcome the Encumbrance
Rule only if she acquired her interest while Secured Party's existing
security interest was unperfected. But Rival Claimant's security
interest did not attach until January 10-a date well after Secured
Party perfected his security interest (January 6). The fact that Rival
Claimant purported to record her security interest on January 1
would be irrelevant. Under the chattel mortgage acts, an attempt to
record a transfer that had not yet occurred was a nullity."
The substantive distinction between the two regimes is that Article 9 not only permits filing prior to attachment, but also adopts a rule
that can make that filing the decisive factor in determining priorities.
The first-to-file-or-perfect rule allows a secured party to obtain a
''prospective priority" (as against other secured parties) by filing a
financing statement in advance of taking a security interest. Here
Article 9 has moved beyond traditional concern about ostensible ownership. Section 9-312(5)(a) lets Rival Claimant, a subsequent transferee, take priority even if Secured Party never allows an ostensibleownership problem to come into being. Suppose that Secured Party
files a financing statement or takes possession of the relevant thing
before Debtor grants him his security interest on X. In that case,
there is no period during which Secured Party has a "secret" encumbrance on X. Notwithstanding that Rival Claimant cannot claim to
74. For the financing statement to be effective, it must be signed by Debtor. U.C.C. § 9402(1) (1987). It is not uncommon, though, for a potential debtor to sign financing statements
even before the potential secured party has committed himself to lend. If the potential secured
party makes no loan, the disappointed debtor can force the filing of a termination statement
that cancels the earlier filing. Id. § 9-404(1).
75. The acts generally demanded that the executed mortgage itself be filed. Moreover,
attempts to encumber property to be created or acquired in the future were void. See Skilton,
supra note 74, at 614-19; Samuel Williston, Transfers of After-Acquired Personal Property, 19
HARV. L. REV. 557 (1906).
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have been misled by Debtor's apparently unencumbered ownership,
she will take priority over Secured Party if she filed her financing
statements before he either filed or perfected.76
More importantly for present purposes, section 9-312(5)(a) seems
to depart structurally from the pattern of the chattel mortgage acts.
In contrast to the acts, section 9-312(5)(a) is not cast as a rule permitting a subsequent transferee to take priority over an existing, but
unperfected, security interest. On the contrary, section 9-312(5)(a)
states that priority goes to whichever secured party is the first to file
or perfect, without any reference to whose security interest was the
first to attach. The structure of section 9-312(5)(a) does not reveal
that its function is to provide the subsequent secured party with an
exception to a baseline rule that ordinarily favors the secured party
whose encumbrance was the first to attach. As it stands, section 9312(5)(a) is self-sufficient. It would apparently function the same way
even if the baseline rule, section 9-201, were stricken from the Code.
This obscures the pattern of baselines and exceptions that is the
framework for analysis under property-transfer law.
However, the structural anomaly is not so great as it may seem.
Although section 9-312(5)(a) is not drafted as an explicit exception to
section 9-201, this is not attributable to anything in the substance of
the first-to-file-or-perfect rule. Section 9-312(5)(a) could be reformulated to state, for example, that "a subsequent secured party takes
priority over an existing security interest if the subsequent secured
party files or perfects her security interest before the holder of the
existing security interest files or perfects his security interest." This
rewording would not only preserve the substance of the current rule,
but also make clear the rule's status as an exception to a baseline rule
favoring the initial secured party. Thus, the structural analogy
between the way section 9-312(5)(a) and the chattel mortgage acts
treat subsequent secured parties would be restored, despite the important substantive differences between the old and the new regimes.
The drafting history of Article 9 supports my reformulation.
Consider section 9-301(l)(a), which is probably Article 9's least-discussed provision. Section 9-301(l)(a) states only that "an unperfected
security interest is subordinate to the rights of persons entitled to priority under Section 9-312." The cross-reference to section 9-312,
76. The fact that Rival Claimant has made a public filing means that Secured Party can
easily discover his potential vulnerability to subordination. Hence, it is not unfair to allow
Rival Claimant to take priority pursuant to § 9-312(5)(a). Note, however, that Rival Claimant
files in order to stake a potential claim, not to disclose an existing encumbrance. Ostensible
ownership is not at issue.
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which picks up the first-to-file-or-perfect rule, drains section 9301(l)(a) of any independent content; this explains why everyone
ignores it. But section 9-301(1)(a) was not always the statutory zombie it is today. In drafts of the Code preceding the 1956 revisions,7 7
section 9-301(l)(a)7 a paralleled the provisions governing judicial lien
creditors"9 and buyers."0 The pre-1956 version of section 9-301(l)(a)
declared an unperfected security interest subordinate to the rights of
"a subsequent secured party who becomes such without knowledge of
the earlier security interest and perfects h[er] interest before the earlier security interest is perfected."'" Except for the requirement that
the second secured party be the first to perfect, a close substantive and
structural connection exists between the early version of section 9301(l)(a) and the chattel mortgage acts. The acts protected subsequent secured parties who were subsequent good faith purchasers for
value; early section 9-301(1)(a) protected a "subsequent secured
party" in the same circumstances,"2 subject only to the requirement
that the subsequent secured party be the first to perfect. It is not
difficult to recognize this rule's status as an exception to section 9-201.
The 1956 revisions deleted the language concerning "subsequent
secured part[ies]" and replaced it with today's bland reference to
"persons entitled to priority under section 9-312. ''83 It seems unlikely
that the purpose of this change was to disrupt the functional analogy
between the Article 9 priority rules and the chattel mortgage acts. In
fact, commentary regarding the 1956 amendments indicates that the
revisers intended nothing more profound than to consolidate all the
rules relating to disputes between two secured parties into a single
provision, present section 9-312.1' Furthermore, the consolidation
was executed less carefully than it should have been: it appears that a
drafting accident is responsible for the deletion of the "no-knowl77. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1957) [hereinafter 1956 REVISIONS].

78. At that time, the predecessor to present § 9-301(i)(a) appeared as § 9-301(1)(b). Id. at
297. For simplicity, I will refer to the section using its current designation.
79. Prior to the revisions, the predecessor to present § 9-301(l)(b) appeared as § 9301(1)(c). See id.
80. Prior to the 1956 revisions, §§ 9-301(l)(c) and (d) appeared as §§ 9-301(1)(d) and (e).
See id.
81. 1956 REVISIONS, supra note 77, § 9-301.
82. Section 9-301(l)(a) did not say that this "subsequent secured party" must be a
purchaser for value, but this was unnecessary. Unless "value has been given," the purported
security interest cannot attach. Id. § 9-203(l)(b) (1956).
83. U.C.C. § 9-312 (1956).
84. 1956 REVISIONS, supra note 77, § 9-301 ("Subsection (1) has been changed to transfer
all questions of priority [between secured parties] to § 9-312.").
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edge" requirement that was part of the original section 9-301(1)(a)."5
If an important substantive feature of the original rule could disappear
by accident, it would seem possible that the loss of structuralcoordination between section 9-201 and the new section 9-312(5)(a) was also
unintentional. The structure of section 9-312(5)(a) is indeed anomalous, but it need not be taken as a deliberate rejection of the system of
baselines and exceptional rules that generally characterizes propertytransfer law.
D. Summary
In Subsequent-Transferee cases involving buyers or judicial lien
creditors, there are clear substantive and structural parallels between
Article 9 and the old chattel mortgage acts. The acts, in order to
vindicate the principle of ostensible ownership, protected certain subsequent buyers and subsequent judicial lien creditors from the
Encumbrance Rule. Article 9, also motivated by ostensible-ownership concerns, supplies priority rules that protect certain subsequent
buyers and subsequent judicial lien creditors from section 9-201. The
main structural difference between the two regimes is that Article 9
codifies the Encumbrance Rule in section 9-201; the chattel mortgage
acts simply presupposed it as one of the property-transfer baselines.
In Subsequent-Transferee cases involving two secured parties,
Article 9 significantly expands the subsequent secured party's rights
relative to those she would have enjoyed under the chattel mortgage
acts. By making priority depend on, among other things, the date on
which a subsequent secured party files a financing statement, section
9-312(5)(a) lets her prevail against an existing security interest despite
the codification of the Encumbrance Rule in section 9-201. Section 9312(5)(a) is not cast as an exception to anything, but it can easily be
reformulated to bring out its function as an exception to section 9201. While this parallel disappeared from the text in 1956, Article 9
and the chattel mortgage acts continued to deal with subsequent
transferees in a remarkably similar manner. The question thus
becomes whether such parallels can be found in cases involving antecedent transferees, antecedent transferors, and offsetting creditors.
85. Former § 9-301(1)(a)'s requirement that the subsequent secured party take without
knowledge of the existing security interest is not reflected in present § 9-312(5). Grant
Gilmore says it is unclear whether this omission "was by design or inadvertence. If it is
assumed that the draftsmen were deliberately making a considerable change in prior law, this
was an odd and unsatisfactory way to have done it, particularly in view of the fact that the
1956 version of § 9-301(1) maintains the earlier policy unchanged in comparable situations." 1
GILMORE, supra note 1, § 34.2. See generally Carlson, supra note 2, at 235-38 (tracing the
revision of §§ 9-301(1) and 9-312(5)).
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ARTICLE 9
THE ANTECEDENT-TRANSFEREE SCENARIO: SECURED
PARTIES VERSUS ANTECEDENT ENCUMBRANCERS
AND ASSIGNEES

The Antecedent-Transferee Scenario is identical to the Subsequent-Transferee Scenario except that the order of the two purported
transfers is reversed. In Antecedent-Transferee cases, Debtor first
makes (or suffers) a transfer of X to Rival Claimant; only later does
Debtor purport to grant Secured Party a security interest on X. Letting the purported transfer to Secured Party serve as our temporal
benchmark, Rival Claimant is an "antecedent transferee."
Debtor
creation of
rb
X
on
encumbrance
or
purported creation of
assgnmentofsecurity
interest on X
S IRival Claimant

time

Figure 2: Secured Party v. Antecedent Transferee
Does section 9-201's declaration that a security interest is effective against "purchasers of the collateral" and "creditors" apply
against "purchasers" and "creditors" who are antecedent transferees?
The Received View holds that a security interest is effective against all
competing claimants, including those whose interests were created
before the security interest purportedly attached to X.86 The burden,
then, is on the antecedent transferee to adduce an exceptional rule to
rebut the presumption in favor of the secured party. Section 9-201,
however, admits only such exceptions as the U.C.C. provides. Proponents of the Received View must therefore provide antecedent transferees with appropriate exceptions provided for in the Code itself.
Notwithstanding the opinion of the commentators, the U.C.C.
does not provide antecedent transferees with a defensible set of exceptions to section 9-201. Moreover, historical and structural considerations affirmatively support my contention that "purchasers of the
86. For leading statements of the Received View in this context, see David G. Carlson &
Paul M. Shupack, Judicial Lien Priorities Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
Part 1, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 320 (1984); Ward, supra note 7, at 233.
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collateral" and "creditors" refer exclusively to purchasers and creditors who are subsequent transferees. Under my restrictive reading,
there is no need to protect antecedent transferees or even non-transferees from section 9-201. Rather, we should determine their rights
against a purported secured party by applying the property-transfer
baselines and any relevant exceptions, even if these are not found in
the Code. The relevant non-Code law varies from state to state, so the
rules determining priority in Antecedent-Transferee cases are by no
means uniform. Still, non-Code law follows fairly predictable patterns and addresses the same ostensible-ownership concerns that are
the focus of Article 9. Evaluated in terms of those concerns, results
reached under non-Code law are better than those that follow under
tortured attempts to "protect" antecedent transferees using Article 9.
In Antecedent-Transferee cases, we do more honor to Article 9 by
limiting its scope.
A.

The Received View and Its Problems

The "plain language" of section 9-201 declares a security interest

"effective . . .against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors." The statute says "purchasers" and "creditors"-not "subsequent purchasers" and "subsequent judicial lien creditors."
Linguistically, there is little reason to suspect that section 9-201 does
not apply to antecedent transferees. The Official Comment also
speaks in generic terms: section 9-201 is said to make a security interest "effective against third parties." There seems to be a prima facie
case for the Received View that Article 9 governs the AntecedentTransferee Scenario.
Yet, if section 9-201 applies against antecedent transferees, proponents of the Received View must identify the Code provisions that
create reasonable exceptions in favor of Rival Claimant. The leading
candidates are the priority rules stated in section 9-301(1) and the
rules found in section 9-203(1) relating to attachment. But none of
these rules provides a sensible set of exceptions applicable to disputes
between a secured party and an antecedent transferee.
1.

ARGUMENTS UNDER SECTION

9-301(1)

Section 9-301(1) protects subsequent judicial lien creditors and
subsequent buyers from section 9-201 by declaring that these persons
defeat "an unperfected security interest" in various circumstances. It
is much harder, however, to sustain the claim that section 9-301(1)
also resolves disputes between a secured party and an antecedent
transferee.
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ARTICLE 9
a.

Rival Claimant as Antecedent Judicial Lien Creditor

Section 9-301(l)(b) awards a judicial lien creditor priority over
"an unperfected security interest" if she acquires her lien "before the
security interest is perfected." Commentators argue that Rival
Claimant, as an antecedent judicial lien creditor, necessarily acquires
her encumbrance on X before Secured Party's security interest
attaches, which means that she acquires her lien "before the security
interest is perfected." 7 According to this interpretation, section 9301(1)(b) provides Rival Claimant with ironclad protection against
section 9-201's (alleged) presumption in favor of Secured Party's subsequently attaching security interest.
Commentators who invoke section 9-301(l)(b) on Rival Claimant's behalf are not entirely comfortable with this argument-and
with good reason. They acknowledge two principal objections. The
first is textual. In keeping with its caption ("Persons Who Take Priority Over Unperfected Security Interests"),"8 section 9-301(l)(b) tells
us when "an unperfected security interest" is subordinate to a judicial
lien. On its most natural interpretation, "an unperfected security
interest" refers to a security interest that has attached to X but is not
yet perfected-just as "an unfrosted cake" refers to a cake that has
been baked, but is not yet frosted. This natural reading, which finds
support in the Comments, 9 implies that section 9-301(l)(b) is
directed at situations in which the security interest attaches before
Rival Claimant acquires her judicial lien. Only in those cases can a
judicial lien attach while there is any security interest for us to call
"unperfected." But if Secured Party's encumbrance attaches before
Rival Claimant's lien, Rival Claimant cannot be an antecedent judicial lien creditor. Section 9-301(1)(b), it would appear, shelters only
judicial lien creditors who are subsequent transferees.
If section 9-301(l)(b) is going to protect antecedent judicial lien
creditors from section 9-201, "an unperfected security interest" must
encompass security interests that have not even attached by the time
Rival Claimant acquires her lien on X. But this construction is quite
a stretch. The Code is emphatic that Secured Party cannot have a
87. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1987); see id. § 9-303(1) (1987) ("A security interest is perfected
when it has attached and when all the applicable steps required for attachment have been
taken.").
88. The second half of the caption-"Rights of 'Lien Creditor' "-was added in 1972 in
connection with the introduction of § 9-301(4) regarding future advances. It is not relevant to
the present discussion.
89. See id. § 9-203 cmt. 1 ("Section 9-301(l) states who will take priority over a security
interest that has attached but which has not been perfected.").
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perfected security interest until his intended encumbrance attaches, 90
but this hardly entails that he has an unperfected security interest
while he is waiting for attachment to occur. 91 Until the hoped-for
security interest attaches, it is more sensible to describe Secured Party
as having no security interest, perfected or otherwise.
The commentators concede that the language of section 9301(l)(b) does not quite fit the dispute between a secured party and an
antecedent judicial lien creditor. Indeed, Professors Carlson and
Shupack claim to have discovered a "lacuna" in the statute, inasmuch
as section 9-301(1)(b) does not explicitly say "that subsequently created security interests are also junior to earlier judicial liens." 92 They
conclude that this omission is "almost certainly an accident." 93 The
text of section 9-301(l)(b) is flawed, but there can be no doubt (based
upon their view) that it was intended to protect antecedent judicial
lien creditors. This conclusion flows naturally from the Received
View: Unless an antecedent judicial lien creditor can invoke section
9-301(l)(b), she will always lose to a subsequent secured party under
' so we are forced
section 9-201. Such a result is "unthinkable," 94
to
construe section 9-301(l)(b) as applying in favor of antecedent judicial lien creditors.
The second objection to using section 9-301(l)(b) to protect antecedent judicial lien creditors is that it can lead to conflict with nonCode law that already seems to deal with these disputes. Statutes or
decisional law in every state regulate the creation and enforcement of
judicial liens. This local lien law must address priority disputes
between judicial lien creditors and competing transferees-including
buyers, secured parties, and rival judicial lien creditors. Local lien
law, as the phrase suggests, is not the subject of any uniform law or
model act, although it would be a good candidate for such treatment.
Regardless, local lien law remains an essential part of every state's
debtor-creditor law.
In some states, local lien law must deal with the ostensible-ownership problem created when a judicial lien attaches to X, but the
judgment debtor remains in possession of the relevant thing. In most
states, this cannot happen, because a judicial lien does not attach to X
until the sheriff levies, i.e., seizes the relevant thing or at least takes
steps to put third persons on notice of the judgment creditor's inter90. Id. § 9-303(1).
91. A cake cannot be frosted until it is baked, but someone who has not even baked a cake
does not have an unfrosted cake.
92. Carlson & Shupack, supra note 86, at 317 n.127; cf Ward, supra note 7, at 245.
93. Carlson & Shupack, supra note 86, at 317 n.127.
94. Id. at 320.
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est. 95 But a significant minority of jurisdictions, including New
York, 96 New Jersey,97 and West Virginia, 98 follow an older rule. 99

According to this rule, judicial liens attach to all the debtor's interests
"located"" ° in a given county as soon as the judgment creditor delivers a writ of execution to the local sheriff. In these date-of-delivery

jurisdictions, attachment of a judicial lien creates a serious ostensibleownership problem because persons dealing with a judgment debtor
cannot easily discover that a judicial lien has already attached to the
particular X in which they are interested. This problem persists until
the sheriff levies, which may involve a delay of days or weeks following delivery of the writ.

Aware of this publication problem, date-of-delivery jurisdictions
generally seek to protect a judgment debtor's transferees from secret
judicial liens. They do this by devising some way to keep the Encumbrance Rule from applying against someone who takes a transfer in

the period between attachment of the lien and the sheriff's levy. New
York, for example, holds that a judicial lien creditor's encumbrance is
subordinate to the rights of "a transferee who acquired ... the prop-

erty for fair consideration before it was levied upon." 10 ' New Jersey
takes a similar position, but adds the sensible requirement that the
transferee take without notice of the lien and give value for his inter95. For a general description of the process of attachment and execution, see 9 DEBTORCREDITOR LAW 37[A] (Thomas Eisenberg ed., 1992); CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 34,

§§ 6.05[3][b], [e]. Levying on immovables might be done by padlocking a machine, posting
signs, or taking similar actions. In some jurisdictions, a valid levy may be conducted, without
the sheriff doing much that would provide effective notice to third parties. For example, in
Credit Bureau of Broken Bow, Inc. v. Moninger, 284 N.W.2d 855 (Neb. 1979), a deputy sheriff
purported to levy on a pickup truck by putting his hands on the truck and announcing that he
was conducting a levy on behalf of the county. The deputy left the truck in the possession of
the judgment debtor, who promptly drove away and sold title to the truck to someone else. Id.
at 857. The Nebraska Supreme Court found that, although the deputy sheriff left the
judgment debtor in possession of the truck and keys, the judgment creditor had acquired a
valid judicial lien. Id. at 858. For an incisive discussion of the formal requisites for levy, see
STEPHAN RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTIONS 129-32 (3d ed.
1979).
96. N.Y. CiV. PRAC. L.&.R. § 5202 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1992).
97. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:17-10 (1987).
98. W. VA. CODE § 38-4-8 (1985).
99. See generally Daniel H. Distler & Milton J. Schubin, Enforcement Prioritiesand Liens:
The New York Judgment Creditor'sRights in PersonalProperty, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 46576 (1960). For a list of states adopting a date-of-delivery rule, see CRANDALL ET AL., supra

note 34, § 6.05[3][e].
100. Strictly, we should say that the judicial lien attaches to all of the judgment debtor's
interests that relate to things located in the relevant county. On my conceptualization,
encumbrances attach to interests, not to things; but the location of a thing may still determine
whether or not a particular interest becomes encumbered by delivery of a writ.
101. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L.&.R. § 5202(a)(1) (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1992).
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est before the sheriff actually levies.10 2 These non-Code rules vary
from state to state, making it unlikely that they are all perfectly fair or
optimally efficient. Nevertheless, they are plausible responses to the
ostensible-ownership problem created in jurisdictions where mere
delivery of a writ creates a lien.
The problem troubling the commentators is that application of
section 9-301(1)(b) in Antecedent-Transferee cases can lead to conflict
with this type of local lien law. Suppose that Rival Claimant wins a
judgment against Debtor on June 1 and delivers a writ of execution to
the sheriff on June 2. On June 10, before the sheriff takes any action
on the writ, Debtor borrows $5,000 from Secured Party, who knows
nothing of Rival Claimant, her judgment, or her writ. Debtor grants
him a security interest on X, Debtor's interest respecting a local drill
press. The next day, June 11, Secured Party perfects by filing. On
June 20, the sheriff finally levies on the drill press pursuant to the
writ. In a date-of-delivery jurisdiction, Rival Claimant's judicial lien
attaches on June 2, which is more than a week before the security
interest either attaches to X (June 10) or becomes perfected (June 11).
Under the Received View, Rival Claimant takes priority over Secured
Party because she "becomes a lien creditor" before Secured Party
obtains a perfected security interest.
Consider the same case under local lien law, assuming it declares
a judicial lien subordinate to the rights of subsequent purchasers who
take for value, without knowledge of the lien, before the sheriff levies.
Suppose that Secured Party takes his security interest, for value and
without knowledge of Rival Claimant's lien, on June 10. This precedes the sheriff's levy (June 20), so local lien law awards priority to
Secured Party. This seems reasonable, in view of the ostensible-ownership problem created by Rival Claimant's secret lien. But this result
contradicts the conclusion we reached when applying section 9301(1)(b).
Professor Ward diagnoses this conflict, but sees no analytical
solution to the difficulty. He ultimately resorts to Article 9 because it
contains a "more comprehensive priority scheme" than local lien
law.' 013 Applying Article 9 also promotes uniformity in commercial
law. A single rule, section 9-301(l)(b), resolves disputes whether
Rival Claimant is a subsequent or an antecedent judicial lien creditor
and, effectively, repeals local lien law as it applies to secured parties.
102. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:17-14 (1987). Although the statute applies, by its terms, only to
"buyers," it should sensibly apply to other kinds of purchasers, e.g., grantees of a security
interest.
103. Ward, supra note 7, at 245
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An analysis based on sections 9-201 and 9-301(l)(b) may promote uniformity, but it clashes with the basic policies animating Article 9. A rule that lets the antecedent judicial lien creditor always win
ignores the ostensible-ownership problems present in date-of-delivery
states. Rival Claimant's lien, pending the sheriff's levy, is for practical purposes a secret encumbrance. Awarding such a lien priority
over Secured Party's subsequent security interest, which he took for
value and without notice of Rival Claimant's interest, flies in the face
of traditional concerns about ostensible ownership. The aspirations of
Article 9 are better realized not by invoking section 9-301(l)(b), but
by applying local lien law, which usually protects subsequent goodfaith purchasers from secret judicial liens.
Professors Carlson and Shupack try to resolve Professor Ward's
difficulty by arguing that the conflict between section 9-301(1)(b) and
local lien law is merely apparent. They contend that section 9301(1)(b) makes Rival Claimant's prospects a function of exactly
when she "becomes a lien creditor." In date-of-delivery jurisdictions,
this would seem to happen when she delivers a writ of execution to
the sheriff. As Carlson and Shupack point out, however, the U.C.C.
never explicitly says that it adopts local definitions of when a judicial
lien attaches. This leaves us free to develop our own test of when
someone "becomes a lien creditor" for purposes of section 9301(1)(b). The test should promote the Code's purposes, which presumably include avoiding conflict with non-Code law.
Accordingly, Carlson and Shupack deny that Rival Claimant
"becomes a lien creditor" as soon as she delivers a writ to the sheriff.
They propose instead that Rival Claimant becomes a lien creditor
only when her lien becomes "established against bona fide purchasers" under local lien law. 105 Rival Claimant's judicial lien, on this
account, does not attach to X until that lien would be sure to prevail
against someone who purchased X from the judgment debtor in good
faith and for value. In most date-of-delivery states, judicial liens
achieve this status only when the sheriff levies. Thus, it is only then
that Carlson and Shupack would recognize Rival Claimant's lien for
purposes of section 9-301(l)(b).
By this device, Carlson and Shupack claim that "statutory conflict between the UCC and state lien law would be eliminated.' ' 06 We
104. At one point, Carlson and Shupack suggest that their proposed definition will have
"Optimal Welfare Effects." Carlson & Shupack, supra note 86, at 306. Professor Carlson
backed away from this kind of claim after his conversion to "legal existentialism." See
Carlson, supra note 2.
105. Carlson & Shupack. supra note 86, at 312.
106. Id.
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can see how their proposal works in my example involving the drill
press. Under local lien law, Rival Claimant's judicial lien does not
become "established against bona fide purchasers" until June 20,
when the sheriff levies on the press. Hence, under their proposal,
Rival Claimant's lien attaches on June 20, not June 2. This means she
"becomes a lien creditor" after the security interest is perfected (June
11). We can then apply section 9-301(l)(b) and conclude that priority
goes to Secured Party, which is the same result we reached under
local lien law. The conflict with Article 9 has disappeared.
There is something in this proposal that makes me think Carlson
and Shupack are putting a rabbit into a hat and pulling it out again.
But, whatever we think of the trick, the fact is that it does not always
work. Suppose that Secured Party somehow learns of Rival Claimant's judicial lien on June 8, two days before he makes the loan and
takes his security interest. In that case, Secured Party does not qualify as a good faith purchaser, so he cannot invoke the local rule protecting good faith purchasers. Rival Claimant therefore retains her
priority under local lien law. The conflict with section 9-301(1)(b)
now reappears. Regardless of the state of Secured Party's knowledge,
Rival Claimant's lien does not become established against bona fide
purchasers in general until the sheriff levies. Thus, she does not
become a judicial lien creditor until June 20, nine days after the security interest is perfected (June 11). Secured Party is therefore entitled
to priority under section 9-301(l)(b). 0 7
Conversely, Secured Party may enjoy priority under local lien
law, while Rival Claimant takes priority under section 9-301(1)(b).
Assume that Secured Party lends and takes his security interest without knowledge of the judicial lien; further assume that he does not
perfect his security interest until June 25. Under local lien law,
Secured Party wins because he is a purchaser for value, without
knowledge, who takes on June 10, ten days before the levy. It
appears, however, that Secured Party loses to Rival Claimant under
section 9-301(1)(b). Carlson and Shupack's proposal tells us that
Rival Claimant does not "become a lien creditor" until June 20, but
this is still early enough for her to defeat Secured Party, who does not
perfect until June 25. So again there is an unresolved conflict between
local lien law and Article 9.
107. Carlson and Shupack try to avoid this conflict by claiming that local lien law can be
applied against Secured Party in the period before the levy, while Article 9 will govern during
the post-levy period. See id. 312 n.114. But this attempt to limit the scope of Article 9 is
inconsistent with their endorsement of the Received View that section 9-201 applies against
antecedent judicial lien creditors.

ARTICLE 9

1993]

The proponents of the Received View face a dilemma. Their
commitment to an expansive interpretation of section 9-201 virtually
compels them to assume that section 9-301(1)(b) protects antecedent
judicial lien creditors from subsequent secured parties. Section 9301(1)(b), however, is strong medicine. If the rule, despite its inapposite phrasing, governs these disputes, the antecedent judicial lien creditor will always defeat the secured party. This result is inconsistent
not only with non-Code rules that govern priorities in date-of-delivery
jurisdictions, but also with the ostensible-ownership concerns that
drive Article 9. Carlson and Shupack's proposal rests on the sound
intuition that local lien law is better suited to handle disputes involving antecedent judicial lien creditors. Nonetheless, their commitment
to the Received View of section 9-201 prevents their applying these
rules directly. The best they can do is to try to shoehorn local lien law
into section 9-301(l)(b).
There is a simple way around these difficulties: reject the
Received View that section 9-201 applies against antecedent transferees. In that case, we do not have to appeal to section 9-301(l)(b); we
can leave the dispute to local lien law. We can drop the implausible
claim that "an unperfected security interest" includes a security interest that has not even attached; and we can avoid the unpalatable conclusion that an antecedent judicial lien creditor always defeats a
subsequent secured party, even when the judicial lien is a secret
encumbrance. Finally, rejecting the Received View eliminates any
concern that section 9-301(l)(b) must be "reconciled" with non-Code
law.
b. Rival Claimant as Antecedent Buyer
Several commentators have suggested that an antecedent buyer
can use section 9-301(l)(c) to protect herself against subsequent
secured parties. 8 A buyer of X takes free of "an unperfected security
interest" to the extent that she gives value and takes delivery of the
relevant thing, without knowledge of the (later) security interest,
"before ... [the security interest] is perfected." If section 9-301(l)(c)

is to protect an antecedent buyer, however, we must again construe
"an unperfected security interest" as including a security interest that
has not even attached by the time of the sale. As in the case of section
9-301(l)(b), this construction is obviously artificial.
Professor Harris, recognizing the linguistic objection, suggests
108. See Harris, supra note 7, at 810-17; Dolan, supra note 7, at 34-39; see also RAY D.
HENSON,

CODE

HANDBOOK

163-67 (1979).

OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
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that "a fortiori reasoning" may nonetheless establish an antecedent
buyer's priority against a subsequent secured party. The essence of
the argument is that "any buyer who prevails over the holder of an
attached but unperfected interest ought to prevail over a person who
holds no security interest at all."" It is uncontroversial that Rival
Claimant, when she is a subsequent buyer, takes free of an existing
("attached") security interest if she satisfies the requirements of section 9-301(l)(c). In such a case, she also prevails a fortiori against a
security interest that does not even exist. Hence, an antecedent buyer
who satisfies section 9-301(l)(c) is entitled to priority even if that provision does not explicitly address her dispute with a subsequent
secured party.
This argument is intuitively appealing, so it is important to see
where it goes wrong. It is true that a subsequent buyer sometimes
takes free of "an attached but unperfected interest." Nevertheless, the
reason she does is to protect her from the ostensible-ownership problem created by the (unperfected) security interest that attached before
the sale. An antecedent buyer, in contrast, does not need protection
from an ostensible-ownership problem created by a security interest
that (purportedly) attaches after the sale. The rationale for the
buyer's priority in the former case is absent in the latter. The fact that
a buyer can defeat an "attached but unperfected interest" does not
imply that the buyer should also defeat "a person who holds no security interest at all.""10 While there are good reasons for holding that
the antecedent buyer defeats the subsequent (purported) secured
party, these reasons do not relate to the ostensible-ownership problem
that is the focus of section 9-301(l)(c). If an antecedent buyer takes
priority, it is not on any "a fortiori" rationale.
Linguistic difficulties aside, applying section 9-301(1)(c) in cases
involving antecedent transferees leads to substantive complications."'I
The statute tells us that Rival Claimant can prevail only to the extent
109. Harris, supra note 7, at 816 n.45 (preferring an argument based on § 9-203(1)(c)); cf
Dolan, supra note 7, at 37 (referring to the "reasonable implication of section 9-301(1)(c)" that
a buyer who "could defeat a secured party, . . . should be able to defeat an unsecured party").
110. This is not to say that ostensible-ownership concerns are always irrelevant in these
cases. If Rival Claimant leaves her seller (Debtor) in possession after the sale, she creates an
ostensible-ownership problem that may work to the detriment of Secured Party. It would not
be unreasonable to require a buyer of X to take possession or risk losing to someone who
innocently gives value in the belief that the seller/debtor can still grant a security interest on X.
Section 2-402(2) does not exactly adopt such a rule, but it leaves the door open for the
application of non-Code law, which has traditionally taken a dim view of buyers who leave
their sellers in possession without some compelling justification.
111. Professor Dolan identifies one such conflict between Article 7 and 9. He resolves it
without difficulty, however, because § 9-201 specifically states that its presumption may be
overcome by any inconsistent U.C.C. rule. See Dolan, supra note 7, at 38.
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that she "gives value." Consider what this implies for gratuitous
transfers. Suppose that Debtor, observing all necessary formalities,
assigns X to Rival Claimant gratis. Rival Claimant thanks Debtor for
the gift and immediately takes possession of the relevant thing. A
subsequent purported transferee (e.g., Secured Party) cannot claim to
be misled by Debtor's ostensible ownership, because Debtor is no
longer in possession. Absent additional facts (such as Debtor's insolvency) that would allow Secured Party to avoid the gift as a fraudulent conveyance, the assignment of X is a done deal. But if section 9301(l)(c) applies in this context, Rival Claimant is in trouble. As a
gratuitous assignee, she does not "give value." If her donor (Debtor)
subsequently purports to grant a security interest on X to Secured
Party, section 9-301(1)(c) offers her no protection. Section 9-201,
with its (alleged) presumption against "purchasers of the collateral,"
claims another victim.
In principle, however, Debtor's gift to Rival Claimant should be
just as effective against Secured Party as it would be against a purported buyer, judicial lien creditor, or other transferee.' 1 2 Unless
Secured Party can identify an ostensible-ownership problem or challenge the assignment as a fraudulent conveyance, the gift to Rival
Claimant finally divests Debtor of any power to transfer X. There is
no reason to suppose that Article 9 was intended to frustrate traditional expectations concerning the effect of gifts, especially when there
is no policy reason why it should. Viewed in this light, section 9301(1)(c) is an implausible candidate to protect antecedent buyers
from section 9-201.
c.

Rival Claimant as Antecedent Trust Beneficiary

Debtor, which is vested with X, declares that it holds X in trust
for Rival Claimant. Rival Claimant acquires a "trust beneficiary's
interest" on X.11 3 The transaction is consensual, so Rival Claimant is
a "purchaser." Under the Received View, she would be subject to the
presumption supposedly established in section 9-201.
Nothing in section 9-301(1) mentions trust beneficiaries as such,
so we could conclude that Rival Claimant cannot rebut the presump112. In general, the principle of 'first in time, first in right" underlies the Code's priority
regime; it not evident why a gratuitous transferee ought to be an exception. See generally
Jackson & Kronman, supra note 2, at 1161-64, 1178-82 (discussing interplay of first-in-time
principle and Code's notice-filing system).
113. A more traditional analysis might view X as splitting into "legal X" and "equitable X,"
with the latter being assigned to Rival Claimant. I find it less confusing to regard Rival
Claimant as simply acquiring an encumbrance on X. It would be possible, however, to adopt
the other conception without affecting the substance of my critique.
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tion in favor of Secured Party. This would render a trust beneficiary's
interest vulnerable to any security interest that the trust grantor' 14
might subsequently grant to a third party. It is unlikely that the Code
was intended to undermine the position of trust beneficiaries in this
way. If it were, the drafters or their contemporaries would have commented on their radical innovation. Yet there is no suggestion that
anyone thought that Article 9 posed a threat to antecedent trust
beneficiaries.
Proponents of the Received View have two main lines of defense.
First, they can argue that section 9-301(1)(c), which plainly protects
certain buyers,"' legitimately extends to other types of purchasers,
including trust beneficiaries. Here I would agree: there is no reason
for section 9-301(1)(c) to protect buyers but not other types of purchasers.' 1 6 I contend, however, that section 9-301(l)(c) protects only
subsequent purchasers. The Received View demands that section 9301 (1)(c) be applied in favor of antecedent purchasers, which requires
that "an unperfected security interest" be read as including a security
interest that has not even attached by the time of the grant to the trust
beneficiary (or other purchaser).
Even if we accept this dubious interpretation, serious problems
remain. Under section 9-301(1)(c), Rival Claimant prevails against
Secured Party only if she gives value for her interest and takes possession of the relevant thing. Only rarely does a trust beneficiary acquire
her interest for value; it is also unusual for her to obtain possession of
the trust res. Is it plausible that section 9-301(1)(c) would require a
trust beneficiary to do both of these things to protect herself from a
subsequent purported secured party? Why should the trust beneficiary have to "give value" to ensure that her interest will stand up
114. For convenience, I assume that the grantor is the trustee. The analysis is similar when
the trustee is a third person.
115. Section 9-301(l)(c) also applies to "transferees in bulk," but there is no need to
consider them separately in this context.
116. An exception must be made for purchasers who are secured parties: they are governed
by §§ 9-301(l)(a) and 9-312(5). See U.C.C. § 9-301 cmt. 4 (1987) (paragraphs (1)(c) and
(1)(d) deal with purchasers other than secured parties).
Despite the Code's apparent intention to deal with all purchasers (other than secured
parties), the persons actually mentioned in §§ 9-301(l)(c) and 9-301(l)(d) are only a subset of
possible purchasers. For example, nothing in Article 9 protects a subsequent innocent lessee
for value from an unperfected security interest. The chattel mortgage acts, in contrast,
typically included the catch-all term "purchasers," which encompassed all transferees except
judicial lien creditors. Such a provision would improve Article 9.
New § 2A-307(2) attempts to fill this gap as regards lessees, although it does so by
introducing the anomalous idea that a prior-in-time secured party can "take subject to" a lease
that has not yet attached. It would be more accurate to say that the lessee "does not take
subject to" an existing but unperfected security interest.
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against a subsequent transferee? Assuming that the grantor was solvent and did not intend to defraud its creditors, why should the fact
that the transfer to Rival Claimant was gratuitous render her interest
vulnerable to Secured Party?
The possession requirement makes a bit more sense. If the
Debtor retains possession after creating a trust in favor of Rival
Claimant, Secured Party faces a classic ostensible-ownership problem.
But it is unlikely that section 9-301(1)(c) is supposed to deal with this
problem, because the law of trusts already does so much more plausibly. For centuries, trust law has followed a simple rule in disputes
between a trust beneficiary and a subsequent transferee, including a
subsequent secured party: the subsequent transferee prevails only if
he is a good-faith purchaser for value. II If the beneficiary has
already obtained possession of the trust res, eliminating the ostensibleownership problem created by the attachment of her encumbrance,
the subsequent transferee will not be deemed a purchaser in good
faith. This is reminiscent of section 9-301(1)(c), which requires the
buyer (or trust beneficiary, let us assume) to take possession. But
trust law further holds that a subsequent transferee with knowledge of
the beneficiary's interest does not qualify as a good-faith purchaser,
even if the beneficiary has not yet taken possession of the res." ,8 Section 9-301(1)(c), in contrast, does not require that the secured party
take without knowledge. Rules that ignore actual knowledge are not
uncommon in Article 9, so we cannot dismiss application of section 9301(1)(c) on that ground alone. Yet the statute's failure to impose a
"no-knowledge" requirement on the subsequent transferee can easily
lead to conflict with trust law, which demands that the transferee be
an innocent purchaser.
Another conflict can arise because trust law requires that the
subsequent transferee be a purchaser for value.'' 9 This ensures that
the subsequent transferee invoking the protection of the rule can
demonstrate detrimental reliance on the grantor's (or other trustee's)
ostensible ownership of the trust res. Section 9-301(1)(c), however,
does not require that the subsequent transferee (Secured Party) give
117. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND). OF TRUSTS § 284 (1957); GEORGE T. BOGERT,
TRUSTS § 165 (6th ed. 1987).
118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 288, 291 (1957). Knowledge of sufficient
facts to put the transferee on notice that a beneficiary's interest may have attached can satisfy
the knowledge requirement. See id. § 297; AUSTIN W. ScOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, IV
SCOTT ON TRUSTS §§ 297-97.9 (4th ed. 1988).

119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 298-305 (1957); BOGERT, supra note 118,
§ 165. In a few cases where the donee has significantly changed his position to his detriment
before receiving notice that the interest in question is subject to the trust, subsequent donees
may also take free of an existing trust. ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 118, § 302.6.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:951

value; 2' instead, it demands that the trust beneficiary do so. This
requirement is inconsistent not only with trust law, which imposes no
such requirement, but also with the rationale for imposing a value
requirement in the first place.
These conflicts and anomalies all originate in the attempt to use
section 9-301(1)(c) to "protect" an antecedent trust beneficiary from
section 9-201. If we restrict section 9-301(1)(c) to cases involving subsequent trust beneficiaries, then it is perfectly reasonable that the trust
beneficiary should have to give value and take without knowledge of
the prior transfer. At the same time, it is understandable that no such
requirements are imposed on the secured party, who is the initial
transferee. The Received View of section 9-201, which encourages us
to invoke section 9-301(1) on behalf of antecedent transferees, thoroughly warps understanding of these elementary priority rules.1 2 1
2.

ARGUMENT UNDER SECTION

9-312(5)

Consider a situation in which Rival Claimant is a competing
secured party. As an antecedent transferee, Rival Claimant takes her
security interest on X before Secured Party takes his security interest
on X. It is unclear how this situation would be analyzed under the
Received View of section 9-201. If a security interest is effective
against both antecedent and subsequent purchasers, Rival Claimant's
security interest is effective against Secured Party and Secured Party's
security interest is effective against Rival Claimant. This is a strange
sort of presumption: it applies in favor of, as well as against, both
parties to the dispute.
Be this as it may, the Received View generally yields the correct
results in particular disputes between two secured parties. The contestants will both look to Article 9 to determine their relative priority.
This is the correct course because one of the secured parties must be a
120. It is true that, before a security interest can attach, the secured party must "give value"
for the encumbrance. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(b) (1987). The Code's definition of what it means
to "give value," § 1-201(44), is more liberal than traditional trust law's. For example, the
mere existence of a debt owed to the secured party is enough to make a security interest given
"for value" under the U.C.C. See id. § 1-201(44)(b) (1987). But a transfer to secure an
antecedent indebtedness would not be a transfer "for value" under traditional trust principles.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 304 (1957). Someone can thus be a secured
party under Article 9 without being a purchaser for value under trust law.
121. It goes too far to claim that traditional trust law is incorporated into the Code via § 1103's reference to the "principles of... equity." If § 9-301(l)(c) means what the Received
View says it does, it qualifies as a "particular provision of this Act [i.e., the U.C.C.]" and
therefore displaces older law. Trust law is therefore unavailable to "supplement" an analysis
under Article 9 until we show that section 9-301(l)(c) is not intended to apply to these cases.
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subsequent purchaser relative to the other.12 2 In the SubsequentTransferee Scenario, Rival Claimant is the subsequent secured party;
it is she who needs protection from section 9-201. In AntecedentTransferee cases, Secured Party is the subsequent "purchaser of the
collateral." Either way, Article 9 supplies both the baseline rule and
the relevant exceptions. This eliminates the possibility of conflict with
non-Code law and ensures that the rule applied to resolve the dispute
will be the right one, the first-to-file-or-perfect test.

3.

ARGUMENTS UNDER SECTION

9-203(l)(c)

If an antecedent transferee doing battle with a secured party finds
no solace in the priority rules set out in sections 9-301(1) and 9312(5), she may try to use section 9-203(1). This section provides that
a purported security interest does not attach and is "not enforceable
against the debtor or third parties" unless three conditions are met.
One of these, stated in section 9-203(1)(c), is that the person purporting to grant the security interest must have "rights in the collateral."
Rival Claimant's argument under section 9-203(l)(c) is that the initial
transfer from Debtor to Rival Claimant leaves Debtor without the
"rights in the collateral" that are necessary if Secured Party is to
acquire a security interest in the subsequent transaction. If this argument succeeds, the purported security interest is unenforceable
against Rival Claimant. The antecedent transferee (Rival Claimant)
therefore overcomes section 9-201's alleged presumption in favor of
3

12
the secured party.

This argument sounds straightforward, but section 9-203(1)(c) is
actually one of Article 9's most problematic provisions. Controversies involving section 9-203(1)(c) usually come up in disputes between
a purported secured party and an antecedent transferor to the debtor,
so it is more convenient to examine the "rights requirement" in connection with the Antecedent-Transferor Scenario. 124 Still, I offer
three observations concerning section 9-203(1)(c)'s possible application in favor of antecedent transferees.
First, Rival Claimant's argument is strongest when Rival Claimant is an antecedent assignee. If Debtor sells or donates X to Rival
Claimant, Debtor is divested of that interest, which makes it intui122. Actually, the possibility also exists that the conflicting encumbrances will attach to X
simultaneously. In that case, neither secured party is a subsequent transferee. I do not deal in
this paper with "ties", which do not fit any of my scenarios, although it would not be difficult
to propose a solution.
123. See Harris, supra note 7, at 816-17 (applying a similar analysis in favor of antecedent
buyers).
124. See infra Part V.
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tively plausible for Rival Claimant to claim that Debtor lacks "rights
in the collateral" when it subsequently purports to encumber X in
favor of Secured Party. In antecedent-assignee cases, section 9203(1)(c) could operate as a substitute for the Vestedness Rule.' 25
This leads to difficulties, however, because section 9-203(1)(c)
does not say that only an assignment of X will deprive Debtor of
"rights in the collateral." The Code fails to define this crucial
phrase,' 26 thereby allowing an antecedent encumbrancerto argue that
she, too, is entitled to invoke section 9-203(l)(c) against a subsequent
secured party. Suppose, for example, that Debtor grants Rival Claimant a security interest on X. Debtor then purports to grant Secured
Party a competing security interest on X. Rival Claimant argues that
the attachment of her security interest in the first transaction left
Debtor with insufficient "rights in the collateral" to permit Secured
Party's purported interest to attach in the second transaction. Rival
Claimant would then be entitled to prevail even without perfecting.
Obviously, this cannot be right. If we accepted Rival Claimant's
argument under section 9-203(l)(c), the elaborate system of priority

rules in section 9-312 would be unnecessary.1 27 We may not really
know what "rights in the collateral" means, but section 9-203(l)(c)
must be satisfied even when X is already encumbered by a security
interest.
If Rival Claimant holds a judicial lien on X rather than a security

125. I should point out that a different analysis results when X relates to accounts or chattel
paper. Section 9-102(l)(b) declares that Article 9 "applies . . . to any sale of accounts or
chattel paper"; in the same vein, "security interest" is defined in § 1-201(37) to include "any
interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper which is subject to Article 9." The Code, in
effect, commands us to recharacterize sales of such interests as encumbering transfers. The
seller of title to an account is treated as granting the buyer a security interest on that title,
which means that a subsequent purported transfer of title presents no problem under the
Vestedness Rule. Because the initial transfer is deemed to create a security interest, the
conflict with the subsequent transferee presents a conventional dispute between a secured party
(the original "buyer" of title to the account) and a subsequent transferee.
126. Section 1-201(36) does not define "rights"; it merely observes that the term "includes
remedies." The definition of "collateral" in § 9-105(l)(c) as "the property subject to a security
interest", is similarly unhelpful. The 1962 version of Article 9 appears, at first sight, to be
more useful. It specifies that "a debtor has no rights" respecting various sorts of thingscrops, fish, "contract rights," etc-until those things come into (legal) existence. U.C.C. § 9204(2) (1962). This rule does not affirmatively tell us when a debtor acquires the requisite
"rights." Instead, it holds that the debtor cannot have "rights" until the thing in question
reaches (so to speak) legal maturity. The rules contained in the 1962 version of U.C.C. § 9204(2) were deleted in 1972.
127. Accepting Rival Claimant's argument also would contradict § 9-311, which affirms
that, notwithstanding attachment of a security interest, "[t]he debtor's rights in collateral may
be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred (by way of sale, creation of a security interest,
attachment, levy, garnishment or other judicial process) .... " (emphasis supplied). The
presence of a security interest must not prevent a second security interest from attaching.
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interest, her argument under section 9-203(1)(c) cannot be dismissed
so automatically. Accepting Rival Claimant's assertion that attachment of her judicial lien deprives Debtor of the "rights" necessary to
support a subsequent security interest would not render section 9301(l)(b) a nullity. Section 9-301(l)(b) could continue to govern disputes between a secured party and a subsequent judicial lien creditor,
while section 9-203(l)(c) would deal with antecedent judicial lien
creditors.
While I maintain that section 9-301(1)(b) protects only subsequent judicial lien creditors, I reject the idea that disputes involving
antecedent judicial lien creditors are covered by section 9-203(1)(c).
To establish such a position, Rival Claimant would first have to argue
that attachment of her judicial lien deprives Debtor of the necessary
"rights." However, we have already determined that attachment of a
security interest would not deprive Debtor of the required "rights." In
their basic structure and function, security interests and judicial liens
are nearly identical, so it is hard to justify such disparate findings
regarding their effects on Debtor's "rights."
Accepting the position that antecedent judicial lien creditors are
covered by section 9-203 also creates a conflict with non-Code law.
Results under section 9-203(l)(c) should be consistent with local lien
law. As we have seen, however, an antecedent judicial lien creditor
will typically be subordinate to a subsequent secured party who takes
for value and without notice before the sheriff levies. To avoid conflict, Debtor's "rights in the collateral" must satisfy section 9203(l)(c) in exactly those circumstances in which local lien law permits the Secured Party to defeat Rival Claimant. Given the variability of local lien law, this is impossible unless having "rights in the
collateral" simply means that the secured party would prevail under
local lien law. Having gone this far, why not admit that local lien
law, not Article 9, governs the dispute?
Finally, there is the complication that section 9-203(l)(c) makes
"rights" a prerequisite to enforcing a purported security interest
against anyone, including the debtor. If the mere presence of Rival
Claimant's lien were sufficient to prevent Secured Party's purported
security interest from attaching, this would protect Rival Claimant,
but it would be fatal to Secured Party. An appropriate analysis
should allow Secured Party a junior encumbrance, rather than no
encumbrance at all. Protecting Rival Claimant should not render the
security interest unenforceable against Debtor. Reliance on section 9203(l)(c), however, yields precisely this result.
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The Origins of Section 9-201

The Received View of section 9-201 generates a variety of textual
and substantive problems when Rival Claimant is an antecedent
transferee. The U.C.C. rules that might protect antecedent transferees simply fail in these circumstances. Given that these same rules
protect subsequent transferees, the Received View must be mistaken.
Despite its broad phrasing, section 9-201 should not be read to make a
security interest effective against antecedent transferees.
I now turn to the affirmative statement of my thesis, namely, that
section 9-201 simply codifies the Encumbrance Rule as that baseline
applies in favor of secured parties and against subsequent transferees.
It is important to consider what Grant Gilmore, the principal drafter
of Article 9, and Peter Coogan, an early and astute commentator, had
to say about section 9-201 and conflicts involving an antecedent transferee. The record is sparse, which is itself significant, and requires
explanation. Nevertheless, it supports my contention that section 9201 was not intended to depart from the sort of analysis that would
have been made under the chattel mortgage acts. This is important
because the old acts, which contain language very similar to section 9201's, dealt exclusively with a secured party's struggle against subsequent transferees. If Gilmore and Coogan, the two preeminent early
commentators on Article 9, found nothing remarkable in section 9201, there is little reason to think that we should either. Viewing section 9-201 as codifying the Encumbrance Rule means that it is an
important provision, but in no sense revolutionary.
1.

ARTICLE 9 AND THE "AFFIRMATIVE APPROACH"

Section 9-201 did not attract much attention when the Code was
under consideration in the 1950s and '60s and little has been written
about its origins. If the adherents of the Received View are correct to
suppose that section 9-201 establishes a presumption good against all
the world, they must explain why contemporaries failed to comment
on this striking innovation. The chattel mortgage acts did not recognize a universal presumption in favor of a secured party, so adoption
of a universal presumption in the U.C.C. should have excited controversy, or at least comment. Nevertheless, the first generation of Code
commentators was largely silent regarding section 9-201.28 If their
128. Early commentary does not suggest that section 9-201 was intended to expand the
scope of Article 9 relative to the chattel mortgage acts. There were extensive discussions of the
deficiencies of chattel mortgages and other security devices, but the lack of a universal
presumption in favor of the secured party was never presented as a problem. See, e.g., Allison
Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing,62 HARV. L. REv. 588, 590-97, 599-
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reticence counts for anything, it indicates that section 9-201 was not
understood to play the role that the Received View assumes it does.
In an early article, Peter Coogan observed that section 9-201
"was intended to reverse the negative approach typical of chattel
mortgage statutes."' 2 9 Typically, the chattel mortgage acts declared a
security interest "ineffective" or "void as against" certain persons
unless it was properly perfected. 3 ' The "negative approach" taken
by the acts is manifested in their declaration that a security interest
would not be effective against certain subsequent transferees-a legacy of the animus against nonpossessory security interests that had
been a feature of Anglo-American law since the sixteenth century.
Reversing this "negative approach" was simply a matter of a rephrasing the old acts. 131 Instead of stating that security interests are "void"
unless certain conditions are met, section 9-201 declares security
interests "effective" unless certain conditions are not met. The task of
specifying these conditions is left to a separate set of priority rules,
principally sections 9-301(1) and 9-312(5).
The drafters' shift to an "affirmative approach" may have lifted
the spirits of secured parties, but there is nothing to indicate that this
new approach was intended as a substantive innovation.132 If the purpose of section 9-201 had been to make security interests effective
against persons other than the "subsequent purchasers" and "creditors" named in the chattel mortgage acts, it would have been appropriate for Coogan to have mentioned it. He might have announced,
with appropriate fanfare, that section 9-201 transcends the limited
approach of the chattel mortgage acts by adopting a universal pre601 (1949); Grant Gilmore & Alan Axelrod, Chattel Security: Part I, 57 YALE L.J. 517, 52938 (1948); Francis Ireton, The Proposed Commercial Code: A New Deal in Chattel Security, 43
U. ILL. L. REV. 794, 805-18 (1949); Homer Kripke, The "Secured Transactions" Provision of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 VA. L. REV. 577 (1949); Homer Kripke, Chattel Paper as a
Negotiable Specialty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 57 YALE L.J. 1209, 1210-12
(1950); Karl Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 687

(1948); Marvin Schwartz, Pennsylvania Chattel Security and the Uniform Commercial Code,
98 U. PA. L. REV. 530, 537-41 (1950).
129. Coogan, supra note 8, at 7 (1963) (citing New Jersey and New York lien law, as well as

the California Civil Code as representative of his position).
130. See supra note 54.
131. Cf. Peter F. Coogan & John Bok, The Impact of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial

Code on the Corporate Indenture, 69 YALE L.J. 203, 236 (1959) ("Section 9-201 ...creates a
presumption of validity, and represents a reversal of some of the older chattel security laws
which began from the opposite approach. But it probably goes little further than to state this

general principle.") (footnotes omitted).
132. However, shifting to an affirmative approach created other consequences for Article 9.
The task of stating exceptions to § 9-201 was assigned to the various Article 9 priority rules.
This no doubt helped them to blossom into their present state of complexity. See, e.g., § 9312(1)-(7).
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sumption in favor of the secured party. However, Coogan just points
to the relatively trivial reformulation of section 9-201 in "affirmative"
terms.
Coogan passed up another opportunity to comment on an
expanded role for section 9-201 and its consequences for antecedent
transferees. In his theory of the status of "future advances" under the
1962 Code, Coogan presents a hypothetical. On January 1, Secured
Party files financing statements covering Debtor's accounts, but he
neither extends credit to Debtor nor takes a security interest at that
time. On February 1, Rival Claimant, who has won a $900,000 judgment against Debtor, acquires a judicial lien on Debtor's interest
respecting the accounts. On February 10, Secured Party lends Debtor
$500,000 and Debtor grants him a security interest on its interest
respecting the accounts. "It would seem clear," Coogan concludes,
"that [Secured Party] is behind [Rival Claimant's] $900,000 lien."' 33
Interestingly, Coogan does not say why Rival Claimant should
come ahead of Secured Party. Coogan just says it is "clear," as
indeed it would have been under the lien law of most states. 3 4 Would
Coogan have treated the priority issue so casually if he subscribed to
the Received View of section 9-201? Because the judicial lien attaches
before the security interest, Rival Claimant is an antecedent judicial
lien creditor. However, the Received View holds that Secured Party
presumptively is entitled to priority. How, then, can it be "clear" that
Rival Claimant prevails?
Under the Received View, the answer must be found in section 9301(l)(b). Rival Claimant would have to make the now-familiar, but
still implausible, argument that "an unperfected security interest"
includes a security interest that has not yet attached. Because Coogan
wrote in 1963, when the Code was beginning its trek through the state
legislatures, it is unlikely that he would have assumed that his audience was already familiar with, and accepted, the argument for Rival
Claimant under the Received View. 135 Coogan would at least have
133. Peter F. Coogan & Nahum L. Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code
upon Receivable Financing-SomeAnswers and Some Unsolved Problems, 76 HARv. L. REV.
1529, 1549 (1963).
134. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing rule in date-of-levy jurisdictions).
135. Responding to Coogan a few years later, a commentator brought up § 9-301(l)(b) and
suggested that it might be unsuited to deal with antecedent transferees. See John J.Creedon,
IMPACT ON LIFE COMPANIES OF THE FEDERAL TAX LIEN ACT OF 1966 35 n. 114 (1967) ("It

might be argued that . . .[section] 9-301(l)(b) does not apply because the future advance
problem does not involve an unperfected security interest but a non-existent security interest.
Under the latter approach, the priority problem between the lien for the future advances and
the lien creditor might not be decided under the Uniform Commercial Code."). Creedon's
intuition was correct, although he did not link it to an interpretation of § 9-201.
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cited sections 9-201 and 9-301(1)(b) and given his readers a chance to
work out the implications for themselves. But he mentions neither
provision in connection with his hypothetical involving an antecedent
judicial lien creditor. 136 For Coogan to call Rival Claimant's priority
"clear" without explanation or reference to Article 9, he must have
assumed that some general principle, such as the Encumbrance Rule,
mandated that result. 137 If Coogan subscribed to the Received View,
he seems not to have realized it.
Grant Gilmore, the principal drafter of Article 9, had little to say
about section 9-201. His monumental treatise on secured transactions, which covers over 1,300 pages, refers to section 9-201 only four
times.' 38 These four references contain nothing to suggest that he
thought the new provision marked a departure from pre-Code law.
Conversely, his discussions of pre-Code law do not suggest that section 9-201 was any kind of watershed. 139 Gilmore, who was fond of
revolutions, certainly would have celebrated the revolutionary implications of section 9-201 if he had thought there were any to
celebrate. '"

Still, there is a passage in the treatise that I find troubling.
Presenting Coogan's theory concerning future advances, Gilmore
describes a situation in which Coogan would regard Rival Claimant
as having acquired a judicial lien before Secured Party's security
136. Contrast this with Coogan's explicit discussion of the steps necessary for a security
interest to "be good against subsequent lien creditors." See Coogan, supra note 8, at 3
(emphasis added).
137. We should also consider Coogan's passing reference in another early article to nonCode law that "governs the relationship between judgment creditors and transferees of the
debtor's property"-i.e., local lien law. Peter F. Coogan, Intangibles as Collateral under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 77 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1033 (1964). Criticizing a proposed
amendment to Article 9 then under consideration in California, Coogan observed that "there
may be difficulty reconciling the [proposed] provision with existing [lien] law ..
" Here
Coogan demonstrated his awareness of non-Code law governing judicial liens (he even cited
New York's date-of-delivery statute) and his sensitivity to the possibility of conflict between
this law and Article 9. In warning against the California amendment, Coogan was apparently
confident that no conflict existed between local lien law and the existing provisions of Article 9.
In particular, he must not have shared the concern of Professors Ward, Carlson, and Shupack
that § 9-301(1)(b) could clash with local lien law. Coogan's attitude would not have made
sense if he had thought § 9-201 applies against antecedent judicial lien creditors.
138. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 1387.
139. See 1 GILMORE, supra note 1, §§ 2.1 - 2.5; 10.1 - 10.2.
140. An impressionistic survey of other early commentary suggests that § 9-201 did not
appear revolutionary at the time. See, e.g., Leon M. Cooper, New Wines in New Bottles: The
Uniform Commercial Code and the California Law of Chattel Security, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 265
(1954); Richard D. Cooper, Effect of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon Chattel
Mortgages in Kentucky, 47 Ky. L.J. 94 (1958); HENSON, supra note 108; Note, California
Chattel Security and Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 8 UCLA L. REV. 812, 820
(1961).
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interest was able to attach. Gilmore concluded that it is "obvious"
that the judicial lien creditor takes priority.141 In reaching this result,
Gilmore might simply have relied on the fact that the security interest
attached after the judicial lien-as I believe Coogan did. But he goes
further than this, noting that the security interest was unperfected
until it attached. This is troubling because it sounds like a step in the
argument that "an unperfected security interest" includes a nonexistent security interest-an argument that an antecedent judicial lien
creditor must make in order to bring herself under section 9301(1)(b).
Gilmore does not mention section 9-301(l)(b), but he seems to
hint at some such rationale for Rival Claimant's priority over Secured
Party in Antecedent-Transferee cases. I think he did not fully consider the implications of his observation regarding Secured Party's
unperfected status. This would not be too surprising, because he was
presenting what seemed to be a relatively minor step in Coogan's general argument about future advances. Gilmore went on to reject Coogan's theory, contending that Rival Claimant was in fact a subsequent
judicial lien creditor. 142 This rendered moot the question of how an
antecedent judicial lien creditor could prevail against a subsequent
secured party. Under these circumstances, Gilmore's dictum concerning the relationship between attachment and perfection of security interests does not indicate a serious intellectual commitment on his
part.
Gilmore's omission of an explicit discussion of section 9-201 and
its effect on the scope of Article 9 is a more significant indication of
how he understood the situation. If either Gilmore or Coogan had
subscribed to the Received View of section 9-201, they would have
commented on its divergence from the system of the chattel mortgage
acts. Their silence on this point makes sense, however, if we recall
Coogan's observation that the purpose of section 9-201 was simply to
promote a more "affirmative" view of secured transactions.
Nothing in the move away from the "negative" approach of the
chattel mortgage acts to the "affirmative" approach of section 9-201
required any change in the class ofpersons to whom the statute would
apply. There is no reason to assume, as the Received View does, that
the persons mentioned in section 9-201 ("purchasers of the collateral"
and "creditors") were intended to be any different from the "subsequent purchasers" and "creditors" featured in the chattel mortgage
acts. Section 9-201 presumes that a security interest is effective
141. 1 GILMORE, supra note 1, § 35.6.
142. See id.
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against these persons; in contrast, the typical chattel mortgage act
presumed that a security interest was void as against them. Although
there are some differences between the conditions under which the
respective presumptions can be rebutted, both regimes are motivated
by concern about the ostensible-ownership problems facing subsequent transferees.
When we recognize Article 9's relation to the chattel mortgage
acts, we can see that "purchasers of the collateral" is coextensive with
"subsequent purchasers" under the acts. This provides the historical
basis for excluding antecedent purchasers from the scope of section 9201, even though the phrase "purchasers of the collateral" contains
no explicit temporal qualification.143 Thus we conclude that applying
section 9-201 against antecedent purchasers exaggerates the scope of
Article 9-a result I have already reached on pragmatic and textual
grounds.
Similarly, I contend that the term "creditors" in the chattel
mortgage acts is coextensive with "creditors" in section 9-201. My
thesis, however, is that section 9-201 applies only to subsequent transferees; the term "creditors," although seemingly generic, really refers
only to subsequent judicial lien creditors. This sounds like a radical
re-interpretation: a creditor, as such, is not a transferee, still less a
"subsequent" transferee. We must turn to the jurisprudence of "creditors" under the chattel mortgage acts to find the justification for my
narrow reading.
2.

THE EXTENSION OF "CREDITORS": REVISITING THE RULE OF
KARST V. GANE

My claim that the chattel mortgage acts applied not to creditors
generally, but rather to subsequent judicial lien creditors only, may
surprise anyone who remembers Karst v. Gane.'" Decided by the
New York Court of Appeals in 1893, Karst was long famous for
declaring that the New York chattel mortgage act protected "antecedent creditors." '4 5 Although this seems further to undermine my thesis, Karst, as well as the statutes that followed it, 146 actually supports
143. Actually, the fact that § 9-201 speaks of "purchasers of the collateral" implies that the
purchasers in question are subsequent transferees. Only after a security interest has attached is
it appropriate to describe the targeted interest as "the collateral." See U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(c)
("collateral" means "the property subject to a security interest"). Prior to attachment, we
should call it "the intended collateral." Professor McDonnell makes a related point in his
discussion of attachment under § 9-203(1)(b). See Coogan & McDonnell, supra note 7,
§§ 2.08[l],[2] (1991).
144. 32 N.E. 1073 (N.Y. 1893).
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3440 (Kerr 1906) (repealed 1963) ("Every transfer of
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my contention that "creditors" referred exclusively to subsequent
judicial lien creditors.
Let me begin with the most obvious objection to my thesis: The
chattel mortgage acts often declared unperfected security interests
void as against "creditors," not just "judicial lien creditors." This is
true-at least as regards the older statutes' 47-but the notion that the

statutes protected creditors in general is mistaken. For it was hornbook law that a creditor, as such, lacked standing to invoke the chattel mortgage acts against a secured party. 148 This is only common
sense, because an unsecured creditor has no proprietary interest in her
debtor's property that can come into conflict with a security interest.14 9 The court in Karst had no quarrel with this principle, which it
specifically mentioned. 150 The court's statement that the New York
statute protected "antecedent creditors" did not relax the requirement
that the "creditor" become a judicial lien creditor in order to contest

the security interest.
What, then, did the Court of Appeals mean when it said that

"antecedent creditors" were within the ambit of the New York act?
Here it is necessary to understand a peculiar feature of the older chat-

tel mortgage acts. In certain situations, the older statutes declared a
security interest void as against a subsequent judicial lien creditor
who acquired her lien after the security interest had been perfected.1 "'
This could happen if the secured party waited an "unreasonably" long
time (e.g., more than ten days) to cure the ostensible-ownership prob-

lem created when he initially acquired his nonpossessory security
interest. If the secured party waited too long to perfect, a post-perfecpersonal property ... is conclusively presumed, if made by a person having at the time the
possession or control of the property, and not accompanied by... change of possession of the
things transferred, to be fraudulent, and therefore void, against those who are his creditors
while he remains in possession ....");cf id.§ 2957 ("A mortgage of personal property is void
as against creditors of the mortgager and subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers of the
property in good faith and for value ... ").
147. It is worth noting that all chattel mortgage acts "drafted in this century have protected
only lien creditors and purchasers." 1 GILMORE, supra note i, § 16.3. In those jurisdictions,
there would be no statutory argument that creditors, as such, are beneficiaries of the recording
acts.
148. See, e.g., I JONES, supra note 54, §§ 245-47; cf. 3 GARRARD GLENN, MORTGAGES,
DEEDS OF TRUST, AND OTHER SECURITY DEVICES AS TO LAND

§ 368.1,

at

1514 & n.4

(1943); id. at § 369.
149. But cf Julie S. Karchin, Note, Fraudulent Conveyance as a Property Right, 9
CARDOZO L. REV. 843, 844 (1987) (contending that unsecured creditors who have a power to
avoid a transfer under fraudulent conveyance law "are in fact secured creditors").
150. The "creditor" in Karst had obtained a judicial lien before bringing suit-and had
done so after the security interest attached-and was therefore a subsequent judicial lien
creditor. See Karst, 32 N.E. at 1075.
151. See I GILMORE, supra note 1, § 16.3 (describing pre-Code law).
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tion judicial lien creditor could take priority by showing that she had
extended credit to the debtor during the period of the secured party's
unreasonable delay. In other words, judicial lien creditors who had
lent "in the gap"-i.e., after the security interest attached but before
it was perfected-could win exemption from the Encumbrance Rule
even though they acquired their liens after' the secured party had
cured the ostensible-ownership problem. While rules protecting "gap
lenders" are unfamiliar to those of us raised on Article 9,152 they were
not particularly remarkable in their day.13
Karst is famous for its resolution of a different question: If a
secured party was guilty of unreasonable delay in perfecting, was his
security interest also vulnerable to a post-perfection judicial lien creditor who extended credit before the security interest attached? Karst
answered in the affirmative, holding that the judicial lien creditor prevailed even though she lent "before the gap." '5 4 The court reasoned
that a creditor's detrimental reliance on a debtor's ostensible ownership during the gap period did not necessarily have to take the form of
a decision to extend credit.' 55 A creditor who lent before the security
interest attached might "be lulled into security, and forbear the collection of [her] debts at maturity, by the apparent unincumbered possession and ownership by the debtor of property covered by an
undisclosed [security interest]."'' 56 The fact that the creditor lent
"before the gap" did not eliminate the possibility that she detrimentally relied on the debtor's ostensible ownership at some time during
the gap period. It is a mistake, Karst concluded, to deny gap protection to a post-perfection judicial lien creditor on the ground that she
extended credit before the security interest attached. 5 7
Viewed from this perspective, Karst's holding regarding "antecedent creditors" is not inconsistent with my claim that the acts protected only subsequent judicial lien creditors. The decision certainly
152. Cf UCC § 9-301 cmt.3 (1987) (§ 9-301(l)(b) "rejects the rule applied in many
jurisdictions in pre-Code law that an unperfected security interest is subordinated to all
creditors, but requires the lien obtained by legal proceedings to attach to the collateral before
the security interest is perfected.").
153. There was, however, controversy about whether a trustee in bankruptcy, in her guise
as a hypothetical judicial lien creditor, could claim to have extended credit "in the gap." In a
famous but mistaken decision, the Second Circuit said that she could. See Constance v.
Harvey, 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955). The Supreme Court
set matters right in Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961). Present
§§ 544(a)(1) and (a)(2) remove any doubt by specifying that the hypothetical judicial lien
creditor "extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of the case."
154. Karst v. Gane, 32 N.E. 1073 (N.Y. 1893).
155. Id. at 1074.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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did not abandon the requirement that a creditor obtain a judicial lien.
Rather, it allowed post-perfection judicial lien creditors who lent
either "in the gap" or "before the gap" to prevail against a secured
party who waited too long to perfect. This is not the same as holding
the act applicable to antecedent judicial lien creditors. Nor would
such a holding make sense under the rationale of Karst, because a
creditor who acquired a judicial lien before the security interest
attached would have little, if any, occasion to rely to her detriment on
a later ostensible-ownership problem. Karst focused on the effects of
unreasonable delay on subsequent lienholders.' 58 Such a restrictive
reading of Karst is consistent, moreover, with subsequent accounts of
the decision. Gilmore, for example, never suggested that the decision
made a tardily recorded security interest vulnerable to an antecedent
judicial lien creditor, despite the fact that an antecedent judicial lien
creditor is necessarily also an "antecedent creditor."' 59
The use of the term "creditors" in the chattel mortgage acts,
then, implied a good deal less than met the eye: even Karst's "antecedent creditors" turn out to have been subsequent judicial lien creditors. Cases involving antecedent judicial lien creditors were beyond
the scope of the chattel mortgage acts and would have been governed
by local lien law. Otherwise, the courts would have had to deal with
conflicts between the acts and the laws governing judicial liens. The
absence of evidence of such conflicts suggests that the division of
labor between the two types of statutes was well understood at the
time. The chattel mortgage acts covered subsequent judicial lien creditors; cases involving antecedent judicial lien creditors were governed
by local lien law.
"Creditors" under the acts and "creditors" under section 9-201
were intended to be coextensive. In both cases, the term refers to
subsequentjudiciallien creditors. Contrary to the Received View, section 9-201's declaration that a security interest is "effective ... against

creditors '""6° does not mean that a security interest is enforceable
against a creditor who acquires a judicial lien before a security interest
158. Id. at 1075 (If there is no delay in recording, there is "no ground upon which
subsequent lienholders could question the validity of the mortgage.") (emphasis added); id.
("The filing, under these circumstances, would be immediate, and make the mortgage valid, as
against liens subsequently acquired.") (emphasis added).
159. In a similar vein, Karst observed that an antecedent purchaser "would stand on his
paramount right, and needed no protection ... against a subsequent mortgagee." Id. at 1073
This "paramount right" would be the antecedent purchaser's priority under the Vestedness or
Encumbrance Rules. It would be the subsequent mortgagee who would need protection.
160. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1987).
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attaches. Hence, there is no need to invoke section 9-301(l)(b) to bail
out such creditors.
C. Conclusion: The Limited "Comprehensiveness" of Article 9
The proponents of the Received View cannot achieve sensible
and consistent results when Rival Claimant is an antecedent transferee. This demonstrates, from a pragmatic perspective, that section
9-201 should not apply in Antecedent-Transferee cases despite the
Code's use of the apparently generic phrases "purchasers of the collateral" and "creditors." A review of the historical origins of section 9201 leads to the same conclusion. Section 9-201 was intended to
apply to the same persons who were the subject of the acts-"subsequent purchasers" and "creditors." The term "creditors," although
apparently unqualified, referred only to subsequent judicial lien creditors. Even in light of Karst v. Gane, the chattel mortgage acts dealt
exclusively with subsequent transferees. The same is true of section 9201 of the U.C.C.
.A restrictive reading of section 9-201 relieves the pressure to
bring Antecedent-Transferee cases under the priority rules of section
9-301(1) or the attachment rule of section 9-203(l)(c). It also eliminates conflict with non-Code law. Substantively, this is all to the
good, because the exceptional rules of Article 9 are inadequate to deal
with ostensible-ownership problems created when Rival Claimant is
an antecedent transferee.
But a restrictive reading has its price: we must abandon the comforting idea that all the law that matters to security interests can be
found, neatly packaged, in Article 9. This is bound to meet resistance, for it seems contrary to the entire project of making secured
transactions part of the U.C.C. The comments to Article 9 open with
the declaration that the statute "sets out a comprehensive scheme for
the regulation of security interests in personal property and fixtures." 6 Under the Received View, this means that every (or nearly
every) conflict between Secured Party and Rival Claimant is resolved
by Article 9 - a state of affairs that would render the law relating to
secured transactions uniform from coast to coast. Local lien law
would continue to govern disputes between a judicial lien creditor and
a subsequent buyer or between two judicial lien creditors, but it would
not apply to disputes between a judicial lien creditor and a subsequent
secured party. Most of us are unfamiliar with the details of lien law
across the fifty states. But every commercial lawyer can recite section
161. Id. § 9-101 cmt. (1987) (emphasis added).
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9-301(1)(b). If I am right about section 9-201, these lawyers--or at
least their associates-will occasionally have to make an extra visit to
the library.
In what sense, then, is Article 9 "comprehensive"? The Code's
accomplishment is one of consolidation. Before Article 9, each state
had its own law of secured transactions162-rules governing (1) the
attachment and perfection of security interests; and (2) the relative
priority of secured parties and subsequent transferees. To make matters worse, the rules within a state typically varied depending on the
collateral involved. 163 Results under Article 9 sometimes vary as a
function of collateral type, but now the rules are stated in a single
statute. Formerly, a state might have had three or four independent
statutes and as many sets of public files giving notice of a security
interest.' 16 The drafters were justifiably proud of the simplification
achieved by Article 9, even though the statute (like its predecessors)
deals "only" with disputes involving a subsequent transferee. "Comprehensive," it turns out, is a relative term.
V.

THE ANTECEDENT-TRANSFEROR SCENARIO: (PURPORTED)
SECURED PARTIES VERSUS ANTECEDENT TRANSFERORS

In contrast to the two previous Scenarios, Antecedent-Transferor
cases open with X vested in Rival Claimant, not Debtor. Two transactions follow. First, Rival Claimant grants Debtor some limited
interest respecting X. This limited interest-call it "L"-might be a
leasehold interest on X, a security interest on X, a trust beneficiary's
65
interest on X, or any other sort of interest that takes X as its target.
In the second transaction, Debtor (now vested with L) purports to
grant the secured party a security interest, not on L, but on X (which
is still vested in Rival Claimant). Suppose, for example, that Rival
Claimant grants Debtor a leasehold interest on title to a drill press;
Debtor then purports to grant Secured Party a security interest on
162. See, e.g., statutes discussed supra note 146 and accompanying text.
163. See U.C.C. 9-101 cmt. (1987).
164. Cf id. (Article 9 "supersedes prior legislation dealing with such security devices as
chattel mortgages, conditional sales, trust receipts, factor's liens and assignments of accounts
receivable.").
165. Although L may well be an encumbrance on X, it need not be. I use "encumbrance"
to refer to the interests that are presumptively enforceable against a transferee of X under the
Encumbrance Rule. But certain types of interests relating to X-e.g., a contractual option to
buy X from someone on a certain date-are not generally enforceable against transferees of X.
If Helen sells title to her car to Isaac, he will probably take that title free of Jay's option to
acquire title to the car. Although it does not "run with" X, the option is nevertheless a
potential L-i.e., a limited interest respecting X that may itself be encumbered in favor a
secured party.
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title to the press. Rival Claimant's limited transfer to Debtor precedes Debtor's attempt to create a security interest, so Rival Claimant
is an "antecedent transferor." If Debtor defaults on its obligation to
Secured Party, can Secured Party enforce his (purported) security
interest on title to the press?

IRival Claimant

time

creation of limited
interest, L, on X
purported creation of
security interest on X

/

ISecured Pat
Figure 3: Secured Party v. Antecedent Transferor
Adherents of the Received View offer two very different
approaches to this question, both of which I contest on analytical and
substantive grounds. I begin with the fact that section 9-201
presumes a security interest to be effective only against "purchasers of
the collateral and ...creditors."' 66 This does not apply to antecedent
transferors, who, as transferors, are neither "purchasers" from, nor
"creditors" of, their transferees. Another argument for the secured
party-that priority is conferred by section 9-203(1), which deals with
attachment-also fails. Nevertheless, practically everyone assumes
that section 9-201 applies in Antecedent-Transferor cases. I argue
that this assumption can be traced to prevailing views of the structure
of secured transactions-in particular, to misconceptions regarding
the way security interests relate to competing property claims and to
the "things" that are their ultimate foci.
Next, I turn to the details of the analyses that have developed
under the influence of the Received View. There are two main
approaches to Antecedent-Transferor cases. The first-the "quantitative analysis"-treats the "size" of L as the critical variable in determining whether Secured Party will prevail against Rival Claimant. I
argue that the quantitative analysis is internally inconsistent, that it
leads to conflicts with non-Code law, and that it fails to explain why
the size of Debtor's interest should be so important in these cases.
166. U.C.C. 9-201 (1987).
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The second approach-the "qualitative analysis"-de-emphasizes
section 9-203(l)(c) and tries to open the door for the application of
non-Code law. While I support this program, I believe it cannot succeed so long as it takes section 9-201 as its starting point.
My own proposal rejects both the Received View of section 9-201
and the prevailing understanding of what happens in a secured transaction. Cases involving antecedent transferors should be analyzed
using the property-transfer baselines-specifically, the Vestedness
Rule-and any exceptional rules relevant under the circumstances,
whether or not these rules are part of the U.C.C. My proposed analysis can perhaps be reconciled with the phrasing of present section 9203(1)(c), but I favor revising the "rights requirement" and related
provisions to reflect a more precise understanding of the structure of
secured transactions and their place within general property-transfer
law. Accordingly, I offer new statutory language that avoids the difficulties that afflict prevailing accounts of Antecedent-Transferor cases.
A.

The Received View and Section 9-201

The Received View presumes a security interest effective against
everyone, including antecedent transferors. But the priority rules of
sections 9-301(1) and 9-312 do nothing to protect an antecedent transferor against a purported secured party. This shortcoming has
encouraged a redirection of attention to section 9-203(1)(c),' 67 which
declares that a purported security interest does not attach and "is not
enforceable against ...

third parties" unless the (would-be) debtor 6"

has "rights in the collateral." The basic argument in favor of the
antecedent transferor is that L, the limited interest she conveyed to
the debtor, does not endow the debtor with the "rights" required by
the statute. The purported security interest therefore does not attach
and cannot be enforced against the antecedent transferor, who is a
"third party" under section 9-203(1). When the debtor lacks suffi167. Section 9-203(1) provides that "[a] security interest is not enforceable.., and does not
attach unless:
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to agreement,
or the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description of the
collateral ... ;
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
My discussion assumes that the first two conditions have been satisfied; all that is at issue is the
requirement that the debtor have "rights in the collateral."
168. Actually, there is no need to speak of a "would-be debtor" because I use "debtor" to
refer to the person who purports to grant a security interest on X. Someone who does not
succeed in this effort is nonetheless a "debtor." See supra note 11.
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cient "rights," the alleged presumption in favor of the purported
secured party is overcome.
Before examining the difficulties that plague this argument and
its variations, consider two more fundamental questions. Does section 9-201 apply against antecedent transferors in the first place? If
not, does section 9-203(1) provide Secured Party with an independent
basis for claiming priority over Rival Claimant? Contrary to the
Received View, the answer to both these questions is "no." Attempts
to protect Rival Claimant using the "rights requirement" are, I submit, misguided from the outset.
1.

ARE ANTECEDENT TRANSFERORS EITHER "PURCHASERS"
FROM, OR "CREDITORS" OF, THEIR TRANSFEREES?

Section 9-201 declares a security interest effective "between the
parties [to the security agreement], against purchasers of the collateral
and against creditors." ' 69 Rival Claimant is not a "party" to the
security agreement between Debtor and Secured Party. 7 ° If Secured
Party is to prevail under section 9-201, he must do so because Rival
Claimant is either a "purchaser of the collateral" or a "creditor." Yet
a transferor, as such, is neither.
In the Antecedent-Transferor Scenario, Rival Claimant transfers
L to Debtor. This is the opposite of purchasing an interest from
Debtor. Hence, section 9-201 cannot make a security interest effective against Rival Claimant on the theory that she is a "purchaser of
the collateral."' 71 While there are transactions-most notably, conditional sales-in which an antecedent transferor comes within the
grasp of Article 9, the Code accomplishes this by recharacterizing the
transferor as a transferee.

72

169. U.C.C. 9-201 (1987).
170. Section 1-201(29) defines a "party" as "a person who has engaged in a transaction or
made an agreement within this Act." The definition distinguishes a "party" from a "third
party," but fails to define that latter term.
171. The Code defines "purchaser" in § 1-201(33) as a "person who takes by purchase."
Section 1-201(32) defines "purchase" as including "taking by sale, discount, negotiation,
mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an
interest in property." The core definition of "purchaser" as the beneficiary of a transfer made
with the consent of the transferor is standard in commercial law and bankruptcy. See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. § 101(43) (Bankruptcy Code's definition of "purchaser" as "transferee of a voluntary
transfer.").
It is irrelevant that Rival Claimant may have purchased X from somefourth person. If it
mattered, we would have to treat differently cases in which Rival Claimant became vested with
X other than by purchase-e.g., by finding the relevant chattel on the street, growing the
chattel herself, or taking X by judicial process. Such a distinction has no historical or
substantive foundation.
172. The transferor is viewed as purchasing a security interest from her transferee (the
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Intuitively, it does not seem that Rival Claimant becomes a
"creditor" simply by granting L to Debtor. But the point deserves a
closer look. Because Rival Claimant has granted Debtor a limited
interest on X, she necessarily retains certain rights against her trans73
feree. Do these rights make her a "creditor" of her transferee?1
Suppose, again, that L is a leasehold interest on title to a drill press.
Rival Claimant has a right that Debtor surrender the press at the end
of the lease term, but this hardly makes Rival Claimant a "creditor"
of the lessee. Two considerations determine Rival Claimant's status
vis-a-vis Debtor: (1) Rival Claimant remains vested with title to the
press, which carries with it a right to possession; and (2) this right is
in abeyance so long as Debtor's leasehold interest is in effect. Rival
Claimant has a "proprietary" right against Debtor. In this respect,
her right to take possession of the drill press upon termination of the
leasehold is no different from, say, Smith's proprietary right that
Jones stay off Smith's land. We do not say that Smith is Jones's
"creditor," even though Jones "owes" Smith a duty (a "proprietary
duty") not to enter the land. In the leasehold situation, Debtor has a
proprietary duty to surrender the press at the end of the lease term.
Rival Claimant has a proprietary right that Debtor do just that, but
Rival Claimant is not Debtor's "creditor" on that account. Creditors
have "personal" rights against their debtors. While a distinction
conditional buyer): A purported "retention . . . of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding
shipment or delivery to the buyer . . . is limited in effect to a reservation of a 'security
interest.' " § 1-201(37). "Reservation" is a term of art drawn from traditional conveyancing.
It describes a transaction in which A transfers X to B, and B immediately "grants back" to A
some limited interest relating to X. A "reserves" the limited interest, though B granted it to
him. See, e.g., Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 498 P.2d 987, 989 (Cal. 1972) ("A
reservation allows a grantor's whole interest ... to pass to the grantee, but revests a newly
created interest in the grantor."); 4 HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 972 (1939). Because the transfer back to A occurs with B's consent, A is a "purchaser" from
B. When § 1-201(37) limits the effect of the conditional seller's attempt to retain title to the
reservation of a security interest, it is telling us to view A as having assigned title to B, who
then grants A back a security interest on that title. A dispute between A and a subsequent
secured party, a subsequent judicial lien creditor, or a subsequent buyer is then a controversy
between two transferees. As such, it is governed by the Encumbrance Rule and falls within the
scope of section 9-201.
173. The Code is characteristically unhelpful to those seeking to define such a basic notion
as "creditor." Section 1-201(12) says only that "creditor" includes "a general creditor, a
secured creditor, a lien creditor and any representative of creditors, including an assignee for
the benefit of creditors, a trustee in bankruptcy, a receiver in equity and an executor or
administrator of an insolvent debtor's or assignor's estate." U.C.C. 1-201(12) (1987). The
Bankruptcy Code is somewhat more helpful. It defines "creditor" basically as someone with a
"claim." 11 U.S.C. § 101(9). "Claim" is defined broadly to include "any right to payment,"
I I U.S.C. § 101(4)(A), and "any right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if
such breach gives rise to a right to payment." I I U.S.C. § 101(4)(B). This comes close to the
idea of "personal rights" mentioned in the text.
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between proprietary and personal rights permeates commercial law,
contemporary analysts seem reluctant to recognize it, presumably
because they are wary of lapsing into formalism.' 7 4 Yet, it is hardly
possible to analyze existing legal materials without admitting a distinction between "owning" and "being owed."' 7 5
If we acknowledge this difference, we find no statutory basis for
applying section 9-201 against an antecedent transferor. We should
not extend "creditor" to include antecedent transferors as such,
unless we have convincing evidence that the drafters of Article 9
intended to abrogate the long-standing and fundamental distinction
between creditors and owners. It would be within the power of the
Code to abolish the distinction between personal and proprietary
claims, but nothing in the Code suggests that it has actually done
174. Professor Andrew, for example, cautions against relying on a distinction between
"contract rights" and "property rights," because the terms may merely be labels. See Michael
T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection", 59 U. COLO. L.
REV. 845, 924 (1988). I would add that "contract rights" are just one instance of what I am
calling "personal rights," which include non-proprietary claims not based on a contract or
other agreement. A familiar example is a tort victim's (personal) right to compensation from
her tortfeasor.
175. Professor Westbrook, paraphrasing Churchill, observes that "the property-contract
distinction is the worst possible, except for all the others." Jay L. Westbrook, A Functional
Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 260 (1989) (footnote omitted). To
avoid controversial associations, Westbrook proposes referring to proprietary (i.e., "property")
rights as "Interests in the Thing Itself." Id. at 258-59. Westbrook, like Andrew, speaks of
"contract rights" when he presumably means personal rights.
The introduction of a new term-"Interests in the Thing Itself"-may be unnecessary.
Lawyers in other parts of the English-speaking world regularly invoke the idea of
"proprietary" (or "real") rights without falling into formalism. See, e.g., PETER BIRKS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 49-50 (1985); LORD GOFF & GARETH JONES,
THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 55-56, 60-63 (3d ed. 1986); GOODE, supra note 39, at 77-78;
ROYSTON M. GOODE, PROPRIETARY RIGHTS AND INSOLVENCY IN SALES TRANSACTIONS I-

3, 10, 42 (1985); Royston M. Goode, Ownership and Obligation in Commercial Transactions,
103 LAW. Q. REV. 433, 433-41 (1987); David Stevens, Restitution, Property,and the Cause of
Action in Unjust Enrichment: Getting by with Fewer Things (Part1), 39 U. TORONTO L.J. 258,
290-95 (1989).
To avoid misunderstanding, I should note that I fully accept Hohfeld's fundamental
insight that all rights are rights against persons and are in that sense "personal." See WESLEY
N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING
(1919). But that is not the issue here. Our legal system frequently treats some rights (which it
calls "personal") differently from others (which it calls "proprietary"). Bankruptcy law is an
outstanding example. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON BANKRUPTCY 218-19, 317 (2d ed. 1990) (bankruptcy law
respects "property rights" asserted against the debtor or the debtor's estate); Stevens, supra, at
290-92 (discussing "the bankruptcy advantage" enjoyed by proprietary claims in AngloCanadian law). A Hohfeldian will insist that even "proprietary" rights are rights against
persons, but she need not deny that these rights receive special treatment. The Hohfeldian
point is that the justification for special treatment (assuming there is one) cannot be based on
the conventional distinction between rights "against persons" ("in personam") and rights
"against things" ("in rem").
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SO.1

True, a transferor may also have a personal claim against the
transferee and thus be a "creditor" in the usual sense. In a leasehold
situation, for example, the lessee will probably have undertaken to
pay rent, an obligation not inherent in a lessee's interest. The promise
to pay rent endows the lessor with a personal right against the lessee,
but this status is not essential to the lessor's rights qua lessor. Suppose a philanthropist leases title to a refrigerator to an orphanage for
one year without charging rent. The philanthropist is a lessor with a
right to get the machine back after a year, but this is a proprietary
right; the orphanage is not "indebted" to the philanthropist. Even if
the lessor is no philanthropist, she is not necessarily a "creditor."
Suppose she demands $1,000 as rent, which the orphanage pays in
advance. This is a commercial transaction, but it does not result in
the orphanage actually owing a debt to the lessor. The orphanage
must surrender the refrigerator at the end of the term, but the lessor is
not the orphanage's "creditor." Even in cases in which the duty to
pay rent is concurrent with the leasehold, the lessor's propriety rights
should be distinguished from her personal claim for rent.
I therefore reject any contention that section 9-201 applies, even
prima facie, against antecedent transferors. If an antecedent transferor is subject to a security interest purportedly granted by her transferee, it must be on other grounds.
2.

DOES SECTION 9-203(1) SUPPLY AN INDEPENDENT BASIS UPON
WHICH A SECURED PARTY CAN ASSERT PRIORITY?

Conventional analysis of Antecedent-Transferor cases has traditionally focused on how section 9-203(l)(c) can "protect" antecedent
transferors.'I" This is understandable in cases where Debtor's "rights
in the collateral" do not exceed the statutory threshold (whatever that
may be). In that event, section 9-203(1)(c) tells us, the purported
security interest is not enforceable against Rival Claimant. We can
then resolve the dispute without having to face the more fundamental
question of whether section 9-201 applies against Rival Claimant in
176. Professor Nickles reaches a similar conclusion in cases where the antecedent transferor
is a conditional seller, i.e., where he retains title to goods pending full payment by the
conditional buyer. "The term 'creditor' is defined by the Code, but not so broadly as clearly to
include such sellers." HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 4, § 18.01[2], at 18-5 n.16. Nickles says
that there is a "possible problem with relying on [U.C.C. § 9-201]" as the basis for the
purported secured party's priority against the conditional seller. Id. (emphasis added). I think
the problem is clear and present in any attempt to enforce a secured party's purported security
interest against an antecedent transferor.
177. See quantitative analysis, infra Part V.C. 1.
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the first place. But whenever we decide Debtor's "rights" are sufficient to permit attachment, the issue becomes unavoidable. If section
9-201 does not make a security interest effective against antecedent
transferors, what is the basis for awarding Secured Party priority over
Rival Claimant?
One might simply assume that section 9-203(1) itself confers priority on Secured Party. The idea would be that, because Secured
Party loses when Debtor's "rights" are insufficient, he must win when
section 9-203(l)(c) is satisfied. But this line of reasoning is a non
sequitur.'
Section 9-203(l)(c) states that the purported security
interest is not enforceable against "third parties" unless Debtor has
"rights in the collateral." This is equivalent to saying that a security
interest is enforceable only if it attaches. 179 Attachment, in other
words, is a necessary condition to enforcement of the security interest
against Rival Claimant. Secured Party, however, must establish that
attachment is a sufficient condition. Yet nothing in section 9-203
allows the inference that a security interest can be enforced against
Rival Claimant simply because it has attached. If we wish to know
against whom a security interest is "effective," we must consult section 9-201, not section 9-203(1).
From a structural perspective, it makes sense that section 9203(1) does not provide an independent ground of priority. The class
of persons mentioned in section 9-203(1)-"the debtor or third parties"-includes all the persons named in section 9-201 ("parties [to
the security agreement],

. . .

purchasers of the collateral and ... credi-

tors"). If section 9-203(1) independently conferred priority on
Secured Party, what would be the point of section 9-201? Moreover,
if section 9-203(1) were the source of Secured Party's priority,
shouldn't it include an "except-as-otherwise-provided" clause, like the
one appearing in section 9-201? Certainly, the drafters intended the
exceptional rules in sections 9-301(1) and 9-312 to have some effect!
It is conceivable that the drafters misdrafted section 9-203(1) and
included section 9-201 by mistake. But I find it more reasonable to
conclude that section 9-203(1) does not itself provide secured parties
178. Specifically, it is the fallacy of "affirming the consequent." See Andrew J. McClurg,
Logical Fallacies and the Supreme Court. A Critical Examination of Justice Rehnquist's
Decisions in CriminalProcedure Cases, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 741, 774-75 (1988). Grant the
following proposition: If it is 1:00 a.m., it is dark outside. I now observe that it is dark outside.
Can I validly infer that it is 1:00 a.m.? No-perhaps it is 2:00 a.m. Perhaps it is noon, but I
am making my observation at the North Pole in January. Maybe there is a solar eclipse.
Maybe the sun has died.
179. On the logical equivalence of "Not-P unless Q" and "P only if Q," see, e.g., RICHARD
C. JEFFREY, FORMAL LOGIC: ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS 54-55 (1967). Of course, "P only if Q"

is not equivalent to "Q only if P."
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with a basis for asserting priority against third parties. If Secured
Party enjoys priority over Rival Claimant under Article 9, it must be
because section 9-201 says he does. But section 9-201's refers only to
"purchasers" and "creditors." Antecedent transferors are not mentioned and consequently have no reason to fear Article 9."s8

B.

The Prevailing Conception of the Structure of a Secured
Transaction and Its Contribution to the Received View

If the case for applying section 9-201 against antecedent transferors is so weak, why does the Received View dominate analysis of
these cases? An explanation lies in the way most courts and commentators conceive of the interests of Rival Claimant, Debtor, and
Secured Party and of how these interests relate to the things (cars,
copyrights, and so on) that are their common focus.
My discussion has consistently presented security interests, leaseholds, judicial liens, and other encumbrances as attaching to other
interests-not to the things to which those interest ultimately relate.
But conventional usage does not observe this distinction, especially
when the targeted interest is the relatively comprehensive interest
known as "title." A leasehold interest "on title to the computer," for
example, is for most people just a leasehold interest "in the computer." This common perception pervades Article 9, which speaks of
security interests "in" various tangible' and intangible 8 2 things. It
also appears in the use of "collateral," a term I have so far refrained
from using. Article 9 abstractly defines "collateral" as "the property
subject to a security interest,"' 83 but it assumes that this property can
have a location' 84 and be the subject of possession.8 5 The reference is
180. This is not to say that an antecedent transferor never has to worry about security
interests created under Article 9. These security interests may prevail under other law. See
infra.
181. Section 9-102(l)(a), for example, provides that Article 9 applies to any transaction
"intended to create a security interest in . . . goods," which are defined, with certain
exceptions, in § 9-105(l)(h) as "things which are movable at the time the security interest
attaches." (Emphasis added.)
182. Similarly, § 9-102(l)(a) makes Article 9 applicable to transactions "intended to create
a security interest in ... accounts," which are defined in § 9-106 as "any right to payment for
goods sold or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or
chattel paper") (emphasis added).
183. Id. § 9-105(l)(c) (1987).

184. See, e.g., id. § 9-103(1)(b) (1987) (referring to "the law of the jurisdiction where the
collateral is"); id. § 9-103(1)(d) (1987) (referring to collateral being "brought into and kept in
this state while subject to a security interest perfected under the law of the jurisdiction from

which the collateral was removed").
185. See, e.g., id. § 9-203(l)(a) (purported security interest does not attach unless the debtor
has signed a security agreement or "the collateral is in the possession of the secured party");
id. § 9-207(1) (secured party "must use reasonable care in the custody and preservation of
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plainly to things, not to interests respecting things.
This conception has important consequences in the analysis of
Antecedent-Transferor cases. The idea of a security interest "in the
computer" suggests that there is an unmediated relationship between
Secured Party and the thing. In much the same way, Rival Claimant's title and Debtor's leasehold are viewed as interests "in the computer." This usage suggests that the three contending interests
occupy the same conceptual plane and have a common intersection
"in the computer." The Antecedent-Transferor Scenario then seems
to involve a tug-of-war in which the computer is pulled in three directions at once. Focusing on the contest between Rival Claimant and
Secured Party, it is natural to ask whether the leasehold interest is
"stronger" than the security interest or vice versa.
If we characterize the conflict between Rival Claimant and
Secured Party this way, we would expect Article 9 to tell us-explicitly-which of the contending interests prevails. This gives the
Received View the opening it needs. For if section 9-201 applies
against everyone, not just subsequent transferees, it supplies the sort of
rule we expect. The security interest, Article 9 then seems to say, is
presumptively stronger than any other interest "in the computer,"
including Rival Claimant's title. Once this threshold has been
crossed, the critical question appears to be whether the Code provides
the antecedent transferor with a way to rebut this presumption in
appropriate circumstances. I argue that it does not. The customary
conception of how security interests and other proprietary claims
relate to things and to each other leads us up the wrong alley.
C.

ProtectingAntecedent Transferors: Two Conventional
Approaches

Courts and commentators offer Rival Claimant two principal
ways to rebut the supposed presumption against antecedent transferors. These approaches rely on section 9-203(1)(c)'s requirement that
Debtor have "rights in the collateral." 1 86 The fact that neither
collateral in his possession"); Id. § 9-304(1) (subject to some exceptions, security interest in
money or instruments can be perfected only by the secured party's taking possession).
186. Professor Harris has proposed a third approach, which does not depend on § 9203(l)(c). According to Harris, § 9-201 is subject to § 2-403(l), which "makes clear that a
'purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased.' "
See Harris, supra note 7, at 865; see also id. at 811 n.26. On this reading, § 2-403(1) codifies
the Vestedness Rule as it applies against a purported secured party asserting an encumbrance
on an interest relating to goods. But Harris has been misled by the ambiguity of the phrase

"purchaser of a limited interest." Harris assumes that it refers to a purchaser of an X that is
something less than title. On this reading, an assignee of a leasehold interest is a "purchaser of

a limited interest," and the assignee "acquires rights only to the extent of the interest
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approach is successful helps to show that the Received View is wrong
in assuming that section 9-201 applies against an antecedent
transferor.
1.

THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Recall the hypothetical where Rival Claimant grants Debtor a
leasehold interest L on title to a computer. Under the prevailing conception, Secured Party can get a security interest "in the computer,"
but only if Debtor has "rights in the computer." If the rights requirement is simply a requirement that Debtor have some "rights,"
Secured Party is home free: everyone will admit that Debtor, vested
with a leasehold interest "in the computer," has some "rights in the
computer." In fact, Debtor's "rights" seem to pass the test no matter
how small L happens to be. This, however, implies that Secured
Party defeats Rival Claimant in every Antecedent-Transferor case, a
result that no one is willing to accept. To avoid this, it is necessary to
hold that section 9-203(1)(c) demands that Debtor have more than
"some rights." The issue thus becomes whether Debtor's "rights" are
"sufficient" under the statute.
To assess the sufficiency of Debtor's "rights," we weigh or measure L against a standard supposedly established by section 9203(l)(c). Although this process need not involve numerical evaluations, it nevertheless focuses on how big L is. Under this "quantitative" analysis, Rival Claimant can win even if it is clear that Debtor
has some "rights in the collateral": Debtor's "rights," while real and
identifiable, may not be big enough to satisfy section 9-203(l)(c).
The quantitative analysis is linguisticly plausible, given the draftpurchased [i.e., the leasehold]." But § 2-403(1) could instead be referring to someone who
purchases an encumbrance (which is a "limited interest") on an X that may or may not be a
limited interest. On this second reading, someone who takes a security interest on title to a
drill press is a "purchaser of a limited interest" even though the targeted interest (title to the
press) is not itself a "limited interest." Under this interpretation, § 2-403(1)'s declaration that
"a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased" is
a platitude, not a codification of the Vestedness Rule.
A moment's reflection confirms that we are dealing with a platitude. Section 2-403(1)
starts by declaring that a "purchaser of goods acquires all title which its transferor had"language that suggests that the transferor's entire interest is assigned to the purchaser. To
remove any doubt that a transferor can grant only limited interest if he so desires, the statute
adds the qualification that "a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent
of the interest purchased." This is confirmed by the Official Comment, which explains that a
"contract of purchase is of course limited by its own terms as in a case of a pledge for a limited
amount or a sale of a fractional interest in goods." § 2-403 cmt. 1 (1987). Accordingly, I
think Professor Harris is mistaken to suppose that the "limited interest" language in § 2403(1) lets an antecedent transferor rebut section 9-201's alleged presumption in favor of a
(purported) secured party.
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ing of Article 9. Yet, despite its persistent popularity with the courts,
the quantitative analysis cannot withstand close scrutiny.
a.

Omission of the Relevant Threshold

To judge from the existing literature, it is difficult to assess the
relative "sizes" of the various "L's" with which a debtor may be
vested.18 7 Even worse, no one really knows how big L must be to be
big enough. Article 9, as its principal drafter observed, "does not
specify the quantum of 'rights' which a debtor must have in collateral
to support a security interest."' 8 8
This omission is surprising. Antecedent-Transferor cases require
us to determine whether the debtor's "rights" are sufficient, but we
are not told what constitutes sufficiency. Contrast this to Article 9's
exquisitely detailed treatment of Subsequent-Transferee disputes.'8 9
Why, if section 9-203(l)(c) deals with Antecedent-Transferor cases, is
T 90
Article 9 so cryptic about the meaning of "rights in the collateral"?'
The courts have attempted to define the requisite threshold, but the
resulting jurisprudence is implausibly complex.' 9'
187. For heroic attempts to summarize the state of the case law, see CLARK, supra note 4,
2.04; Coogan & McDonnell, supra note 7, § 2.08; HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 4, ch. 18;
Steven W. Sanford, Debtor'sRights in Collateralas a Requirementfor Attachment of a Security
Interest Under the Uniform Commercial Code, in COOGAN ET AL., surpa note 4, ch. 4B;
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 22-6; Ralph C. Anzivino, When Does a Debtor Have
Rights in the Collateral Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code?, 61 MARQ. L. REV.
23 (1977); Joseph W. Turner, Note, Rights in the Collateral Under UC.C. § 9-203, 54 Mo. L.
REV. 677 (1989).
188. 1 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 353. Section 9-204(2) of the 1962 Code attempted to
determine the earliest date on which a debtor could have "rights in" certain types of things.
For example, a debtor could not have "rights... in fish until caught," U.C.C. § 9-204(2)(b)
(repealed 1972), or "in an account until it comes into existence." Id. § 9-204(2)(d). These
rules focused on the process by which a legally recognized "thing" comes into being; strictly
speaking, this would establish the earliest date on which anyone could have an interest
respecting that thing. Nevertheless, knowing the earliest date on which a debtor could
possibly have "rights in" a thing still did not explain how big those "rights" had to be to satisfy
§ 9-203(1)(c).
Former § 9-204(2) was deleted in 1972. According to the revisers, it was "eliminated as
unnecessary and in some cases confusing. Its operation appeared to be arbitrary, and it is
believed that the questions considered are best left to the courts." Id. § 9-204 reasons for 1972
change.
189. See § 9-301(l)(a)-(d), § 9-312(1)-(7).
190. Gilmore was content to observe that something "less than full 'legal title' [would] do"
for purposes of § 9-203(l)(c), including the "special property interest" that a would-be buyer
acquires as soon as goods are identified in a contract for sale. 1 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 353.
Although Gilmore made no effort to identify the critical threshold, his dictum is a favorite
with the courts. See, e.g., Merchants Bank v. Atchison (In re Atchison), 832 F.2d 1236, 1238
(11 th Cir. 1987); State Bank of Young America v. Vidmar Iron Works, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 244,
249 (Minn. 1980); Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 208 N.W.2d 97, 104 (Wisc. 1973).
191. Coogan & McDonnell, supra note 7, § 2.08.
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Conceptual Complications

Despite doctrinal confusion, the courts have generally managed
to achieve results similar to those obtaining under pre-Code law. In
the computer hypothetical, for instance, Debtor's default would not
have empowered Secured Party to sell Rival Claimant's interest
(title). Yet, Secured Party would have been able to sell Debtor's interest (the leasehold) and credit the proceeds against the secured debt. 92
Commentators agree that Article 9 should reach the same or
similar results. 93 The quantitative analysis, however, is unable to
deliver the goods. Assume that Debtor, which has a viable leasehold
interest "in the computer," defaults on its secured obligation.
Secured Party forecloses and purports to auction off "the computer"-more accurately, title to the computer. The conventional
way to protect Rival Claimant is to argue that Secured Party's purported security interest did not attach. Under the quantitative analysis, we must find Debtor's "rights in the computer"-here, its
leasehold interest-insufficient to satisfy section 9-203(1)(c).
In some situations, such a finding appears plausible. If the leasehold is scheduled to expire in just a few days, Debtor's "rights in the
computer" do not seem very substantial. The same is true if L is a
bailment interest terminable at the discretion of the bailor (Rival
Claimant). These are easy cases for the quantitative analysis. But
what if L is a leasehold with five years left to run and Debtor has paid
Rival Claimant the full rent in advance? If we are still unwilling to let
Secured Party sell "the computer" (i.e., Rival Claimant's title), we
must hold that Debtor's "rights"-a long-term, fully paid-up leasehold interest-are again insufficient to sustain the purported security
interest. This is counterintuitive. Given these facts, Debtor's "rights
in the computer" look fairly substantial. It may be possible for
Secured Party to show that the market for long-term, fully paid-up
192. The amount of those proceeds would have depended on many factors, the most
important being whether the leasehold interest, once assigned, would have remained in force
against Rival Claimant. If, by the time Secured Party enforced his security interest, the
leasehold had expired or was about to expire, the right to step into Debtor's shoes would be
worthless, or nearly so. Even if the leasehold had a considerable period to run, there still
might be no one willing to buy it. Suppose, for example, that the leasehold was subject to
termination unless the lessee (or any buyer) paid Rival Claimant rent of $1,000 a month. If
similar computers could be leased on the market for $700 a month, there would be no bidders
for Debtor's leasehold, and Secured Party's security interest would be worthless.
On the other hand, if the rent due Rival Claimant was only $500 a month, a buyer would
be willing to pay up to $200 a month to assume the lease. If it had ten months to run, Secured
Party could receive as much as $2,000 in proceeds, which might go a long way toward
satisfying Debtor's debt to Secured Party.
193. See supra note 187.
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leasehold interests on title to the computer values such an interest
almost as highly as an unencumbered title to the machine. In that
case, it seems unrealistic to deny the sufficiency of Debtor's interest.
The quantitative analysis is open to another conceptual objection. In my last example, we would not permit Secured Party to sell
Rival Claimant's title, but we would want him to be able to sell
Debtor's leasehold interest. Secured Party's power to sell the leasehold interest depends on his having some sort of security interestbut a security interest on what? Under the prevailing conception,
security interests attach to things, so Secured Party must have a
security interest "in the computer." This implies that Debtor's
"rights in the computer" do satisfy section 9-203(1)(c). But this
implication contradicts our explanation of why Secured Party cannot
sell off Rival Claimant's title. Obviously, we cannot maintain that
Debtor simultaneously does and does not have "rights in the computer" sufficient to satisfy section 9-203(l)(c).
c.

Conflicts with Non-Code Law

A third problem with the quantitative analysis is its potential
conflict with non-Code law. Here my objection is one of principle,
because non-Code law does not do much to protect would-be secured
parties from antecedent transferors. For purposes of exposition, however, imagine a dispute governed by one of the old mercantile factors
acts, which are the ancestors of the U.C.C.'s rules covering consignments. Most states have repealed their acts, but the Code does not
require them to do so.194 Indeed, several of the Comments anticipate
that the acts will remain on the books. 195 Pennsylvania, the first state
to adopt the U.C.C., retains its factors act, 1 96 as does Massachusetts. 197 The challenge posed by the factors acts is not entirely theoretical. In any event, it exposes another weakness of the conventional
analysis under section 9-203(1)(c).
194. The acts are not included on § 10-102(l)'s list of statutes automatically repealed by the
Code. Section 10-102(1) does repeal "factor's lien acts," but these are a completely different
matter. See generally 1 GILMORE, supra note 1, ch. 5 (discussing factor's lien acts).
195. Official Comment 2 to § 2-236 states that "there is no intent in this Section to narrow
the protection afforded to third parties in any jurisdiction that has a selling Factors Act. The
purpose of the exception is merely to limit the effect of the present subsection itself, in the
absence of any such Factors Act, to cases in which creditors of the buyer may reasonably be
deemed to have been misled by the secret reservation [of title]." See also id. § 2-403 cmt. I
("The section also leaves unimpaired the powers given to selling factors under the earlier
Factors Acts."); Id. § 7-209 cmt 3.
196. PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 201 (1963).
197. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 104, § 1 (1990). The statute was amended as recently as
1986. 1986 MASS. AcTs 649 (approved Dec. 24, 1986).
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Assume that Rival Claimant, who manufactures electronic
goods, has title to a new television set. Rival Claimant appoints
Debtor, a merchant dealing in television sets, to serve as her mercantile factor; this invests Debtor with an L that I will call a "factor's
interest." Under the factoring arrangement, Rival Claimant entrusts
possession of the television set to Debtor so that Debtor can serve as
her retail outlet. Debtor is authorized to display the set to its customers and explicitly empowered to sell Rival Claimant's title for $1,000.
Debtor is obligated to remit the sale proceeds to Rival Claimant, net
of a $50 commission for Debtor's services in arranging the sale.
Now, suppose that Debtor, having taken possession of the television set and put it in its showroom, borrows $1,000 from Secured
Party, to whom it purports to grant a security interest "in the television set." 198 A few months later, Debtor defaults and Secured Party
tries to enforce his purported encumbrance by foreclosure. Rival
Claimant intervenes, seeking to recover her television set. Rival
Claimant argues that her arrangement with Debtor, by its terms,
empowers Debtor only to sell her title, not to encumber it. Rival
Claimant even points to specific provisions in the factoring agreement
where Debtor acknowledges that it has no power to grant anyone any
kind of security interest "in the television set," especially if that security interest is to secure Debtor's own obligations. Rival Claimant
therefore asserts that the purported transfer to Secured Party is a
nullity.
The factors acts ensured that Rival Claimant's argument would
not succeed. Secured Party (or any third person, for that matter)
faces an ostensible-ownership problem when he deals with Debtor, a
merchant in possession of a television set that looks like any other
item in its inventory. The factors acts protected Secured Party by
endowing Debtor with a statutory power to transfer Rival Claimant's
title to a good-faith purchaser for value, regardless of any restrictions
that might appear in Rival Claimant's agreement with Debtor.' 99
Thus, the Pennsylvania statute provides that, if a factor in possession
purports to make a transfer to someone who gives new value for the
198. If the security agreement is fastidiously drafted, Debtor will purport to encumber "title
to the television set." In all probability, however, the agreement will just say that Debtor
grants Secured Party a security interest "in the television set." My analysis will treat the latter
phrase as an attempt to express the former idea.
199. The much-imitated English Factors Act declared that "any sale, pledge, or other
disposition of ...goods, made by ... [a factor] when acting in the ordinary course of business
of a mercantile agent, shall ...be as valid as if... [the factor] were expressly authorized by the
owner of the goods to make the same." Factors Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., ch. 45, § 2(1).
Notice the fictive, or quasi-fictive component, in this rule, which determines results "as if" the
factor had actual authorization to make the transfer.
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transfer and takes without notice that the purported transferor is only
a factor, that person "shall acquire . . . the same interest in . . .the
said merchandise as he would have acquired thereby if such... factor
had been the actual owner thereof. ' '200 The statute creates an exception to the Vestedness Rule, letting Secured Party's security interest
attach to Rival Claimant's title if Secured Party takes without knowledge and gives new value. This result is both fair and efficient.
But it is difficult to reach this result using the quantitative analysis. The purported security interest can attach only if Debtor's
"rights in the collateral" satisfy section 9-203(l)(c). Under the factoring arrangement, Debtor's "rights" consist of a bailment interest combined with a power to sell Rival Claimant's title. To avoid conflict
with the factors act when Secured Party is a good-faith purchaser for
value, Debtor's "rights" must be sufficient to permit a security interest to attach "to the television set." This is not disturbing in itself, but
it is hard to reconcile with common intuitions regarding other L's.
As we have seen, the interest of a long-term, fully paid lessee is not
considered substantial enough to support a security interest "in" the
relevant thing.2 0 ' Such evaluations are relatively subjective, but I suspect that most people would regard the long-term lessee's interest as
"bigger" than that of a factor, who is usually no more than a bailee at
will with a power of sale. If so, how can the factor's interest supply
the necessary "quantum of rights" while the lessee's interest does not?
Another weakness of the quantitative analysis is the role of
Secured Party's state of mind. Under the Pennsylvania act, Secured
Party defeats Rival Claimant if he lends and takes his purported
security interest without knowledge of the terms of the factoring
arrangement.20 2 To reproduce this result, the quantitative analysis
must hold that Debtor's "rights" satisfy section 9-203(l)(c). But in
an otherwise identical case, where Secured Party proceeds with
knowledge, he loses under the act. Now the quantitative analysis
must find that Debtor's "rights" do not satisfy section 9-203(1)(c).
This is troublesome because the only difference between the cases is
Secured Party's awareness in the second case of the limited nature of
Debtor's "rights" under the factoring arrangement. Something is
wrong if our evaluation of "how big" Debtor's interest is depends on
200. PENN. STAT. ANN. § 201 (1963); see also id.§ 202. Note that the act refers only to
pledges of merchandise-i.e., the creation of possessory security interests. Compare with
Factors Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., ch. 45, § 2(1) ("provided that the person taking under the
disposition acts in good faith, and has not at the time of the disposition notice that the person
making the disposition has not authority to make the same.")
201. See supra Part V.C.i.b.
202. PENN STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 201 (1963).
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what Secured Party knows about that interest. To reconcile the quantitative analysis with the factors act, we must allow Secured Party's
mental state to affect our assessment of the magnitude of Debtor's
"rights."
One might argue that this is not a problem. When Secured Party
purchases without knowledge, Debtor's "rights" are greater than
when Secured Party proceeds with knowledge. After all, Debtor's
"rights" now include a power that is absent when Secured Party takes
with knowledge, namely a power under the factors act to encumber
Rival Claimant's title in favor of a good-faith purchaser for value.
The trouble with this line of reasoning is that it reduces the quantitative analysis to a formality. We are instructed to identify Debtor's
"rights," weigh them, compare them to some (unspecified) Article 9
threshold, and then conclude that these "rights" are--or are not-big
enough to support the purported security interest. An analysis that
takes into account Debtor's power under the factors act compromises
this procedure. To avoid conflict between the rights requirement and
other law, the analysis must come down to the following question:
Under the particular facts of this case, does some body of law endow
Debtor with a power to encumber Rival Claimant's interest? If the
answer is yes, the quantitative analysis must find L sufficient, no matter how negligible L may seem by itself. If the answer is no, L must
be insufficient regardless of how substantial L appears. This undercuts any serious attempt to make attachment depend on the magnitude of Debtor's "quantum of rights." The quantitative analysiswhich purports to evaluate Debtor's interest using a standard established by Article 9-becomes a charade.2 °3
In any event, the quantitative analysis begs a fundamental question: Why should attachment depend on "how big" L happens to be?
Gilmore's dictum concerning the "quantum of rights" necessary
under section 9-203(1)(c) encourages quantitative thinking, but it
does not explain why the size of Debtor's interest is relevant. 2° Perhaps its appeal rests on the following intuition. As a rule of thumb,
the bigger L is relative to X, the more likely it is that Debtor will have
possession of the relevant thing. However, we know that such possession can create an ostensible-ownership problem that we may want to
mitigate with an exceptional rule endowing Debtor with a power to
203. Cf WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 22-6, at 990 ("[E]quities between competing
claimants may be fought out in the name of this phrase [i.e., 'rights in the collateral'].... In
such cases, judges should be alert to the possibility that they may be deploying the phrase...
as a priority determining device, and that the phrase was not, as such, intended to have that
function." (footnote omitted)).
204. 1 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 353.

1993]

ARTICLE 9

1023

encumber X, notwithstanding that Debtor is vested only with L. 20 5
One might argue that this justifies linking attachment under section 9203(l)(c) to the size of L relative to X.
Such reasoning is far from convincing. If law outside Article 9
holds that Debtor has a power to encumber X because Debtor is
vested with L, so be it. We should not, however, jump to conclusions
simply because L is often a "large" interest. We should explain
Debtor's power to cause a security interest to attach to X by pointing
to the specific factor that other law deems relevant. This factor might
be Debtor's possession of the relevant thing or it might be something
quite different, e.g., Debtor's status as Rival Claimant's agent with
actual authority to encumber X. If the relevant factor is present, we
should apply the exceptional rule, even if L is a "small" interest.
Conversely, in the absence of the relevant factor, we should refuse to
permit attachment, no matter how "big" L happens to be. Determining the size of L, in other words, is no substitute for an inquiry into
relevant law outside Article 9. 20 6 Quantitative analysis, which tries to
"weigh" various L's to assess their sufficiency under section 9203(l)(c), misses the point.
2.

THE REFORMIST ALTERNATIVE:

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

Some commentators object to the complexity of the "rights"
jurisprudence and the unrealistic evaluations it sometimes requires.2 °7
Their proposed solution is a "qualitative" analysis of AntecedentTransferor cases. The qualitative analysis retains the conventional
idea of security interests (and other encumbrances) as interests that
attach directly to things. What is new is its understanding of the consequences of attachment. According to the reformers, attachment of a
security interest should have no specific implications for anyone
except the debtor. Considering the consequences for third persons,
we should take into account "the quality of the debtor's rights in collateral, not merely their existence."2 0 The existence of some "rights"
is necessary to permit a security interest to attach, but the quality of
those "rights" ordinarily determines how the security interest will
205. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403(2). Such an exceptional rule is demonstrated supra note 43
and accompanying text.
206. If the cost of determining the size of L were low and the cost of identifying and
applying other law were high, it could make sense to focus on size-assuming there is a strong
correlation between the size of L and the probability that other law will give Debtor a power to
encumber X. But the cost of finding and applying relevant law outside Article 9 does not
appear to be especially high, especially in comparison to the cost of divining the size of
particular L's.
207. See, e.g., HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 4; BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 7.
208. HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 4, ch. 18 at 18-4.
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affect competing claims. 2" I will call this idea-that every security
interest has a qualitative aspect determining how strong the encumbrance is against third persons-the "Potency Principle." According
to the Potency Principle, a security interest "in a thing" gives the
secured party a claim to that thing, but this claim is ordinarily no
stronger than the "rights in the thing" on which the security interest
is founded.
Because the reformers rely on the Potency Principle to limit the
consequences of attachment, they can dispense with the traditional
hand-wringing about the sufficiency of Debtor's "rights." On the contrary, they are happy to consider any "rights" sufficient for purposes
of section 9-203(1)(c).210 In my hypothetical involving the computer
and the leasehold, the quantitative analysis protects the lessor from
the lessee's purported secured party by denying that the purported
security interest even attaches. Proponents of the qualitative analysis,
in contrast, can concede that the lessee's leasehold "rights" will support attachment. The important question-whether the security
interest "in the computer" is strong enough to overcome the lessor's
title-depends on the character of the lessee's "rights." If the leasehold were to expire or be terminated for non-payment of rent, the
lessee (Debtor) would have to surrender the computer to the lessor
(Rival Claimant). Under the Potency Principle, the security interest
would suffer from the same infirmity. If, on the other hand, the leasehold remains in effect, Secured Party attains a kind of limited priority
against the lessor. His security interest "in the computer" is exactly
as strong as the leasehold interest on which it is founded.
The qualitative analysis recognizes that the Potency Principle is
subject to exceptions. In certain circumstances involving ostensibleownership concerns, a secured party can acquire an interest stronger
than his debtor's. Quite sensibly, the reformers want such rules to
apply in Antecedent-Transferor cases. In a state with a mercantile
factors act, for example, Secured Party should defeat Rival Claimant
if Debtor is a merchant-factor and Secured Party is a good-faith purchaser for value of the purported security interest. 211 The factors act
is understood here as creating an exception to the Potency Principle;
specifically, it permits a security interest founded on a mere factor's
209. Cf BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 7, at 168-70 ("The first issue, that of 'rights in the
collateral,' invites an examination into whether the debtor has any rights to which a secured
party may succeed. A secured party (or other property claimant) may hold (contingently)
rights that are derived from the debtor but may nevertheless find that it enjoys no greater
rights against the 'owner' of the goods than does the debtor itself.").
210. See id. at 170.
211. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
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interest to transcend its humble origins and actually defeat Rival
Claimant's title to the relevant merchandise.
By introducing this qualitative dimension into the analysis, the
reformers are able to surmount two major objections to the traditional
approach. When we downplay the consequences of attachment per
se, we can largely abandon the search for the elusive "quantum of
rights" necessary under section 9-203(1)(c). At the same time, the
new analysis opens the door to non-Code law, reducing the prospect
for conflict and permitting Antecedent-Transferor cases to be decided
under rules that take account of ostensible-ownership concerns.
While the qualitative analysis represents a major advance, it does
not fully succeed, given the structure of the present Code and the
prevailing conception of the way security interests relate to things.
Two statutory objections illustrate the problems of measuring reform
within the framework of existing Article 9.
a.

What Role for Section 9-203(1)(c)?

The reformers' sensible emphasis on the quality-as opposed to
the quantity-of Debtor's "rights" is manifest in their relaxed view of
attachment. Professor Nickles would permit a purported security
interest to attach so long as Debtor has "some transferable rights or
interest with respect to the property."2 2 Professor Baird and Dean
Jackson are even more lenient: Debtor's possession of the relevant
thing "should itself always constitute sufficient 'rights in the collateral' to pass the hurdle of whether or not a security interest ... has
attached ..
213 This criterion would permit attachment even in
situations where Debtor has traditionally been described as having
"no rights," transferable or otherwise, as against Rival Claimant (e.g.,
when Debtor has taken possession by theft).
The liberal approach to attachment raises a question concerning
the function of section 9-203(1)(c). If the threshold can be set so low,
why does the Code bother to erect any threshold at all? Assuming
that Antecedent-Transferor cases are to be decided under the Potency
Principle (and the exceptions thereto), why should Article 9 require
Debtor to have any "rights in the collateral," transferable or not?
Indeed, why should even possession be required? Under the qualitative analysis, the fact that Debtor is a thief with "no rights" as against
Rival Claimant is no reason not to let the purported security interest
attach. Rival Claimant will be adequately protected by the principle
that Secured Party's claim to the computer, television set, or whatever
212. HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 4, ch. 18 at 18-3.
213. BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 7, at 170-71.
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is limited by the quality of Debtor's "rights." If those "rights" are
inferior to Rival Claimant's, there will be no reason for Rival Claimant to worry even if Secured Party's encumbrance does attach. Section 9-203(1)(c) need not establish a minimum threshold so long as we
take seriously the notion that it is the quality of "rights"-not their
quantity-that counts. Hence, there is no reason for Article 9 to
require the debtor to have any "rights," even bare possession, as a
prerequisite to attachment. Under the qualitative analysis, then, the
role of section 9-203(1)(c) is unclear.
b.

The Potency Principle Versus Section 9-201

By introducing a qualitative dimension into the analysis, the
reformers hope to gain access to non-Code law that recognizes exceptions to the Potency Principle. But this sensible attempt to go beyond
the U.C.C. cannot be reconciled with section 9-201, which clearly
states that the presumption in favor of Secured Party can be rebutted
only by exceptional rules that are part of the UC. 214 If the reformers accept the conventional view that section 9-201 applies against
antecedent transferors, their proposal is stymied.
Some proponents of the qualitative analysis try to meet this
objection by arguing that section 9-201 was not intended to displace
non-Code rules dealing with antecedent transferors.21 5 I agree, but
for a different reason. The problem is not that section 9-201's provision for exceptions is drafted too narrowly. Instead it lies in the
assumption that section 9-201 is even relevant to disputes involving
antecedent transferors. If proponents of the qualitative approach
want to make non-Code law part of the analysis, they should begin by
rejecting the Received View of section 9-201.
D.

A ProposedAnalysis

The textual, practical, and conceptual problems that dog current
approaches disappear once we drop the notion that section 9-201
214. The introductory clause to § 9-201 reads: "Except as otherwise provided by this Act
215. See Coogan & McDonnell, supra note 7, § 2.08[2] at 2-87 ("Article 9 does not purport
to codify all the law of property. Section 9-201 does not embody a negotiability principle that
automatically gives secured creditors priority over all prior legal and equitable claims to
property not dealt with in Article 9.").
In a similar vein, Baird and Jackson emphasize that, "despite 9-201's bold assertion that
only other provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code override it, obviously other statutory
law (such as the Internal Revenue Code and the Bankruptcy Code) must be considered."
BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 7, at 330. They are plainly right that federal statutes can trump
§ 9-201. But how can competing state laws overcome the (alleged) presumption in favor of the
secured party when § 9-201 specifically states that they do not?
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makes a (purported) security interest effective against antecedent
transferors. From this new perspective, it is apparent that Antecedent-Transferor cases can-and should-be decided by whatever law
outside Article 9 speaks to the situation. We begin with the Vestedness Rule, which sets up a presumption in favor of the antecedent
transferor, not the purported secured party. The burden is then on
the would-be secured party-not the antecedent transferor-to
adduce a relevant exception to the baseline rule. If the would-be
secured party identifies an exception, he can enforce his purported
security interest, whether or not the exceptional rule is contained in
the U.C.C.

1.

RECONCEIVING THE DISPUTE

An analysis founded on property-transfer law begins by conceiving of a security interest as an encumbrance on another interest. This
puts an end to loose talk about security interests "in" computers,
copyrights, and other "things." Instead, we identify the specific interest (or interests) the debtor purports to encumber and apply the Vestedness Rule and its exceptions to determine the consequences of the
purported transfer. Three examples will illustrate this procedure.
The first is the limiting case in which the debtor does not actually
purport to encumber the antecedent transferor's interest. Debtor and
Secured Party agree that Debtor is granting a security interest only on
its interest (L); they explicitly disclaim any intention to encumber X,
the interest vested in Rival Claimant. Plainly, the Vestedness Rule
poses no obstacle to Secured Party's getting a security interest on L.
If Debtor defaults on the secured obligation, Secured Party is empowered to sell L-not X-and apply the proceeds to the debt. This
result, which conforms to pre-Code law, 216 does not require us to
evaluate the Debtor's "rights in the computer," its "rights in X," or
even its "rights in L." The only question is whether Debtor is vested
with L or is otherwise empowered to encumber L under relevant law.
There is no need to introduce a "qualitative dimension" into the analysis because we do not characterize Secured Party as having a security
interest "in the computer." By specifying that the security interest
attaches to L, we automatically take account of the "quality" of
Debtor's interest.
As a second example, consider an Antecedent-Transferor case in
which Debtor does not limit its purported transfer to L, but instead
purports to grant Secured Party a security interest on X. Under the
216. Security interests on leasehold interests, for example, are commonplace in real estate
finance (the "leasehold mortgage"). See, e.g., 2 POWELL, supra note 71, 1 25811].
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Vestedness Rule, the purported transfer cannot succeed: X is vested
in Rival Claimant, not Debtor. Accordingly, Secured Party gets no
security interest on X. But Secured Party does not come away empty
handed. He will ordinarily acquire a security interest on L, the interest with which Debtor is actually vested. This is more straightforward, I suggest, than saying that Secured Party has a security interest
"in the computer," but limited in its potency by L, the "rights" on
which it is founded.
Finally, suppose that a statute, for example a factors act, lets
Debtor encumber X even though X is vested in Rival Claimant.
Under my proposed analysis, there is nothing mysterious about
Secured Party's acquisition of a security interest on X; it follows
directly from the content of the hypothetical statute. The qualitative
analysis reaches the same result, but it does so by saying that the statute makes the security interest "in the computer" stronger than the
"rights" on which it is founded. I think this can be expressed more
clearly by saying that Debtor has exercised a statutory power to
encumber X in favor of Secured Party, notwithstanding that X is
vested in Rival Claimant.
There is more at stake here than conceptual clarity. The competing analyses can generate different results. The qualitative analysts
have not abandoned section 9-203(l)(c) and the notion that Debtor
must have "rights in the collateral"-they simply contend that the
threshold is very low. Professor Nickles, for example, regards section
9-203(l)(c) as satisfied so long as Debtor has "some transferable
rights or interest with respect to the property."2 7 This sounds reasonable, but it can lead to trouble. Suppose that a non-Code statute
endows Debtor with a power to encumber X, despite the fact that
Debtor has no independent interest relating to X-i.e., Debtor has no
"rights" except the special power conferred by the statute. Proponents of the qualitative analysis will want to give the statute effect, but
they can do so only by interpreting the exceptional rule itself as providing the necessary "rights." As I have suggested above, this creates
a circularity. If Debtor must have certain "rights" in order to gain
access to other law, we cannot invoke that other law as the source of
Debtor's "rights." Hence, the fact that Debtor has no independent
interest "in the computer" precludes attachment under Nickles' criterion,"8 which creates a conflict between the hypothetical statute and
Article 9. An analysis under property-transfer law, in contrast, does
not posit even a minimal threshold. If the statute empowers Debtor
217.

HILLMAN ET AL.,

218. Id.

supra note 4, at 18-3.

ARTICLE 9

1993]

1029

to encumber X, then Debtor can encumber X. The fact that Debtor
may have no other "rights" respecting the property X is irrelevant.21 9
An analysis based on property-transfer law also deals easily with
a situation that is problematic for Professor Baird and Dean Jackson.
As we have seen, they suggest that section 9-203(1)(c)'s threshold-test
is satisfied so long as Debtor has possession of the relevant thing.220
This takes care of cases in which other law bases Debtor's power to
encumber X on ostensible-ownership concerns. But suppose a statute
grants Debtor a power to encumber X even though Debtor is not in
possession. Assuming Debtor has no other "rights," the purported
security interest cannot attach, which means the hypothetical statute
cannot be applied in favor of Secured Party. Baird and Jackson's
analysis thus leads to a conflict between section 9-203(1)(c) and the
law that gives Debtor a power to encumber X notwithstanding
Debtor's lack of possession. It is unclear why Article 9 should prevent Debtor from using its power under other law. An analysis under
property-transfer law, in contrast, easily deals with this situation:
Debtor can encumber X because the hypothetical statute says it can.
Debtor's possession (or lack thereof) may be relevant to attachment
under Article 9, but only to the extent other law says it is.
9-203(l)(c)
Neither the traditional nor the reformist approach resolves Antecedent-Transferor cases as effectively as an analysis based on property-transfer law. The challenge is to implement the transfer law
approach in the face of the rights requirement of section 9-203(l)(c).
I see three main possibilities: deletion, reinterpretation, and
amendment.
2.

HOW TO DEAL WITH SECTION

a. Deleting the "Rights Requirement"
In the overall scheme of property-transfer law, the function of
Article 9 is to protect certain subsequent transferees from the Encumbrance Rule, which would otherwise operate in favor of existing
security interests. Antecedent-Transferor cases, in contrast, implicate
the Vestedness Rule. There the issue is whether a purported secured
party can overcome a baseline presumption that favors the antecedent
transferor. This is a critical issue for the would-be secured party, but
219. Another problem with Professor Nickles' test is its requirement that Debtor's interest
be "transferable." Id. Suppose that the hypothetical statute forbids Debtor to transfer its
power to encumber X. Does this mean that Debtor lacks "rights in the collateral"? There is
no reason that Debtor's power to transfer X should depend on whether that power is itself
transferable.
220. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.

1030

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:951

it is not Article 9's burden to resolve it. Section 9-201, after all, does
not pretend to make a (purported) security interest effective against a
debtor's transferor. Yet the prevalence of the Received View and the
presence of the "rights requirement" in section 9-203(1)(c) has led to
confusion. An obvious remedy is to renounce the Received View and
delete section 9-203(l)(c) from the Code.
This approach is probably too austere. While Article 9 does not
determine whether a debtor has a power to encumber a particular
interest, it is not inappropriate for Article 9 to remind us that attachment cannot occur unless the debtor has such a power. Section 9203(1) is a sensible place to insert such a reminder. Simple deletion of
section 9-203(1)(c) is justified in theory, but may complicate matters
for users of Article 9 whose understanding of the system of propertytransfer law may be a bit hazy.
b.

Reinterpreting Section 9-203(l)(c) as a Tautology

A second approach is to reinterpret section 9-203(l)(c) to bring it
into line with analysis under property-transfer law. As a starting
point, it is necessary to stipulate that the term "collateral," as used in
section 9-203(1)(c) and certain other provisions, refers to interests,
not things. Then we must decide what it means for a debtor to "have
rights in the collateral."
One interpretation is that a debtor "has rights in" an interest
only if the debtor "is vested with" that interest. On this view, section
9-203(l)(c) codifies the Vestedness Rule as it applies against someone
purporting to take a security interest, just as section 9-201 codifies the
Encumbrance Rule as it applies in favor of a secured party against
subsequent transferees. A major problem with this approach is that
section 9-203(1)(c), unlike section 9-201, does not provide for exceptions. The proposed reinterpretation will lead to conflicts with other
law that creates exceptions to the Vestedness Rule. There is no reason for section 9-203(l)(c) to undermine non-Code rules that may be
directed at this problem of ostensible ownership.
A more promising reading would hold that a debtor "has rights
in" an interest only if the debtor has a power to create a security
interest on the targeted interest. 221 This interpretation reduces section
9-203(l)(c) to a tautology: a debtor cannot encumber an interest
unless the debtor has a power to encumber that interest. This is good
news: Because we look to other law to determine whether the debtor
221. One of the earliest commentators on Article 9 considered and favored this reading.

See Hogan, supra note 7, at 577 (discussing former § 9-204, the predecessor of current § 9203(1)(c)).
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has the requisite power, there is no longer any possibility of conflict
between Article 9 and rules originating outside the U.C.C. I acknowledge that interpreting the "rights requirement" as a "power-toencumber requirement" is linguistically tendentious. But the Code
never comes close to defining "rights in the collateral," so every interpretation is open to that objection. At any rate, we have good structural and substantive grounds for adopting this interpretation, even if
it is not addressed by the language of Article 9.
This new understanding of "rights" as "power to encumber"
requires a reinterpretation of section 9-504(4), which deals with the
effect of enforcing a security interest. The Code provides that
"[w]hen collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the
disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights
therein. ' 222 This language creates a problem if "rights" refers to the
debtor's power to encumber the interest, rather than to the encumbered interest itself. A purchaser wants to acquire X, not a power to
encumber X. Accordingly, we would have to interpret section 9504(4) as mandating that a purchaser in foreclosure becomes vested
with whatever interest is encumbered by the security interest. But
here we are stretching the limits of section 9-504(4).
c. Amending Sections 9-203(1)(c) and 9-504(4) to Harmonize
Them with Property-Transfer Law
Amending Article 9 may be best course. Sections 9-203(1)(c)
and 9-504(4) should clearly reflect the conception that security interests attach to interests, not things. This can be achieved by dropping
section 9-203(l)(c)'s current reference to "collateral" and redrafting
the provision as the tautology discussed above: a security interest
cannot attach to an interest unless the debtor has a power to grant a
security interest on that interest. We might reformulate this by saying
that attachment of a purported security interest to an interest is precluded unless the debtor is either vested with the interest or is otherwise empowered to create a security interest on the interest. The
virtue of this formulation is that it reproduces the analytical sequence
of property-transfer law: it begins with the Vestedness Rule and progresses to relevant exceptional rules.
Section 9-504(4) should be amended with language indicating
that a purchaser in foreclosure, assuming he is a buyer,2 23 is invested
222. U.C.C. § 9-504(4)(1987).
223. It is possible, however, that Secured Party will "dispose of the collateral" by some

means other than sale, for example by granting the purchaser a leasehold interest on X. See
U.C.C. § 9-504(l)(1987) (secured party "after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of
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'
with "the interest that is encumbered by the security interest."224
It
may be helpful to spell this out: The purchaser (assuming he is a
buyer) acquires not only (1) any interest of the debtor that is encumbered by the security interest; but also (2) any interest of a third person (i.e., Rival Claimant) that is encumbered by the security interest.
Under the Vestedness Rule, of course, the third party's interest will
not be subject to the security interest unless the debtor exercised an
exceptional power to encumber that interest.
These proposals to amend Article 9 have a noncontroversial analogue in Article 2. The basic rule governing sales is stated in section
2-403(1): a purported purchaser of goods "acquires all title225 which
his transferor had or had power to transfer. ' 226 If section 2-403(1)
stated only that the purported purchaser becomes vested with the
interest with which his transferor was actually vested ("all title which
his transferor had"), it would be a codification of the Vestedness Rule
as it applies to sales. But section 2-403(1) goes further, providing that
the purchaser also becomes vested with any interest that the purported transferor "had power to transfer" (assuming that power was
exercised). Article 2 does not, however, purport to lay down all the
rules that may bear upon a purported sale of goods.22 7 Section 2403(1), then, is a tautology. My proposal is to amend section 9203(l)(c) to bring Article 9 into line on this point.

E. Summary

Conceiving of a security interest as an interest that attaches to a
thing, rather than to some particular interest relating to the thing,
impedes analysis of Antecedent-Transferor cases and encourages the
misapplication of section 9-201. The jurisprudence that has grown up
around the "rights requirement" is a complicated, and ultimately
any or all of the collateral."). In this case, the purchaser gets a leasehold interest on X; he is
not invested with X itself. The reader can provide appropriate qualifications to deal with such
situations.
224. The buyer, of course, takes the interest free of the encumbrance being enforced and
any junior encumbrances.
225. In § 2-403(1), "title" is being used to denote whatever interest the transferor happens
to be vested with, not just the relatively comprehensive interest I have been calling "title."
226. U.C.C. § 2-403(l)(1987) (reference added).
227. Official Comment I to § 2-403 notes that this provision "continue[s] unimpaired all
rights acquired under the law of agency or of apparent agency or ownership or other estoppel,
whether based on statutory provisions or on case law principles. The section also leaves
unimpaired the powers given to selling factors under the earlier Factors Acts." The reference
to powers of disposition created by statute, including the factors acts, is particularly
significant. Such powers are not part of the U.C.C. and are distinct from the "supplementary
general principles of law" whose continued application is endorsed in § 1-103. In section 2403, at least, there is no pretense that the U.C.C. is a universal commercial code.
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unsuccessful, attempt to protect antecedent transferors from security
interests purportedly granted by their transferees. Understanding
that section 9-201 is directed only at subsequent transferees lets us see
that the invocation of section 9-203(1)(c) is a pseudo-solution to a
pseudo-problem.
Shifting to an analysis under property-transfer law, we easily
reach the results courts and commentators have struggled to achieve.
Whether these results can be reached under the existing Code is
another question. We should therefore expand the scope of current
sections 9-203(1)(c) and 9-504(4) to cover cases in which other law
gives a debtor the power to create a security interest on an interest
that is vested in an antecedent transferor.
VI.

THE SET-OFF SCENARIO: SECURED PARTIES VERSUS

ACCOUNT DEBTORS

In the Set-Off Scenario, Rival Claimant and Debtor are mutually
indebted. Assume, for example, that Rival Claimant owes $100 to
Debtor and that Debtor owes $75 to Rival Claimant. Rival Claimant
seeks to exercise her common-law or statutory power to "set off" the
mutual debts-that is, to reduce her $100 indebtedness to Debtor by
$75, the amount Debtor owes her. 22 8 After the set-off, Rival Claimant
will owe Debtor only $25; Debtor will owe Rival Claimant nothing.
The problems in this Scenario arise because Secured Party has a
security interest on Debtor's title to Rival Claimant's obligation to
pay $100. By setting off, Rival Claimant reduces her debt by $75,
leaving Secured Party with a security interest on title to Rival Claimant's obligation to pay $25. In order to prevent this reduction in the
value of his collateral, Secured Party argues that the existence of his
security interest on Debtor's title to the $100 debt bars Rival Claimant from setting off.
To discuss this Scenario, I need to modify my terminology.
Rival Claimant's "claim," just described, is significantly different
from the "claims" we have seen in the three preceding Scenarios.
When Rival Claimant tries to set off, she asserts a power to reduce the
amount of her debt-she does not dispute that Debtor is vested with
title to the debt, that Secured Party has a security interest on title to
the debt, or that the security interest is senior to any other encumbrance on title to the debt. A successful set-off is analogous to other
228. Set-off is not permitted unless both debts are mature and liquidated. See Dwight L.
Greene, DepositAccounts as Bank Loan CollateralBeyond Setoff to Perfection-The Common
Law is Alive and Well, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 259, 278-83 (1990). My discussion assumes that

these conditions are satisfied.
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transactions in which Rival Claimant reduces the amount of her obligation, for example by paying Debtor $75 in cash or providing $75 in
services to Debtor. In none of these situations does she assert a rival
claim "to" any interest. Accordingly, it is better to avoid the name
"Rival Claimant." Let us rename Secured Party's antagonist
"Account Debtor," a term that lacks proprietary connotations and
reflects commercial usage.2 2 9 The following diagram incorporates this
new terminology.
time
Debtor
creation of security
intertest on Debtor's claim
against Account Debtor

A
D
t
\ Account Debtor attempts to
\set off against Debtor's claim

Secured Party

SAccount Debtor
Figure 4: Secured Party v. Account Debtor
Over the past fifteen years, there has been extensive commentary
on the question of whether Secured Party can prevent Account
Debtor from setting off.230 Section 9-201 declares a security interest
effective against "creditors, ' 23 ' and Account Debtor is necessarily a

creditor if she asserts a power to set off. According to the Received
View, this means that Secured Party is protected against Account
Debtor's attempt to reduce the amount of her obligation. Even courts
and commentators that allow Account Debtor to set off agree with
this interpretation of section 9-201; they ultimately contend, however,
that section 9-201 does Account Debtor no harm because of section 9104(i)'s declaration that Article 9 "does not apply ... to any right of
229. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(a) (defining "account debtor" as "the person who is
obligated on an account, chattel paper or general intangible.").
230. See, e.g., Robert H. Skilton, The Secured Party's Rights in a Debtor's Bank Account
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1977 S. ILL. U.L.J. 120 (1977); Stephen L.
Sepinuk, The Problems with Setoff: A Proposed Legislative Solution, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV.
51 (1988); Note, Conflicts Between Set-Offs and Article 9 Security Interests, 39 STAN. L. REV.
235 (1986).
231. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1987).
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'232

Secured Party's supporters, on the other hand, argue that
the "exclusion" of set-offs in section 9-104(i) does not really exempt
set-off.

set-offs from the effect of section 9-201.233

In my view, the entire controversy rests on the erroneous premise
that section 9-201 makes a security interest effective against "creditors." While the language of section 9-201 says precisely that, I
believe I have shown that section 9-201's real focus is subsequent
transferees.234 A successful set-off extinguishes all or part of Account
Debtor's obligation, but there is no "transfer" to Account Debtor.
Her dispute with Secured Party lies outside the presumption established in section 9-201. As a result, Account Debtor does not need
section 9-104(i)'s exclusion to block section 9-201: section 9-201 does
not apply against her in the first place.
If section 9-201 does not govern these cases, what law does? As
in the Scenarios involving antecedent transferees and antecedent
transferors, the rights of Secured Party depend on "other law"-in
this instance, the law of assignments of choses in action. Much of this
law has been codified in the U.C.C., specifically, in section 9-318(1).
Ironically, this means that Article 9 does actually resolve most of
these cases, but that section 9-201 plays no role in the analysis!
The difficulties with prevailing approaches can be attributed to
the fact that Article 9's codification of "other law" is not quite complete. To avoid unacceptable results, it is sometimes necessary to look
beyond Article 9 for the governing rule. This is problematic, however, if one believes that set-off cases fall within section 9-201, which
recognizes only the exceptions set out in the U.C.C. Under my analysis, we can apply non-Code law-which may be identical to section 9318(l)-with a clear conscience. It will also eliminate the confusion
that plagues current approaches.
A.

The ConventionalAnalysis and the Conventional Dilemma

As a general matter, someone vested with title to a chose in
action can transfer that title to another person. This capacity calls for
232. U.C.C. § 9-104(i) (1987). See, e.g., Citibank v. Interfirst Bank, 784 F.2d 619, 620-21
(5th Cir. 1986); Bank of Crystal Springs v. First Nat'l Bank, 427 So. 2d 968, 971 (Miss. 1983);
State Bank v. First Bank, 320 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Minn. 1982); Skilton, supra note 230, at 20405.
233. See, e.g., Southeastern Fin. Corp. v. Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 377 N.W.2d 900 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1985); Continental Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 251 Ga. 412, 414, 306 S.E.2d 285, 287
(1983); Citizens National Bank v. Bornstein, 374 So. 2d 2, 10 (Fla. 1979); Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank of Portageville, 358 F. Supp. 317, 325 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
234. See discussion of the meaning of "creditors" in the chattel mortgage acts and Article 9,
supra Part IV.B.2.
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rules to govern various "proprietary" controversies-e.g., disputes
between two purported assignees of title to a single chose. But the
transfer of a chose in action may also affect the person who is the
obligor with respect to the chose. Can the obligor assert against the
transferee claims and defenses she enjoyed against the transferor? In
particular, can she reduce her debt by setting off, even though title to
her debt has been assigned or encumbered in favor of a third person?
Translated into the terms of our Scenario, the question becomes: Can
Account Debtor set off Debtor's $75 debt against her $100 obligation
even though Debtor has granted Secured Party a security interest on
title to the $100 obligation?
Conventional analysis begins, as usual, with section 9-201.
Secured Party contends that his security interest is presumptively
effective "against creditors" under the Code, which implies that
Account Debtor is barred from setting off. Account Debtor's standard response is to point to section 9-104(i), which states that Article
9 "does not apply ...

to any right of set-off." This, she contends,

exempts her from section 9-201, despite her status as a "creditor."
Secured Party responds by claiming that Account Debtor is carrying
section 9-104(i) beyond its purpose. Security Party can point to
Grant Gilmore's famous discussion of section 9-104(i), in which he
observed that the exclusion of set-offs was intended to appease pusillanimous bankers, who feared that their traditional set-off powers
might be mistaken for security interests. 235 The purpose of section 9104(i)'s declaration that Article 9 does not apply to "any right of setoff" was simply to make it clear that banks (and other creditors) continue to enjoy their traditional set-off powers without having to bother
with security agreements and financing statements.236
This bit of history strongly suggests that the exclusion of set-offs
should not be taken literally. Recognizing that a set-off power is not a
security interest implies that provisions of Article 9 dealing with the
creation and perfection of security interests are irrelevant. It does not
mean that set-offs should be beyond the reach of provisions dealing
with priority. Hence, the exclusion in section 9-104(i) need not stand
235. 1 GILMORE, supra note 1, § 10.7, at 316.
236. Secured Party can also attack Account Debtor's expansive reading of § 9-104(i) by
observing that it cannot account for several other provision of the statute. Section 9-

306(4)(d)(i) states that, in the event of insolvency proceedings, a secured party has a perfected
security interest "in [certain commingled] cash and deposit accounts of the debtor," but that

this security interest is "subject to any right of set-off." U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(i) (1987). In such
cases, Article 9 is being applied to a set-off, notwithstanding § 9-104(i). The same problem
arises with respect to § 9-318(1)(b), which sets out circumstances in which "the rights of an
assignee" of an interest respecting a chose in action are "subject to" certain set-offs. See id.
§ 9-318 cmt. 1.
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in the way of our applying the fundamental rule of section 9-201.
This sounds ominous for Account Debtor because section 9-201, as
conventionally understood, creates a presumption that a security
interest is effective "against creditors"-including a creditor attempting to set off."
Nevertheless, Account Debtor is usually no worse off under section 9-201 than she would be under non-Code law. For even if we
adopt the Received View that there is a presumption in favor of
Secured Party, section 9-318(1)(b) appears to carve out an exception
in favor of Account Debtor. According to this provision, "the rights
of an assignee are subject to . . . any . . . defense or claim of the
account debtor against the assignor which accrues before the account
debtor receives notification of the assignment."2 a In a set-off case,
Debtor becomes an "assignor" when it grants a security interest to
Secured Party (the "assignee"). 23 8 The "account debtor"-the person
who owes the relevant obligation 2 39 -is Account Debtor. Because a
set-off power qualifies as a "claim or defense, ' '2 ° Account Debtor can
set off over the objection of Secured Party, provided that her power
"accrued" before she got notice of the security interest. This is not a
revolutionary result. As the Official Comment observes, section 9318(l)(b) "makes no substantial change in prior law," which held that
a transferee of an interest respecting a chose in action takes "subject
to defenses or set-offs existing before an account debtor is notified of
the assignment."' 24 ' As a result, it would seem to make little difference whether section 9-104(i) excludes set-offs from Article 9. If it
does, Account Debtor's rights should be determined under non-Code
law; if it does not, the case is governed by section 9-318(l)(b). The
result will probably be the same either way.
There is, however, a commercially important set of cases in
which a great deal seems to depend on whether section 9-201 applies
against a creditor attempting to set off. In these cases, the attempted
set-off relates to Account Debtor's obligation on a non-negotiable certificate of deposit ("NNCD"). 242 Suppose that Account Debtor has a
banking charter and that Debtor has deposited $100 with her in
237. Id. § 9-318(l)(b).
238. The Code's notion of "assignment" is generic-it corresponds to my "transfer," which

includes both assignments and encumbrances as I have defined them.
239. U.C.C. § 9-105(a) (1987).
240. Id. § 9-318 cmt. 1.
241. Id.
242. A certificate of deposit represents a debt owed by the issuing bank to its depositor. See
generally Steven L. Harris, Non-Negotiable Certificates of Deposit: An Article 9 Problem, 29
UCLA L. REV. 330 (1981).
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exchange for a $100 obligation evidenced by an NNCD. Debtor borrows $75 from Account Debtor, creating a mutual indebtedness. A
few months later, Debtor borrows $150 from Secured Party; to secure
repayment, Debtor grants Secured Party a security interest on title to
the NNCD. Debtor fails to make an interest payment on its $75 debt
to Account Debtor, who declares the loan in default and tries to set
off the $75 debt against her $100 debt on the NNCD. Secured Party,
fearing that the value of the NNCD is about to drop to $25, objects
loudly.
Under non-Code law, Account Debtor would probably be permitted to set off if her power accrued before she was notified of the
security interest.24 3 In view of section 9-318(l)(b), we should expect
the same rule to apply under Article 9, but it seems that Account
Debtor cannot invoke section 9-318(1)(b) in NNCD cases. Section 9318(1)(b) applies to an "account debtor," which section 9-105(l)(a)
defines as "the person who is obligated on an account, chattel paper
or general intangible."' 244 The problem for Account Debtor is that
non-negotiable certificates of deposit are classified as "instruments,"
and persons obligated on instruments are not included on section 9105(1)(a)'s list. If we take section 9-105(1)(a) at face value, Account
Debtor is not an "account debtor" for purposes of section 9-318(1)(b).
This seems to leave Account Debtor with no way to overcome section
9-201's alleged presumption against "creditors." She cannot call on
pre-Code law because exceptions to section 9-201 must be drawn from
the U.C.C. 245 According to this analysis, Secured Party always
prevails against Account Debtor in NNCD cases.
It is unclear why Account Debtor should have the benefit of setoff in cases involving accounts, chattel paper, and general intangibles,
but not in cases involving NNCDs. Indeed, it is ironic that she does
not. If Account Debtor had secured the NNCD obligation by granting Debtor a security interest on title to a drill press, she would have
been an obligor with respect to "chattel paper." As such, she would
qualify as an "account debtor" and therefore would be able to invoke
section 9-318(1)(b) as an "exception" to section 9-201. Account
Debtor, in other words, would seem to fare better against Secured
Party if she granted Debtor a security interest than if she had not.
One must question why Account Debtor should have to grant a secur243. See, e.g., In re Multiponics Inc., 622 F.2d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 1980); Kaufman v. First
Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 1070, 1071-72 (5th Cir. 1974).

244. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(a) (1987).
245. Id. § 9-201.
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ity interest in order to preserve her set-off power as against Secured
Party.
At the same time, it is hard to understand why Secured Party
should prevail if he has not actually notified Account Debtor of his
security interest. But that is the result if we adopt a categorical view
of section 9-201 and deny Account Debtor the protection of section 9318(1).
To avoid gratuitously awarding victory to Secured Party in such
situations, some courts and commentators accept Account Debtor's
expansive interpretation of section 9-104(i).246 If set-off issues are
completely excluded from Article 9, the dispute can be settled under
non-Code law, which usually provides a close substitute for section 9318(1)(b).24 7 Account Debtor can expect to win if her set-off power

accrued before she learned of Secured Party's encumbrance.
The conventional analysis leads to a dilemma. To reach substantively reasonable results in NNCD cases, we must apply non-Code
law. But to do this, we must accept Account Debtor's implausibly
broad reading of section 9-104(i). The alternative is to interpret section 9-104(i) narrowly and leave Account Debtor at the mercy of section 9-201. In that case, Secured Party always prevails, at least if the
NNCD obligation is unsecured. Both these approaches are unsatisfactory, which suggests that there is something fundamentally wrong
with an analysis that assumes that section 9-201 applies against a
creditor attempting to exercise a power to set-off.
B. A ProposedAnalysis
To resolve the dilemma created by conventional analysis of the
Set-Off Scenario, we need only recognize section 9-201 for what it is:
a codification of the Encumbrance Rule as it applies in favor of
secured parties against subsequent transferees. In setting off, Account
Debtor does not become Debtor's transferee. She can reduce the
amount of her obligation to Debtor without denying that Secured
Party has a security interest on Debtor's title to her obligation and
that this security interest is "effective" against Debtor's subsequent
transferees. Despite section 9-201's use of "creditors," Account
Debtor's dispute with Secured Party lies outside the scope of that
provision.
If section 9-201 does not apply to set-off disputes, we are free to
apply whatever law does speak to the issue. When Account Debtor
246. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
247. See U.C.C. § 9-318 cmt. 1 (1987).
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meets the statutory definition of "account debtor," section 9-318(1)(b)
determines whether she will be permitted to set off. When, as in
NNCD cases, Account Debtor falls between the definitional cracks,
we look to non-Code law, which is likely to be consistent with section
9-318(l)(b). Hence, we can reject Account Debtor's dubious contention that section 9-104(i) completely excludes set-offs from Article 9.
Following Gilmore, we can interpret the "exclusion" of set-offs as
nothing more than a statement of the obvious fact that a set-off power
is not a security interest. 4 s But we need not follow courts and commentators into the difficulties that result when section 9-201 is held to
apply against creditors attempting to set off.
VII.

CONCLUSION: AN "OLD-NEW" ARTICLE

9

The Received View radically misconceives the scope of section 9201 and Article 9's entire relationship to other law. Yet there should
be no rush to blame the confusion on either the drafters of the statute
or on its subsequent interpreters. The text of actual Article 9 frequently omits temporal and other qualifications that would establish
that its exclusive subject is disputes between secured parties and subsequent transferees. But language that seems vague today would have
been unproblematic to a drafting team working in the 1940s and '50s.
Lawyers and academics who had spent their careers with the chattel
mortgage acts would have understood the limited reference of "purchasers of the collateral" and "creditors" in section 9-201.249 Property-transfer law, with its characteristic pattern of baselines and
exceptional rules favoring certain subsequent or purported transferees, provided the schema by which the drafters understood their
world. Although the drafters of Article 9 intended to change this
world, the validity of the schema was never in question. It is precisely
because the schema was so strong that the actual text of Article 9 is
rather careless in observing its implications.
Forty years later, the intellectual world of secured transactions is
no longer dominated by the chattel mortgage acts and the concepts of
248. 1 GILMORE, supra note 1, § 10.7, at 316.
249. I have discovered only one explicit reference to this in the early literature. See Hogan,
supra note 7, at 591 ("Section 9-201 does state that the security agreement is valid as against
third parties except as otherwise provided in Article 9. This provision seems to be directed at
third parties asserting their rights to the goods subsequent to the creation and perfection of the
security interest.") (emphasis added). It would be more accurate to omit the reference to
perfection. Section 9-201, after all, applies against subsequent transferees even if their claims
arise before perfection; it is the job of the exceptional rules (Article 9's "priority rules") to
protect a post-attachment, but pre-perfection, transferee. Also note that what should matter
is the date on which the purported "rights to the goods" arose, not the date on which they
were asserted.
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traditional conveyancing. Instead, it is Article 9 itself on which every
commercial lawyer cuts her teeth. The irony is that the "modem"
commentator is often blind to the pervasive structural continuity
between the ancient acts and Article 9. Received methodologies,
which focus on Article 9 as just one more part of the U.C.C., exacerbate the problem: no amount of reflection on the text of the Code or
its "underlying policies" can substitute for an accurate understanding
of Article 9's place within property-transfer law. Only through the
kind of conceptual reconstruction undertaken in this paper does such
an understanding become possible.
The first task, however, is to clear up the confusions in current
Article 9 jurisprudence. There is no reason that working lawyers and
judges should have to recapitulate our lengthy journey every time
they reach for Article 9. To keep them on track, we need to remove
several key ambiguities that-from our contemporary perspective, at
least-vitiate the text. The best way to rehabilitate the "old" Code
from the ravages of the Received View is a dose of innovation. I offer
250
the following proposals.
Section 9-201 should be revised to presume a security interest
effective "against subsequent transferees of the encumbered interest,
including subsequent purchasers and subsequent judicial lien creditors." Such redrafting should preclude any claim that the Code creates a presumption effective against antecedent transferees, and
should eliminate the pressure to enlist the Article 9 priority rules on
their behalf. 251 Still, to be on the safe side, section 9-301(l)(b) should
be amended to state that "an unperfected security interest is
subordinate to the rights of ...a person who subsequently becomes a
lien creditor, but does so before the security interest is perfected."
Sections 9-301(l)(c) and (1)(d) should be redrafted to protect not just
buyers, but any type of "purchaser" who is not a secured party. Once
again, the statute should make it clear that these exceptions exist for
the sake of subsequent purchasers. In cases involving antecedent judicial lien creditors or antecedent purchasers, we must look to law
outside Article 9 and even outside the Code. The Official Comments
should give some indication of this.
Because there is no danger of applying the wrong law in disputes
between two secured parties, it is not strictly necessary to revise section 9-312(5)(a). Still, the fact that the first-to-file-or-perfect rule is
not cast as an exception to section 9-201 only promotes confusion. I
250. The suggested language is only illustrative.
251. The use of "transferees" should also prevent the inappropriate invocation of section 9201 against creditors attempting to set off.
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have suggested how this "revision" might be achieved.252 While we
are at it, we should delete section 9-312(5)(b). The rule that, in a
conflict between two unperfected security interests, the first to attach
takes priority is superfluous; we should recognize this as the normal
result under section 9-201.
What is needed in such cases is a statement in Article 9 that the
security interest is effective against the person who is actually vested
with the targeted interest, even if that person is not a party to the
security agreement. Section 9-201 should be amended to state precisely that. Section 9-203(l)(c), in turn, should state that a security
interest cannot attach unless the debtor (here meaning the person purporting to grant the security interest) has a power under applicable
law to encumber the interest in question.
Amending section 9-201 to focus on the person vested with the
targeted interest and subsequent transferees will also eliminate the
current reference to "creditors." This will undercut any claim that a
secured party is presumed to have a power to block an attempted setoff because the account debtor is a "creditor" under section 9-201. In
cases involving nonnegotiable certificates of deposit, this will relieve
the considerable pressure for account debtors to argue, and courts to
hold, that section 9-104(i)'s exclusion of setoffs applies across the
board.
There is currently movement to reexamine and possibly improve
Article 9.253 While the statute should certainly be brought up to date,

we also have an opportunity to answer some fundamental questions
about the scope and structure of Article 9. To do so, however, we
must grasp a conceptual framework that is older than the statute
itself.

252. See discussion supra Part III.D.
253. U.C.C. art. 9 (Report of the Permanent Editorial Board Study Group, Dec. 1, 1992).

